Report On Consideration Of Sessional Paper No. 3 Of 2025 On Partial Divestiture In Safaricom

A report of Finance And National Planning (National Assembly)

Published: March 2026 · 13th

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THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTEENTHPARLIAMENT-FIFTHSESSION-2O26

DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND NATIONALPLANNING AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PUBLICDEBT AND PRIVATIZATION

JOINT REPORT ON:

THE CONSIDERATIONOF THE SESSIONALPAPER NO.3 OF 2025 ON THE PARTIALDIVESTITURE IN SAFARICOMPLCBY GOVERNMENT OF KENYA

Published by:

The Directorate ofDepartmental Committees Clerk's Chambers Parliament Buildings NAIROBI

MARCH2026

| ANNEXURES | ANNEXURES | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----| | EXECUTIVESUMMARY | EXECUTIVESUMMARY | 8 | | CHAPTERONE | CHAPTERONE | 13 | | 1.0 | PREFACE | 13 | | 1.1 | Introduction | 13 | | 1.2 Establishmentand MandateoftheDepartmental Committee on Finance and National Planning... | 1.2 Establishmentand MandateoftheDepartmental Committee on Finance and National Planning... | 13 | | 1.3 | Establishment and Mandate of the Select Committee on Public Debt and Privatization... | 16 | | CHAPTERTWO | CHAPTERTWO | 19 | | 2.0OVERVIEWOFTHESESSIONALPAPERNO.3OF2025ONTHE PROPOSEDDIVESTITUREINSAFARICOMPLCBYTHEGOVERNMENT OF KENYA | 2.0OVERVIEWOFTHESESSIONALPAPERNO.3OF2025ONTHE PROPOSEDDIVESTITUREINSAFARICOMPLCBYTHEGOVERNMENT OF KENYA | 19 | | 2.0Background | 2.0Background | 19 | | 2.1 RoleofParliamentin Consideration of Sessional Papers | 2.1 RoleofParliamentin Consideration of Sessional Papers | 20 | | 2.2 Performance of Safaricom PLC:Company Profile and Shareholding Structure. | 2.2 Performance of Safaricom PLC:Company Profile and Shareholding Structure. | 21 | | 2.3 Trend in Share Prices Since Inception | 2.3 Trend in Share Prices Since Inception | 22 | | 2.4 | Reviewof Safaricom PLC'sHistorical Financial Performance...... 24 | | | 2.5 | Trend in Government Revenues from Dividends | .25 | | 2.6 | Importance of Partial Divestiture in Relation to Safaricom PLC..27 | | | CHAPTERTHREE | CHAPTERTHREE | 28 | | 3.0 PUBLICPARTICIPATIONANDSTAKEHOLDERENGAGEMENTON THESESSIONALPAPER | 3.0 PUBLICPARTICIPATIONANDSTAKEHOLDERENGAGEMENTON THESESSIONALPAPER | 28 | | 3.1THENATIONALTREASURY | 3.1THENATIONALTREASURY | 28 | | 3.2CAPITALMARKETAUTHORITY(CMA). | 3.2CAPITALMARKETAUTHORITY(CMA). | 36 | | 3.3NAIROBISECURITIESEXCHANGE(NSE) | 3.3NAIROBISECURITIESEXCHANGE(NSE) | 37 | | 3.4COMPETITIONAUTHORITYOFKENYA(CAK) | 3.4COMPETITIONAUTHORITYOFKENYA(CAK) | 39 | | 3.5COMMUNICATIONAUTHORITYOFKENYA(CA)... | 3.5COMMUNICATIONAUTHORITYOFKENYA(CA)... | 40 | | 3.6OFFICE OF THEATTORNEYGENERALOF KENYA(AG) | 3.6OFFICE OF THEATTORNEYGENERALOF KENYA(AG) | 41 | | 3.7CENTRALBANKOFKENYA(CBK). | 3.7CENTRALBANKOFKENYA(CBK). | 42 |

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

| 3.8OFFICE OF THEDATAPROTECTIONCOMMISSIONER | 44 | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------| | 3.9 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL(OAG) | 45 | | 3.10PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORYAUTHORITY(PPRA).... | 46 | | 3.11INSTITUTE OFCERTIFIED PUBLICACCOUNTANTS OF KENYA (ICPAK).. | 46 | | 3.12 KENYA BANKERS ASSOCIATION(KBA).. | 48 | | 3.13THEKENYAASSOCIATIONOFSTOCKBROKERSANDINVESTMENT BANKS (KASIB). | .49 | | 3.14LAWSOCIETY OF KENYA(LSK) | 50 | | 3.15 ANDERSENLLP | 51 | | 3.16SAFARICOMPLC | 52 | | 3.17INSTITUTE OFCERTIFIED INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL ANALYSTS(ICIFA).. | 53 | | 3.19AIRTELKENYA | | | | .55 | | 3.20JAMIITELCOM(JTL) | 55 | | 3.21SAFARICOMDEALERS'ASSOCIATION 3.22 SAFARICOMDEALERS(CHECHE TELECOMM,CASHCOMLIMITED, | 57 | | KILIMANJARO LTD,EDTON TECH,SABENALTD,EAST ZONE... | ...58 | | 3.23 TRANSCENDMEDIA GROUPLIMITED | .59 | | 3.24 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL AND KATIBA INSTITUTE..... 60 | | | 3.26 WECARE CBO | 3.25 KENYA NATIONALCHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANDINDUSTRY....62 | | | 63 | | 3.27 THE INSTITUTE OFSOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY(TISA) | 64 | | 3.28OPERATIONLINDAJAMII-PROF.FRED OGOLA | 65 | | 3.3O CONSUMER FEDERATION OF KENYA(COFEK).. | 68 | | 3.31COMMUNICATIONWORKERS UNION(COWU-K).. | 69 | | 3.32 KENYA NATIONALMICRO AND SMALLMANUFACTURERSERVICE PROVIDERS UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION(KENAMISMASPU).. | ..69 | | 3.34 HON.NDINDINYORO,CBS,MP | 71 |

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

1.ThisReportcontainstheproceedingsof theJointCommitteesonFinance andNationalPlanningandPublicDebtandPrivatizationpursuantto StandingOrderNo.202oftheNationalAssemblyintheirconsiderationof SessionalPaperNo.3of2025ontheProposedPartialDivestitureofthe GovernmentofKenya'sshareholdinginSafaricomPLC.

2. SessionalPaperNo.3of2025wastabledintheNationalAssemblyon Thursday,4th December 2025,and subsequently committed to the Departmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningand theSelect Committeeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationfor jointconsiderationand reportingtotheHouse.PursuanttoArticle1i8oftheConstitutionofKenya, 2010,the Joint Committeeundertookpublicparticipation,including the 2026,invitingsubmissionsfromstakeholdersandmembersofthepublic.

Further to this,the Joint Committee,vide letters Ref.Nos. NA/DDC/F&NP/2025/103,NA/DDC/F&NP/2025/104,NA/DDC/F&NP/20 25/105,NA/DDC/F&NP/2025/106,NA/DDC/F&NP/2025/107andNA/DD C/F&NP/2025/110dated 15thDecember 2025,invitedstakeholders to appearbeforeitforhearingsscheduledbetween 2ndand 10thFebruary 2026.

4. Subsequently,theNationalAssembly,videletterreferences NA/DDC/F&NP/2026/002,NA/DDC/F&NP/2026/003,NA/DDC/F&NP/20 26/004,NA/DDC/F&NP/2026/006,NA/DDC/F&NP/2026/005,NA/DDC/F &NP/2026/007,NA/DDC/F&NP/2026/008andNA/DDC/F&NP/2026/009 dated5thJanuary2026,rescheduledthemeetingsandinvitedstakeholders toappearbeforetheJointCommitteebetween13thand21stJanuary2026.

5.During this period,the Joint Committee engaged seventy-eight (78) professional associations,private sector entities,civil societyorganisations, labourrepresentatives,and industryplayers.
6.Inaddition,theJointCommitteeconducted publicparticipation forums across3Ocountiestoreceiveviewsfrommembersofthepubliconthe proposed divestiture.These engagements enabled citizens to express their perspectives on valuation,fiscal implications,governance,employment, competition,consumer protection,data sovereignty,and national security considerationsarisingfrom thetransaction.In total,theJointCommittee held thirty-two(32) sittings,comprising both in-house deliberations and stakeholder engagements,to interrogate the Sessional Paper and review writtenandoralsubmissions.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

7. UponconsiderationofSessionalPaperNo.3of2025ontheproposedpartial divestitureoftheGovernmentofKenya'sfifteenpercent(15%)shareholding in Safaricom PLC to Vodacom Group,and having reviewed submissions receivedfromforty-threestakeholderorganizationsandinstitutionstogether with views from public participation hearings conducted across thirty counties,theJointCommitteecarefullyevaluated theeconomic,fiscal,legal, governance,and national securityimplications of the transaction. 8. TheJoint Committee observed that,the National Treasury in November, 2025enlistedtheservicesofKCBInvestmentBankLtdtoundertakeafull independentvaluationofSafaricomPLCshares.Inarrivingattheproposed offerpriceofKES34.00pershareforSafaricomPLC,thevaluationemployed variousvaluationmethodologies. 9. Thevaluation exercise applied several recognized approaches,includingthe Discounted Cash Flow(DCF),Discounted Dividend Model (DDM), EV/EBITDA tradingmultiples,and Price-to-Earnings (P/E) multiples.These methodologiescollectivelyproducedavaluationrangebasedonprojected cash flows,dividends,comparable market data,and historical trading performance.While the useofmultiplemethodologies strengthened the technicalrobustnessoftheexercise,theJointCommitteeemphasized that timelydisclosureofkeyassumptionsandindependentfairness confirmationsisessentialintransactionsinvolvingstrategicpublicassetsin publicinterest. 4. 10.Withregardtopricingandmarketdevelopments,theJointCommitteenoted thatatthetimeofexecutionoftheagreementand thetablingoftheSessional PaperinDecember2025,SafaricomPLC'ssix-monthVolumeWeighted AveragePricestoodatapproximatelyKSh.27.50pershare.Thenegotiated transactionpriceofKsh.34.o0persharethereforerepresentedapremium multiples.TheJointCommitteefurtherobservedthattheSafaricomshare pricesubsequentlyappreciatedtoapproximatelyKSh.33.95pershareby proposed divestiture andthe Company'sinterimdividend declaration. Notwithstandingthis upwardmovement,the six-month volume-weighted averagepriceasofFebruary2026remainedatapproximatelyKSh.29.95 per share.Therefore,itis theJoint Committee's view,thenegotiatedprice reflectsapremiumabovehistoricalmarkettradinglevelsandalignswith potentialundervaluation.

JointReportof theDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningand theSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

I1.On theissueofbuyeridentificationand thecompetitiveprocess,theJoint Committee considered public concerns regarding whether alternative s theproposedpurchaser.TheJointCommitteenoted thatnegotiatingwithan existing strategic shareholder minimizes executionrisk,preservesmarket confidence,and avoidspotentialgovernanceinstability thatmayarisefrom introducinganewcontrollingorinfluentialshareholder.TheCommittee further observed that alternative disposalmethods,including a public offering or cross-listing,could have introduced additional marketvolatility, currencyrisks,andpotentialdownwardpressureon thesharepricedueto increased supplyin the market.In theJoint Committee's view,engaging VodacomGroupprovidedtransactioncertaintyandstabilityin corporate governance.Nevertheless,the Committee underscored the importance of documentingtherationaleforbuyerselectioninfuturedivestituresinorder to enhance transparency and strengthenpublic confidence.
12.TheJointCommittee alsoobservedthattheSessional Paperdid not sufficientlyclarifyentitlementtodividendsdeclaredforthe2025financial SafaricomPLC'sfinancialyearendon31stMarch2026.TheJointCommittee notedthatunderSection 142ofthe CompaniesAct,dividendsarepayable toshareholders registered at the time ofdeclarationunless otherwise GovernmentofKenyaheldthesharesthroughoutthe2025financialyear,it remainslegallyentitled toanydividendsdeclaredforthatperiod.TheJoint Committeethereforeemphasizedthatthetransactionstructuremustclearly indicatewhetheritisexecutedonanex-dividendorcum-dividendbasisto avoid ambiguityregarding theeffectiveconsideration payabletothe Government.
13.Given SafaricomPLC'ssystemicimportancetothenationaleconomy,the JointCommitteefurtherconsideredissuesrelatingtonationalsecurityand digitalinfrastructure.Safaricom'stelecommunicationsnetworks and financial servicesplatforms,particularlyM-PESA,which serves over thirtytwo million active users andprocesses approximatelyninety-fivepercent of retail digital 1paymentsinKenya,constitutecriticalinformation infrastructure.TheJointCommitteenotedthatexistingstatutorysafeguards under theComputerMisuseand CybercrimesAct,theDataProtectionAct, and theConstitution ofKenyawill continueto applyfollowingthe divestiture. Theseframeworksrequiretheprotectionofpersonaldata,thereportingof cyber threats,and the safeguarding of critical digitalinfrastructure.The JointCommitteethereforeemphasizedthattheproposeddivestituremust not compromise data sovereignty,national security,or the resilience of Kenya'sdigitalfinancialecosystem.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

I4.TheJointCommitteealsoexaminedissuesofbusinesscontinuityandthe sustainabilityof Safaricom'sshared prosperitymodel.Safaricom's operations supportavastecosystem ofdealers,agents,and digitalservice providers,encompassingover855,000directemployeesandmorethantwo millionphysical anddigital touchpoints across the country.The Joint Committee observed that disruptions to tariff structures,commission frameworks,or servicedeliverycould adverselyaffectboth thedistribution networkandconsumerswhorelyondigitalfinancialservices.Itwasfurther employmentprotection,retention of Kenyan leadership,and continued supportforsocialimpactinitiatives,thesecommitmentswerenotexplicitly incorporatedintotheSharePurchaseAgreement.TheJointCommittee thereforeemphasizedthatsuchsafeguardsmustbeformallyincorporated intothelegallybinding agreementto ensure enforceabilityandtoprotect employees,partners,and communities that depend on Safaricom's ecosystem.
15.WithrespecttotheproposedKSh.40.2billionupfrontpaymentinlieuof theJointCommitteeundertookananalysisofthefinancialimplicationsof thearrangement.TheCommitteeobservedthatalthough theGovernment wouldrepayKSh.55billioninsixyears,thepresentvalueofthatobligation when discounted atprevailing market rates is approximately Ksh.29.3 billion,comparedwiththeimmediatereceiptofKSh.40.2billion.Onboth present-valueandfuture-valueanalyses,theJointCommitteefoundthatthe immediateliquiditywhilemaintainingarepaymentobligation thatisbelow themarket-determinedcostoffunds.
I6.TheJointCommitteefurtherobservedthattheproceedsfromthetransaction areintended tobering-fencedexclusivelyforinvestmentincommercially viable infrastructure projects,including energy,transport,water,airports, and seaports.The Committeeemphasized that theseproceedsshould not be appliedtorecurrentexpenditurebutinsteaddirectedtowardlong-term national development priorities,including the completion of ongoing initiativesandinvestmentsguidedbynationaldemandandcommercial viability.TheJointCommitteefurthernotedthattheuseoftheseresources willremainsubjecttooversightbytheNationalAssemblyundertheproposed NationalInfrastructureFundframework.
17.Having carefully consideredtheSessionalPaper,s stakeholder representations,andthe applicablelegal andregulatory frameworks,the JointCommitteeresolved torecommend thattheHouseapproveSessional PaperNo.3of2025ontheProposedPartialDivestitureinSafaricomPLCby the GovernmentofKenya,subject to several conditions.Theseinclude that

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya theeffectivedateofapprovalshallbe1stApril2026orsuchlaterdateupon receiptofall regulatory approvals required under the Share Purchase Agreement;that theGovernmentshallreceive theKSh.40.2billionupfront paymentasprovidedundertheDividendPurchaseAgreement;thatall proceedsfromthesharesaleshallbedepositedintothe National Infrastructure Fund;and that no acquisition-related redundancies shall occur within five years of the transaction while preserving the shared prosperity business model that supports dealers,agents,and business actorswithintheSafaricomecosystem.

18.TheJoint Committee expressesitsgratitude to theOfficeof theSpeaker and the Office of the Clerk of the NationalAssembly for the logistical and technical supportprovided throughouttheinquiry.TheJointCommitteealso acknowledgesthededicationandcommitmentoftheMembersoftheJoint of this assignment.
19.It is therefore my pleasant duty and privilege,on behalf of the Joint CommitteesonFinanceandNationalPlanningandthatonPublicDebtand Privatization,to present thisReport on the consideration of Sessional Paper No.3of2025ontheProposedPartialDivestitureinSafaricomPLCbythe GovernmentofKenyaforconsiderationandadoptionbytheHouse.

Hon.FCPA Kuria Kimani,C.B.S,M.P. Chairperson, Departmental Committee on Finance and National Planning

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

Hon.Abdi Shurie,CBS,M.P Chairperson Select Committee on PublicDebt&Privatization

1.0 PREFACE

1.1 Introduction

20.Thisis thereportoftheJointCommitteesonFinanceandNational Planning andPublicDebt&PrivatizationonitsconsiderationoftheSessionalPaper No.3of2025ontheproposedPartialDivestitureinSafaricomPLCbythe ManagementAct,2015.

1.2 Establishment and Mandate of the Departmental Committee on Finance and National Planning

21.The DepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceand National Planningis establishedpursuanttostandingorder216whosemandatespursuantto thestandingorder216(5)areasfollows-
(a)Toinvestigate,inquireinto,andreporton allmattersrelatingto the mandate,management,activities,administration,operations and estimatesoftheassignedministriesanddepartments;
(b) To study theprogramme andpolicy objectives ofministriesand departmentsandtheeffectivenessoftheimplementation;
(c)onaquarterlybasis,monitorandreportontheimplementationof thenationalbudgetinrespectofitsmandate;
(d)Tostudy andreviewalllegislationreferred toit;
(e)Tostudy,assess andanalyse therelative successof theministries anddepartmentsasmeasuredbytheresultsobtainedascompared withtheirstatedobjectives;
(f)TovetandreportonallappointmentswheretheConstitutionorany lawrequirestheNationalAssemblytoapprove,exceptthoseunder StandingOrder204(CommitteeonAppointments);
(g)Toexaminetreaties,agreementsand conventions;
(h)Tomakereportsandrecommendations to theHouseasoftenas possible,includingrecommendationofproposedlegislation;
(i)To consider reportsof Commissions and Independent Offices submitted totheHousepursuantto theprovisionsofArticle254of theConstitution;and
(i)Toexamine anyquestionsraisedbyMemberson amatterwithinits mandate.

CHAPTER ONE

1.2.1 Committee Membership

22.TheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningcomprises thefollowingMembers

Chairperson

UDA Party

Hon.FCPA Kuria Kimani,CBS,MP Molo Constituency

Vice-Chairperson

UDA Party

Hon.(Amb.)FCPA LangatBenjaminKipkirui,CBS,MP Ainamoi Constituency

Members

Hon.Peter Kaluma,CBS,MP HomaBayTown Constituency

Hon.Sunkuyia,R.George,MP KajiadoWest Constituency

ODM Party

UDA Party

Hon.FCPA Oyula,JosephH.Maero,MP Butula Constituency

Hon.(Dr.)FCPAArikoJohnNamoit,MP TurkanaSouth Constituency

ODM Party

Hon.Mboni,David Mwalika,MP KituiRural Constituency

Hon.Sheikh Umul Sheikh,MP Mandera County

WDM Party

UDM Party

Hon.OkuomeAdipoAndrew,MP Karachuonyo Constituency

Hon.CPA Rutto Julius Kipletting,MP Kesses Constituency

ODM Party

UDA Party

Hon. Chiforomodo, Munga, MP Lunga Lunga Constituency

Hon.Betty N.Maina,MP Murang'a County UDA Party

UDM Party

1.2.2 CommitteeSecretariat

23. TheFinanceandNationalPlanningCommitteeisfacilitatedbythe following staff:

Mr.Benjamin Magut

Principal Clerk Assistant II /Head of Secretariat

| Ms.Jennifer Ndeto DeputyDirector Legal Services | Mr.Benson Kamande Clerk Assistant III | |---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------| | Mr.SalemLorot Senior Legal Counsel | Ms.WinfredKambua Clerk Assistant III | | Ms.Penninah Simiren Legal Counsel II | Mr.George Ndenjeshe Fiscal Analyst II | | Mr.JamesMacharia Media Relations Officer | Mr.Benson Muthuri Assistant Serjeant-At-Arms | | Ms.JoyceWachera Hansard Reporter II | Ms.NellyW.Ondieki Research Officer III | | Mr.Mwangi Muchiri Audio Officer III | |

1.3 Establishment and Mandate of the Select Committee on PublicDebt and Privatization

24.ThepowersofeachHouseofParliamenttoestablishcommitteesandtomake StandingOrdersfortheorderlyconductofitsproceedingsareprovidedfor under Article 124of the Constitution ofKenya,2010.To ensureeffective oversight on matters concerningpublic debt,debtguarantees,public-private partnerships,andtheprivatizationofnationalassets,theNationalAssembly StandingOrder207AestablishesthePublicDebtandPrivatization Committee,whichistaskedwith specificmandatessuchas:
i. Oversightofpublic debtandguarantees,pursuanttoArticle214of theConstitution
ii. Examine matters relating to debt guarantees by the National government;
ii. OversightConsolidatedFundServicesexcludingauditedaccounts;
iv. Examinereportsonthestatusoftheeconomyinrespectofthepublic debt;
V. Oversight ofpublic-privatepartnership programs by the national governmentwithrespectofthepublicdebt;and
Vi. Oversightofprivatizationofnationalassets
25.This Committeeis thereforemandated,amongother functions,toexamine theConsolidatedFundServiceExpendituresandproposerecommendations totheHouseforadoption.

1.3.1 Committee Membership

26.ThePublicDebtand PrivatizationCommitteeascurrentlyconstituted, comprisesthefollowingMembersofParliament:-

CHAIRPERSON

Hon.Abdi Shurie, CBS,M.P. BalambalaConstituency Jubilee Party

VICE-CHAIRPERSON

Hon.Njoki Irene Mrembo,M.P Bahati Constituency

Jubilee Party

Hon.OmbokoMilembaM.P Emuhaya Constituency

Hon.(CPA) Suleka,H.Harun.M.P NominatedMP

ANC Party

UDM Party

Hon.(Dr.)Irene Kasalu M.P Kitui County

Hon.KipkorosJosephMakilapM.P BaringoNorth Constituency

Wiper Party

UDA Party

Hon.Kwenya,Thuku Zachary,M.P Kinangop Constituency

Hon.Chege Njuguna M.P Kandara Constituency

Jubilee Party

UDA Party

Hon.Muiruri Muthama Stanley,M.P LamuWest Constituency

Hon.AbdiAliAbdi,M.P ljaraConstituency

Jubilee Party

NAP-K

Hon.AdenDaud,EBS,M.P WajirEast Constituency

Hon.Kirwa Abraham Kipsang,M.P Mosop Constituency

Jubilee Party

UDA Party

Hon.(Dr.) DanielManduku,M.P NyaribariMasabaConstituency

Hon.Letipila DominicEli,M.P Samburu North Constituency UDA Party

ODM Party

Hon.BarongoNolfasonObadiah,M.P BomachogeBorabuConstituency ODM Party

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

1.3.2 CommitteeSecretariat

27.TheCommitteeissupportedbythefollowingSecretariat:

Mr.Chacha Machage

Senior Fiscal Analyst / Clerk Assistant

Mr.JobMugalavai

Ms.JulieMwithiga

Fiscal AnalystIl/ ClerkAssistant

Senior Fiscal Analyst

Ms.Audrey Ogutu

Mr.Timothy Chiko

Legal Counsel 1I

Research Officer III

Ms.Edith Chepngeno

Ms.MwanaashaJuma

Media Relations OfficerIII

AssistantSerjeant-at-Arms

Mr.DantonNirvana

Audio Officer III

CHAPTER TWO

2.O OVERVIEW OF THE SESSIONAL PAPER NO.3 OF 2O25 ON THE PROPOSED DIVESTITURE IN SAFARICOM PLC BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA

2.0 Background

28.SessionalPaperNo.3of2025wastabledintheNationalAssemblyon Thursday,4th December 2025,and subsequently committed to the DepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelect Committee onPublicDebtand Privatization for jointconsiderationand reportingtotheHouse.
29.SessionalPaperNo.3of2025seeksapprovaloftheNationalAssemblyon theGovernment'splantosell15%ofitssharesinSafaricomPLC,whilestill keepingaminoritystakein thecompany.Itisanchoredunder section87A Government shares in government-linked corporations.Under this framework,suchasalerequiresCabinetapprovalinformedby theNational SafaricomSessionalPaperbroadlysatisfies.
30.In addition,the amended frameworkrequires approval of the National Assemblythroughaformalresolutionfollowingsubmissionoftheproposal bytheCabinetSecretary
31.Theproposedpartial divestitureof theGoK'sshareholdinginSafaricomPLC aspartofitsbroaderfiscalconsolidationanddivestitureobjectives.Theplan involvesthesaleofa15%staketotheVodacomgroupatanestimatedKES 204billion,receiptofanupfrontadvancedividendofKEs40billion,andthe
32.Thisstructureisdesignedtoprovideimmediatefiscalrelief while maintainingGovernmentinfluenceoverastrategicallyimportantenterprise. Safaricom'sgovernance andsafeguardsnationalstrategicinterests, includingoversightofcriticaldigitalinfrastructureandfinancialinclusion platforms such asM-Pesa.The proposed divestiture alsoreflects efforts to balancefiscalobjectiveswithcapitalmarketdevelopment,privatesector participation,and investor confidence.
33.The Government intends to allocate proceeds from the divestiture of Safaricomtowardskeynationalpriorities.Partofthefundswillsupportthe portionwillbedirectedtotheInfrastructureFund,targetingcriticalsectors such as roads,energy,and digital networks. Additionally,proceeds will

promoteintergenerationalequity.

34.Thisallocationrepresentsthefirststepin theGovernment'sbroadervision tochannelresources into strategicinfrastructureinvestment priorities, including energy,roads,water,and airports.Investment in these priority sectorsisintendedtoensurethatinfrastructurebecomesapowerfulcatalyst for economicgrowth,facilitates the achievementofstrategicnationalgoals, projects.

2.1Role ofParliament in ConsiderationofSessional Papers

35.TheSessionalPaperrecognisesParliament'sconstitutional andlegalrolein overseeing thedisposal ofpublic assets,including the proposed saleof GovernmentsharesinSafaricomPLC.UndertheConstitutionofKenya (201o),Parliamenthastheresponsibilitytosafeguardpublicresourcesand publicinterest.
36.Inparticular,Article95(2)and Article95(4)(c)ofthe Constitutiongive the National Assembly the mandate to represent the people and exercise oversightovernationalgovernmentexpenditureandStateorgans.Further, Article 201(a)and (d)requires thatpublicfinance bemanaged inan open, accountable,and responsible manner.Together,these provisions require thatanydecision todisposeofavaluablepublicasset,suchasSafaricom reinforces the principle thatmattersrelatingtopublicfinance mustbe
37.The PublicFinance ManagementAct further strengthens Parliament's oversightrole.Section 12(1)assignsParliamentresponsibilityforoverseeing publicfinancialmanagement toensure accountabilityand transparency. Sections 5o(1) and (2) require the National Treasury to manage public finances subjectto Parliamentary oversight,whileSections 203and 204 providethatpublicassetsmayonlybedisposedofinaccordancewith the lawandinamanner thatensuresvalueformoney.Theseprovisionsmake itclearthattheproposeddivestitureofSafaricomsharescannotproceed withoutParliamentaryreviewandaccountability.
38.Section74ofthePrivatizationAct2025introducedamendmentstothe PublicFinanceManagementAct through the insertionof Section87A, establishinga specificmechanism for the saleof Governmentsharesin government-linked corporations.Under thisframework,such a salerequires

financialimplications,arequirementthat the Safaricom SessionalPaper broadlysatisfies.

39.In addition, the amended framework requires approval of the National Assemblythroughaformalresolutionfollowingsubmissionoftheproposal by theCabinetSecretary.The tablingofSessionalPaperNo.3of2025, therefore,alignswith the statutoryprocessfor authorising thedisposalof strategicpublicassets.Whilethe Papermeets thebasicprocedural requirements,Parliament retains a substantive responsibility to assess whetherthetransaction deliversvalueformoney,protects nationalinterests, and supportslong-termfiscalsustainability.

2.2 Performance of Safaricom PLC:Company Profile and Shareholding Structure

40.SafaricomPLCwasincorporatedinKenyaunder the CompaniesActasa privatecompanyinKenya.Thecompanyprovidesawiderangeofservices, includingmobilevoiceand data,mobilefinancial services throughM-Pesa, andenterpriseanddigitalsolutionsforbusinessesandgovernmenttoover 60millioncustomersinKenyaandEthiopia.IntheFY2024/25,Safaricom CompanycontributedKSh.722billiontotheeconomy,sustainingover1.28 millionjobs.
41.Safaricom plays a systemically important role in Kenya's economy.It both directly and through its wide network of agents,suppliers,and partners.Through M-Pesa,Safaricom has also played a major role in banking system.This strong economic and socialfootprintexplainswhy Safaricomisconsideredastrategicnationalasset.
42.TheSessionalPapernotes thatSafaricom'sshareholding structurehas evolved since its initial public offering (IPO) in 20o8.Currently,the company'smajorshareholdersincludeVodafoneGroup(throughVodacom), the Government of Kenya,andpublic shareholders listed on the Nairobi SecuritiesExchange.
43.Asof31st2025,Safaricom Companyhad533,549shareholdersholdinga totalof40,065,428,000ordinaryshares.TheGovernmentcurrentlyholds approximately35%ofSafaricom'sshares,whileVodacomholdsabout40%, with theremaining sharesheldby thepublic.Theproposeddivestiture wouldinvolvethegovernmentselling15%ofitsshares,therebyreducingits ownershipstaketo20%.Atthesametime,Vodafone'sshareholdingwould increaseto55%,givingit majority ownershipandcontrolof the company.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningand theSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

Table 1:Shareholding Before and After the Proposed Divestiture

| | BeforeDivestiture | BeforeDivestiture | AfterDivestiture | AfterDivestiture | |----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------| | Shareholders | Ordinary Shares | (%) | (%) | Ordinary Shares | | GovernmentofKenya | 14,022,572,580 | 35% | 20% | 8,013,085,600 | | VodafoneGroup(via Vodacom) | 16,000,000,000 | 40% | 55% | 22,035,985,400 | | PublicShareholders | 10,042,855,420 | 25% | 25% | 10,016,357,000 | | Total | 40,065,428,000 | 100% | 100% | 40,065,428,000 |

44.ThisproposedchangewouldsignificantlyalterSafaricom'sownership AlthoughpublicshareholdingwouldstaythesameandtheGovernment wouldkeepaminoritystake,Vodafonewouldgainmajoritycontrolofthe company.Thisraisedimportantconcernsabouthowthecompanywillbe governed,whowill sit ontheboard,and howmajor decisions will bemade, makingitanimportantissuethattheJointCommitteeconsidered.
45.However,the Sessional Paper notes that Vodacom has made several commitmentstomitigatetheseconcerns.Theseincludeacommitmentthat thetransaction will notresultinacquisition-relatedredundancies fora periodofthreeyears,theretentionofaKenyanchairpersonandindependent directors,and continued supportfortheSafaricomFoundation.Inaddition, theGovernmentwillretaintwoseatsontheSafaricomboardtosafeguard national interests,ensure continuity in governance,and preserve Kenya's digitalheritageandleadershipininnovation.
46.Vodacom Group LimitedisaSouthAfrica-basedmultinational telecommunicationscompany,majority owned byVodafone GroupPLC.The proposed transactionwould therefore resultinSafaricomPLCbecoming effectively controlledby a foreign-headquarteredcorporate group.While Safaricomwould remain incorporated and listed in Kenya,majority ownershipbyaSouthAfrican-basedentityintroducesamaterialshiftin control that may influence long-term strategic direction,regulatory could have implications for where key strategic,financial,or operational decisionsaremade,and howSafaricomalignsitsprioritieswithnational development objectives.This change in ownership structure,therefore, warrantsscrutinyinlightofSafaricom'sstrategicroleinKenya'seconomy anddigital ecosystem.

2.3 Trend in Share Prices Since Inception

47.Since its listing on theNairobi Securities Exchange(NSE)inJune 2o08, Safaricom PLC's share pricehasexhibiteddistinct phasesofvolatility, sustainedgrowth,cyclicaladjustments,andrecentconsolidation,reflecting both the company'sperformance andbroadermarket dynamics.Atthetime

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

ofitsinitialpublicoffering(IPO),Safaricom's shareswerepricedatKSh5 pershare,valuingthecompanyataroundKSh200billion,with 40billion sharesissuedto thepublic.
48.In the years immediately following listing,the stock experienced early volatility.FromtheIPOpriceofKSh5in2008,thesharedroppedto approximatelyKSh3.60in2008-2009anda1owofKSh2.95in2011, reflecting challenging market conditions and competitive pressures.As earningsandinvestorconfidencestrengthenedthroughtheearly2010s,the shareprice ascended steadily,reaching double-digit levels(e.g.,aroundKsh 10.85in2013andKSh14.05in2014).
49.Between2017and2018,Safaricom'sstockhadbeguntoexhibitlong-term appreciation,buoyedbystrong financial performanceandexpanding servicessuchasmobiledataandM-Pesa.Thesharetradedatapproximately KSh26.75in2017andKSh31.00-in2018,showing-itsgrowingmarket dominance.Asignificantmilestonecamein2021,whenSafaricomreached anall-timehighofaroundKSh45.25pershare,drivenbyrobustearnings growth,strategic expansion,and investor interest.However,broader economicpressuresandmarketadjustmentsledtoamoderationinthe sharepricein subsequentyears,includinga declineinthelate2022-2023 period,whenpriceshoveredsignificantlybelowpeaklevels.
50.By2ndDecember2025,the average sharepricewas aboutKSh.27.50,giving thecompanyatotalvalueofaroundKSh.1.158trillion(USD8.979billion). Under theproposed deal,the Governmentwould sell shares atKSh.34each, raisingapproximatelyKSh.204.33billion(USD1.576billion).Thispriceis 17%higher than the current share price of KSh.28.50,meaning the

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya Governmentwouldgetmoremoneypersharethanwhatitcurrentlytrades foronthestockmarket.

2.4 ReviewofSafaricom PLC'sHistorical FinancialPerformance

51.Between 2019 and 2024,Safaricom's revenues grew steadily,from KSh 250.28billiontoKSh349.45billion,driven byexpansionincore telecommunications,data,and mobile money services. Operational performance remainedstrong,with EBITDA consistentlyaboveKSh 124 billion and reaching KSh 163.29 billion in 2024,whilemargins,though slightlylowerthanpeaklevels,stayedhighbyindustrystandards,reflecting efficientcostmanagement.EBITmarginsdeclined to23%in 2024due to higherdepreciationfromsignificantcapitalinvestments,with capexpeaking atKSh96.13billionin2023andremainingelevatedatKSh93.54billionin 2024 for network expansion,technology upgrades,and regionalprojects. Despiteheavyinvestments,Safaricommaintainedstableearningspershare and consistentdividends,averagingKSh 1.2-1.4,underscoringitsroleasa reliable, strategically important revenue-generating asset for the Government,withclearimplicationsforfiscal sustainabilityinthecontext ofanyproposedsharedivestiture.

Table 2:Financial Performance for Six-Year Track Record

| | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | |------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| | Service revenue (KshsBn) | 335.35 | 295.69 | 281.11 | 250.35 | 251.22 | 239.77 | | Total Revenue (Kshs Bn) | 349.45 | 310.9 | 298.08 | 264.03 | 262.56 | 250.28 | | EBITDA (KShs Bn) | 163.29 | 139.86 | 149.06 | 134.13 | 138.04 | 124.3 | | EBIT (KShs Bn) | 80.34 | 85 | 109.13 | 96.16 | 101.49 | 88.97 | | Capital Expenditure(KShs Bn) | 93.54 | 96.13 | 49.78 | 34.96 | 36.1 | 37.25 | | EPS | 1.57 | 1.55 | 1.74 | 1.71 | 1.84 | 1.56 | | DPS | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.39 | 1.37 | 1.4 | 1.87 | | EBITDA Margin (%) | 46.70% | 45.00% | 50.00% | 51.00% | 52.70% | 49.80% | | EBIT Margin (%) | 23.00% | 27.30% | 36.60% | 36.50% | 38.70% | 35.60% |

Source:Safaricom

Table 3:Definition of Terms in Table2

| TERM | FULL FORM/ MEANING | SIMPLE DEFINITION | |-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | EBITDA | Earnings BeforeInterest, Taxes,Depreciation,and Amortization | Profitfromcoreoperationsbefore interest,taxes,and non-cash expenses like depreciation. | | EBIT | EarningsBeforeInterest andTaxes | Profitfromoperationsaftercostsbut beforeinterestand taxes;measures operationalprofitability. | | Capital Expenditure (CapEx) | | Money spentonbuying,maintaining,or upgradingphysical assetslikebuildings, equipment,ornetworks. | | EPS | EarningsPerShare | Profitallocatedtoeachshareshowshow much each share earns. | | DPS | DividendsPer Share | Cashpaid toshareholderspershare reflectsthecompany'sreturnto investors. | | EBITDA Margin (%) | | EBITDAasapercentageofrevenue showsoperationalefficiencybeforenon- cash andfinancingcosts. | | EBIT Margin (%) | | EBITasapercentageofrevenue indicatesoperationalprofitabilitybefore interestandtaxes. |

2.5 Trend in Government Revenues from Dividends

52.S SinceSafaricomPLCbeganpayingdividendsfollowing itsinitialpublic offeringin2oo8,dividendreceiptshavebecomeanincreasinglyimportant sourceofnon-taxrevenue fortheGovernmentofKenya.From thefirst dividendpaidinFY2008/09throughFY2023/24,Safaricomhasreturned atotalof aboutKSh564.12billion toallshareholders,withthe Government'sshareofthisamount summingtoapproximatelyKSh197.44 billion over the sameperiodi

Table 4:Shareholders'Dividend Trends Over the Years

| Year | Rate | Type | Total Dividends to shareholders in KSh.billions | Trends in Gov's dividends in KSh. Billions | |--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------| | 2009 | 0.1 | Final | 4.01 | 1.4035 | | 2010 | 0.2 | Final | 8.01 | 2.8035 | | 2011 | 0.2 | Final | 8.01 | 2.8035 | | 2012 | 0.22 | Final | 8.81 | 3.0835 | | 2013 | 0.31 | Final | 12.42 | 4.347 |

| Year | Rate | Type | TotalDividendsto shareholdersinKSh.billions | Trendsin Gov'sdividendsinKsh. Billions | |--------|--------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | 2014 | 0.47 | Final | 18.83 | 6.5905 | | 2015 | 0.64 | Final | 25.64 | 8.974 | | 2016 | 0.76 | Final | 30.45 | 10.6575 | | 2016 | 0.68 | Final (Special) | 27.24 | 9.534 | | 2017 | 0.97 | Final | 38.86 | 13.601 | | 2018 | 1.1 | Final | 44.07 | 15.4245 | | 2019 | 1.25 | Final | 50.08 | 17.528 | | 2019 | 0.62 | Final (Special) | 24.84 | 8.694 | | 2020 | 1.4 | Final | 56.09 | 19.6315 | | 2021 | 0.45 | Interim | 18.03 | 6.3105 | | 2021 | 0.92 | Final | 36.86 | 12.901 | | 2022 | 0.64 | Interim | 25.64 | 8.974 | | 2022 | 0.75 | Final | 30.05 | 10.5175 | | 2023 | 0.58 | Interim | 23.24 | 8.134 | | 2023 | 0.62 | Final | 24.84 | 8.694 | | 2024 | 0.55 | Interim | 22.04 | 7.714 | | 2024 | 0.65 | Final | 26.04 | 9.114 | | Total | 14.08 | | 564.12 | 197.442 |

Source:Safaricom

53.Historicaldividenddatafrom2009to2024showsthatSafaricomPLChas maintainedastrongandrelativelystabledividend-payingrecord.Over the mostrecentfive-yearperiod(FY2020-FY2024),totaldividendsdistributedto shareholders averaged approximatelyKSh51-55billionperyear.Duringthe sameperiod,the GovernmentofKenyareceivedanestimatedKSh18-20 billion annually,reflectingits35%shareholding.Thisperformance shows Safaricom'smaturityasabusiness,itsrobustcashgeneration capacity,and itssustainedcommitmenttoshareholderreturns.
54.AssumingSafaricommaintainsitscurrentprofitability,dividendpolicy,and competitiveposition,andallowingformodestgrowthinline with inflation andcontinuedexpansion ofdigitaland financialservices.Underthese assumptions,Governmentdividendswillaverage approximatelyKSh 20-22 billion per year over the next five years (FY2025-FY2029),resultingin cumulativereceiptsofaboutKSh100-110billion.Overaten-yearhorizon (FY2025-FY2034),averageannual Governmentdividendscould riseto

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

approximatelyKSh 22-25billion,translatingintocumulative receiptsof aroundKSh220-250billion,providedthecurrent35%shareholdingis maintained.
55.TheseprojectionsarebasedonthecontinuationofSafaricom'sexisting marketdominance,stable dividendpayoutsbroadly consistentwithrecent historical trends,and the absence of major regulatory,competitive,or macroeconomicdisruptions.As such,theyprovideaprudentbaseline for assessingthelong-termfiscalvalueofretaining Governmentownershipin SafaricomPLC.

2.6Importance of Partial Divestiture in Relation to Safaricom PLC

56. Fiscal Consolidation and Development Financing:The proposed partial divestitureofSafaricomPLCaimstosupport thegovernment'sbroaderfiscal and economic objectives,in line with the national divestiture policy.The divestitureofaportionoftheGovernment'sshareholdingwouldunlock ininfrastructureandpublicservicedelivery,whilecontributingtothe reduction of the fiscal deficit.Reduced reliance on public borrowing, especiallyhigh-costdomesticandexternaldebt,wouldstrengthen fiscal sustainability,allowingpublic resources toberedirected to sectorswith highersocialandeconomicreturns. 57. Enhanced Corporate Governance and Operational Efficiency: The partial divestitureofgovernmentSafaricomPLCsharesisexpectedtoenhance sectorparticipation inownership and strategicdecision-making.Greater promoteinnovation,andsustaintheCompany'scompetitivenessinarapidly theGovernment'scontinuedminority shareholdingwouldmaintain nationalasset. 3. 58.Private Sector Investment and Capital Market Deepening: From the perspective oftheprivatesector,thetransactionpresents anopportunity to increaseinvestmentinoneofKenya'smostprofitableandwell-governed listed companies.Safaricom PLCoffers attractive prospects for stable market position,diversified revenue streams,and robust cash flows. Expandedprivateparticipationisexpected todeepen theNairobiSecurities strengthenedinvestorconfidence.

SESSIONALPAPER

59.TheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025ontheProposedpartialdivestitureof SafaricomPLCbytheGovernmentofKenyawastabledin theNational Assemblyon Thursday,4th December 2025 and committed to the DepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandSelect CommitteeonPublicDebt&Privatizationforajointconsiderationand reporting to theHouseinaccordancewithStandingOrderNo.202of the National Assembly.
Article118(1)(b)oftheConstitutionofKenya,2010andinthisregard,an advertisementwasplacedin thedailiesonWednesday,21stJanuary2026, invitingthepublictosubmitmemorandaontheSessionalPaper.
61.Followingthecallformemorandafromthepublicthroughtheplacementof advertisementsin the print media,the Joint Committee received and consideredmemorandafrom aroundseventy-sevenstakeholdersincluding forty-sevenstructuredorganizationsand thirtycounties.Thestakeholders statedasfollows:

3.1THENATIONALTREASURY

The Cabinet Secretary,theNational Treasury appeared before the Committee andsubmittedthefollowing:-

Safaricomatapremiumof23.6%tothe6-monthvolumeweightedaverage priceendingDecember2,2025.Thistransactionfacilitatesthemobilization ofsignificantresourceswithoutcontractingdebtorraisingtaxes.
63.This is the first step in the Government's vision to allocateresources into critical infrastructure investment priorities,specifically Energy,Roads, Water,Airports,etc.PriorityinvestmentinNationalInfrastructureisaimed atensuringthatitbecomesapowerfultool tofueloureconomy,accomplish strategic goals,and scale publicinvestment by bridginginstitutional capital withpublicprojects.
64.Thedivestiture seeks approvalinlinewith theprovisionsof Section74of the PrivatizationAct,2025,asread together with Section 87Aof the Public FinanceManagementActCap412A,whichrequiresthatadivestitureina Government Linked Corporation,a specific proposal for privatization be

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

CHAPTER THREE

preparedforapprovalbytheCabinetandsubmittedtotheNational Assemblyforconsiderationandapproval.
65.Whereasgeneralprivatizations followastructuredprocess ledby the PrivatizationAuthority,thesaleordisposalofgovernmentsharesinGLCsis anchoredwithinthePublicFinanceManagementAct(PFMA)framework, requiringdirectexecutiveandlegislativeapproval.
66.Through theinsertionofSection87AintothePFMA,Kenya'sPrivatization Act,2025introducesadistinctandstreamlinedapprovalmechanismforthe saleofgovernmentshares.Thisframeworkensures thatsuchtransactions arefiscallyprudent,subjectto Cabinetand National Assemblyoversight, and guidedbythe National Treasury's financial assessment,thereby investments.
67.The Cabinethas approved the National Treasury toinitiate the partial divestitureof15%oftheGovernment'sequitystakeinSafaricomPlc.The considerations:
i. Provision of funding for Critical and Priority Infrastructure Investment:Thetransactionwillmobilizesubstantialnon-taxrevenue tosupporttheGovernmentindeliveringpriorityinfrastructure developmentin critical sectors,including Energy,Roads,Aerospace, Water,and Digital transformation,reducing reliance on debt and expandingfiscalspacefordevelopmentpriorities;
1i. Strategic Investor Partnership:The proposed buyer,Vodacom Group, is a long-standing investor in Safaricom,holding approximately 40% throughVodafoneKenya,withdeepregionalexperienceandaproven trackrecord in capitalinvestment,digital infrastructure,innovation, andfinancialinclusion.TheirincreasedstakewillreinforceSafaricom's competitivenessandgrowthtrajectory.
ili. Preservation of National Interest:The Government will retain a strategic stake,representing 20%,with 2 seats on the board of Safaricom to safeguard national interests,ensure continuity in governance,and preserve Kenya's digital heritage and innovation leadership.Theresidual2o%shareholdingrepresentsalong-term investmentinSafaricombytheGovernment.Throughthetransaction, Vodacomhasmadevariouscommitments,includingnoacquisitionrelatedredundancies within3yearsofthe transaction,ensuring the chairman and independent directors remain Kenyan,as well as Vodacom'scontinuedsupportoftheSafaricomFoundation.
68.In addition to the approval by the National Assembly,inter alia,the transaction isalsogovernedbytheCapitalMarketsActandtheCapital

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya Markets(PublicOffers,ListingsandDisclosures)Regulations,2023.Itis also subject toapprovalsand notificationsfromrelevantregulatorsand stakeholders,including the Competition AuthorityofKenya(CAK),Central Bank of Kenya (CBK),Communications Authority of Kenya (CA),and the Nairobi SecuritiesExchange (NSE),where applicable.

69.Safaricomwaslisted in the Nairobi Securities Exchangein 2008.The CompanyexpandedintoEthiopiain2022followingitslicensingin2021.The SafaricomEthiopiabusinesscontinuestostruggleandisyettobreakeven, henceitcontinues torequire supportfrom the shareholders.
70.Vodacom,whichiscontrolledby theUK-basedcorporation(Vodafone)has been the strategicinvestorinSafaricom since1998.Vodacom continues to providetechnicalandmanagementexpertise totheCompany,and ithas been asignificantdriverofthe Company's success.
71.Safaricom operatesina verytightlyregulated operating environment. Kenya's telecommunicationslandscapehasverymatureregulators e.g.CA, CBK,Data Commissioner and CAK.This is one business area where isnolongeramaterial Governmenttoolofcontrol.

3.1.1 Safaricom Shareholding

72.AsatMarch31,2025,Safaricomhad533,549shareholdersholdingatotal of40,065,428,000ordinaryshares.Thetablebelowsetsout thetop shareholders in Safaricom (ordinary shares only) as at March 31,2025.

| | Shareholder | No.ofShares | Shareholding% | |-------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------| | 1 | VodafoneKenyaLimited | 16.000.000,000 | 40.0% | | 2 | CabinetSecretarytotheNational | 114,022.572.580 | 35.0% | | 3 | Others | 10.042,855,420 | 25.0% | | Total | | 40,065,428,000 | 100 |

3.1.2 Basis of the Divestiture Route-Existing Strategic Investor

| Considerationsregarding the Choice ofDivestiture Route | Considerationsregarding the Choice ofDivestiture Route | Considerationsregarding the Choice ofDivestiture Route | |----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------| | Sale to strategic shareholder- Vodacom | existingSaletonewfinancialinvestorNSEsharesell-down -e.gPrivateEquityFirms | |

| Sufficient Liquidity to Complete the transaction | Willbemorerisk-averse | Pricedwithreferenceto theexisting share price, typicallyatadiscount | |-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | As long-term partnercantake higher andlong- termrisks | Can lead to strategic misalignment,hence eroding the successofthebusiness | Theticketsizewill requireunderwriting | | Provedtobe a crediblestrategic investorinKenya | Willnothaveajustification to payapremium | Willnotattractsufficient hard currency | | Allowscontinuityin thesuccessofthe business | Likelytofocusonshort-term gains,hence distorting the characteroftheCompany | | | Minimal disruption in thebusiness | Completion risks due tothe huge ticket size | | | Settlementviahard currency | | | | AllowsGOKtosellat apremium | | | | Controlriskscanbe mitigated by negotiating safeguards | | |

3.1.3Valuation

CommercialBankInvestmentBanktoadviseon theproposed transaction. TheBankprovidedavaluationreportdetailingvariousvaluation methodologies.
74.Thefollowingvaluation approacheswereused to determine the Enterprise valueofthebusiness:
I. Marketvaluationapproach-multiples;and
II. Incomevaluationapproach-DCFandDDM;
75.Themethodsinusearebasedonseveralfactorsthatinfluenceorexplain share pricing. These factors include the value of thenet assets,earnings, dividends,anddiscounted cashflows.Sharesofpubliccompaniesquoted onastockexchangeareusuallyeasiertodispose topotentialbuyerssince their pricesaremore readily determinable.However,even fora quoted company,different investors and potential investors valueit differently basedon theirvaluationofthecompany'svaluedeterminants,suchas assets,earnings,dividends,and cash flows.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

3.1.3.1 Valuation-Comparatives with similar Businesses

| Market Approach:Benchmark with similar businesses | Market Approach:Benchmark with similar businesses | Market Approach:Benchmark with similar businesses | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| | AtissalatAlMaghrib | Africa | 6.30x | | AirtelAfrica | Africa | 6.10x | | VodacomSouthAfrica | Africa | 6.50x | | VodacomTanzania | Africa | 5.70x | | MobileTelecommunications | Africa | 5.70x | | HIS Holdings | Africa | 5.80x | | HeliosTowers | Various | 7.80x | | EmiratesTelecoms | MiddleEast | 6.40x | | KuwaitTelecoms | MiddleEast | 6.50x | | SaudiTelecomCo | MiddleEast | 8.30x | | EtihadEtisalatCo | MiddleEast | 7.10x | | VodafoneQatarPQSC | MiddleEast | 7.10x | | PartnerCommunicationsLtd | MiddleEast | 6.40x | | High | | 8.30x | | Low | | 5.70x | | Median | | 6.40x | | Average | | 6.60x |

3.1.3.2Valuation-MarketValuation Approaches

I. EV/EBITDAMultiples

| Price per share-EV/Low-22.32 EBITDA | Ave-26.19 | High-33.50 | |---------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|

II. P/EMultiples

| P/EMultiple | Low-10.62 | Ave-17.08 | High-25.01 | |---------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|

3.1.3.3 Valuation-Income Approaches

III. TheDiscountedCashFlowapproachobtainedavalueofKES 18.51per ordinary share
IV. DiscountedDividendModelapproachobtainedavalueofKES23.61per ordinaryshare.
V. The volume weighted average price over the sixmonths endingon December 2,2025,was approximatelyKes.27.50per share.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

3.1.4NegotiationOutcome

76.Thefinalnegotiationoutcomewith thestrategicInvestoryieldedKes34.00 per share.Thevolumeweighted averageprice over thesixmonthsendingon December 2,2025,was approximately Kes.27.50per share,resultingin a actualproceedstoberaisedfromthetransactionis-KES204333682800 orUSD1576162317,whichrepresentsapremiumtotheprevailinglisted sharepriceof17%ofthecurrentsharepriceof28.5.

3.1.5 Dividendspaid in Advance

77.TheNational TreasurynotedthatGoKisreceivingKshs4Obn todayand repayingKshs55bnin6yearsimpliesafundingcostof5.6%,below the 11.3%sovereignyieldforthesametenor.Onapresent-valuebasis,Kshs 55bn discounted atmarketratesis worthKshs29.3bn today,yetyouwould receiveKshs40bn,aKshs 10.6bngaininfavourof GoK.Lookingforward, ifKshs40bnwereinvestedatthemarketrate,itwouldgrowtoroughlyKshs 75bn in sixyears,meaningtheproposedrepaymentofKshs55bnisKshs 20bnlowerthanthefairfuturevalue.ThetransactionfavoursGOKbothin presentvalue andfuturevalue viewpoints.

3.1.6 Costs

78.Thetransactionwillbesubjecttothefollowingleviesandfees:
i. TransactionAdvisoryfees
ii. CMATransactionlevy-0.012
ii. NSETransactionLevy-0.012
iv. CDSCTransactionLevy-O.08
V. CDsCGuaranteeFund-O.01
vi. CMACompensationFund-o.01
vii. Brokeragefees-1.36
viii. StampDuty-0.02

3.1.7Divestiture Structure

79.The National Treasury highlighted that the GovernmentofKenyaproposes todivest 6,009,814,200 shares,equivalent to 15%,while retaining 8,012,758,380shares,equivalentto20%.

3.1.7.1 Benefits of the proposed Divestiture

80.TheproposedpartialdivestiturebytheGovernmentofKenyainSafaricom well asourCapitalMarket,and thistransactioniswell-positionedtosupport thefinancingofourpriorityinfrastructurerequirements.
81.Kenya's economy isat acritical turningpoint,and to sustain the economic achievementsrealizedthus far,both fromamacroand fiscal(inflation, interestrates,currency stabilization,and GDPgrowth)perspectives,must

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningand theSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya turntoinnovativefinancingmechanismstofundinfrastructure andpublic serviceprojects.

82.As thefinancialneedsof thegovernmentcontinue tooutpace available publicresources,private sector participationhas become a critical tool in addressing infrastructure gaps,enhancing service delivery,and promoting sustainabledevelopment.
83.Thisproposal alignswell with the sentimentsreceived fromKenyans during thepublicparticipationprocessduringthe2025/2026budget-making process.Thegovernmenthas traditionally financed itsbudgetusingdebt andtaxationinstruments,anditisnow timetoleverageotherinstruments toalignwithboth economicprogression and public sentiments.
84.The National Treasury noted that it is also carryingout an economy-wide and state corporations'sector-specific reforms and corporation-specific restructurings not just as an end in itself,but also inresponse topolicy and business dynamics.The dynamics include the following;
ii. TheneedtoelevatetheroleoftheGovernmenttooneofpolicyand regulationtosupportcommercialactivitiesoftheprivatesector(toavoid conflictatthecommercialoperationslevel).
i. Thecomingofageof theprivatesector thatcandelivercommercial activitiesmore efficiently,hence(partof)the needforprivatization of GOEs;and/therefore,

3.1.7.2 The specific benefits of the partial divestiture include:

85.The specificbenefits of thepartial divestiture include the following;
ii. Theoptimizationofourmatureinvestmentsgeneratesrevenuewithout increasingdebtortaxation
i. Opportunitytoraisecapitalatasignificantpremiumtomarketvalue
iii. The capitalreceivedcanbedeployed towardsnecessaryinfrastructure investment,acceleratingeconomicgrowth
V. While retaining the Government's material stake and significant influenceinanimportantnationalasset
iv. Inward flow of much-needed foreign,hard currency into the Kenyan economy
86.Further,TreasurynotedthattheGovernmentretainsamaterialinvestment inSafaricom,which,through this transaction,willbecomepartofoneofthe largestandmostrespectedtelecommunicationscompaniesin theworld (Vodafone,which owns 65%of Vodacom),bringingbestpractice andknowhowofoperatingaroundtheworldtoSafaricomKenyaandEthiopia.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

3.1.8Economic Imperatives

87.Topaceupwiththeresourcesrequiredtodeliverpriorityinfrastructure investments,the National Treasury highlighted that it has identified strategicdivestituresasakeytooltoaddressthefollowingthreemajor economic balances:Governmentdebt,Budget balances and Economic stimulation.In this regard,our program is designed to address fiscal deficits,andpromotingcounter-cyclicalfiscalpolicy.
88.Havingpursuedfiscalconsolidationoverthelastthreeyears,thepolicyhas nowreachedoptimallevelsandhencecan'tbepushedfurther.Inthiscase, unlike taxation,privatizationneverreducesprivate sectorwealth.Inmost cases,it encourages the propensity to invest and enhances aggregate demand,whichinthelongrunwouldwidentherevenuebase.

3.1.9 Deepening our Capital Markets

89.From a capitalmarketsdevelopmentperspective,GOKintendstobuild its capacityandcapabilitytocrowdinprivatesectorresourcestoenableithave awider elasticityinoptimizing thelimitedresources.Capitalmarkets provideinstitutionalinvestors,bothlocal and foreign,such asmutual funds, pension funds,and insurance companies,with instruments to diversify their portfolioinvestment.
90.The transaction shallnowincreaseinstitutionalinvestors'desiredstockof assetsin theExchange,and thiswill resultinan increaseintheflows of foreigncapital.Transactionscarriedoutinthecapitalmarketsareoneofthe keyfinancial reformswearedeployinginthedevelopmentanddeepeningof ourcapital markets,whichis anecessaryingredientfor enhancingeconomic

3.1.10 ValueRealization

91.The partial divestiture,especially to an existing partner like Vodacom, enablestheGovernmenttorealizeoptimalvaluefromitsmatureinvestment bysellingatKES 34per share,whichrepresentsasignificantpremium comparedtothemarketprice,asopposedtoanon-marketsale,whichwould typicallyattractadiscounttothemarketprice.Ithasalsobeenagreed that theproceedsgeneratedwillbepaidinUsDollars,amountingto$1.577bn.
92.This transaction eliminatesany settlement risk,asVodacom has a strong financial capacityand proventrack recordincompleting similar investments.Additionally,the proposed transaction includes a further aspect,wherein Vodacom willmakeanupfrontpayment of KES40.2bn

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya will accrue to the government on the Government's residual 20% shareholdinginSafaricom.

3.1.12 Continued growth and Investmentby Safaricom PLC

93.ThekeybenefitthatGOKshallderivefromthedivestitureistomitigatethe riskoffuturedilution due tocapitalrequirementsby thebusiness.Given theprevalenterosionoffiscalspace,Companies thatarecontrolledfullyby thegovernmentmightnotbeabletoundertakeinvestmentsevenin cases wherethereisprovencertaintyofpayoffsor enhancingefficiency,asthe debt carryingcapacity of thesovereignisdiminishing.
94.As aresult,GOKriskslosing thevalue from itsprofitable enterpriseslike Safaricomasaresultofdilutionintheeventofacapitalcallwhenfundsfor Governmentwillbekeenerondelivering themuch-neededsocialservices like education,healthcare,roads,etc.
95.Private sector investors,like the case ofVodacom,can reduce or eliminate, theunsystematicriskofinvestmentand,hence,increasetheavailabilityof capitalaswell as lower theriskpremium componentin itscost,hence allowing the company tomeet its objectiveofsafeguarding Safaricom's expansionanddiversificationplansaswell asenhancingKenya'sstrategic positionasatechnologyhub.

3.2CAPITALMARKETAUTHORITY(CMA)

96.CMA supported theproposalnoting it is likely to appeal to institutional investorsbothforeignandlocalleadingtopositivepricemovements.They notedthatonthedateoftheannouncementSafaricomshareshita52-week pricehigh.Thisisbecauseit signals confidence inSafaricom,once a strong global telecommunicationCompanysuchas Vodafone increasesits investmentintheCompany.
97.Further,they noted that Safaricom share price has been trading below KES.32in thepast oneyear.Thehighestprice ofKES.31.90was registered on December 4,2025and the lowest price ofKES.14.5registered on 30th August2024.
98.CMAcommendedtheexitpriceofKES.34asapremiumofabout17%of the currentmarketpriceandalmost21%abovetheVolumeWeightedAverage Price(VWAP)overthelast6monthsbeforeJanuary9,2025ofKES.29.1.
99.Theynoted that theproposed increase in the shareholdingofVodafone theresultantincreaseineffectivecontrolin the Company.
100.CMAreceivedanapplicationfromVodafoneKenyaLimitedforexemption from thetakeoverprocess andtaken thefollowingactions:

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Once the proposed Transaction is completed,Vodafone has committedtokeepSafaricomlistedontheNairobiSecurities ownership,andtrustinKenya'scapitalmarkets.
ii. TheAuthorityrequiresfulldisclosureofallrelevantinformation pertaining thetransaction toensure there isnoinformation asymmetry.
iii. Toprotecttheintegrityofthemarketsaswellastheinvestorsin themarket, the CMA together with NSE conducts surveillance of tradingonrealtimebasisandofflineafter themarketcloses.The objectiveofsurveillanceistoensurefairandorderly tradingaswell asensurethatthereisnootherformofmarketabuse.
iv. The Authority to continue ensuringgood corporate governance standardsatSafaricom justasitcontinuesensuringforalllisted companies.

10l.CMArecommended thefollowing:

i. Thereis need tohave theGovernment develop a criterionof determining the minimum threshold of itsownershipin strategicallylistedentities.
ii. Thereisneedtoconsiderapossiblelock-inrequirementonanchor incomingshareholderswhere Governmenthasdivested.
iii. Thereisneed forGovernmenttotakea strongpositionagainst specialprivilegesforpurchasersof SoEs.Nationalauthorities oreven adding to,anyspecialbenefitsandprivilegesthatmayhave beenattached totheenterprisewhenitwasin thepublicsectorprotection from competition,tax exemptions,specialinvestment credits,sheltereddomesticmarkets.
iv. Thegainsfromprivatizationwillbegreaterifthepolicyenvironment encouragesefficientoperationsofprivateenterprises.

5. Transparency shouldbeamajorelementinalldivestiture-related V programs.Therationalefor such divestitureneeds to be clear and theprocessfollowedshouldremainoverboardtopersuadesceptical andhesitantdecision-makerswhomaynotbeclearon theoverall objectives.

3.3 NAIROBI SECURITIES EXCHANGE (NSE)

102.The ChiefExecutiveOfficer,theNairobi SecurityExchangeappearing the Joint Committee submitted the following:-
103.That,NSEsupportstheproposedpartial divestitureofSafaricomPLCbythe governmentwiththefollowingreasons;

i. MarketdeepeningthetransactionwillsignificantlygrowKenya's capital markets. The transaction is premium priced,which signalsdomesticand internationalinvestors thatKenyacan priceandsettlelarge,complexequitytransactionswithinthelaw
ii. publicly listedcompany onNSE and thepublicmarketcanhave access toownership.
ii. AsafepairofhandsVodacomsharesadecade-longpartnership with Safaricomleading tovarious developments,includingMPesa.Vodacom is a strategicinvestor who knows the Kenyan market and,hence,willnotintroduce any disruptive changes.
iv. Oversightandgovernanceremainrobust the transactionsits withintheregulatoryperimeterofKenya.
vi. A bilaterally negotiated sale is the rightmethod because it maximizes price certainty and minimizes market impact compared toanopenmarketselldown.
V. ValuationandvalueforKenya-thevaluationisclearanddatadriven,whilethe government obtains cash proceeds and retains a strategic20%withboardrepresentation,which is valuefor Kenya.
vii. Positive signalling to global capital the premium-priced consistencyandinstitutionalcoordination.
ix. Supportsgovernmentprivatizationandfiscalstrategy-thestate raisesnon-debtcapitalatapremiumtofundpriority infrastructurewithoutaddingtodebtservice.
viii. Freefloatisunchanged-itisatransferofownershipbetween asitis,and thispreserves index eligibility,support on-going pricediscoveryandkeepsforeigninvestormandatesengaged.
X. Regulatory continuity and minority protections through the capitalmarketsframework,includingtheCMAAct,Listingsand DisclosuresRegulations,and NSE tradingrules.

104.TheStakeholdermaderecommendationsasfollows:

i. Approve thetransactionbuthave itexecutedviaNSE'sBlock TradingBlocktoensure theexecutionalignswithestablished marketprinciplesandregulatorysafeguards.
ii. Uploadminorityshareholdingrightstoensuremarketstability and investor confidence.This would include the regulatory pathway anddisclosures, board-levelchecks and representation,equaltreatmentandrelated-party safeguards andmarketintegrityandexecutionprotections.

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iii. Strategicinvestorlock-inof10yearstopreservelong-term strategicalignmentandmarketstabilitywhileallowinglimited flexibilityforlegitimatecorporateactions.Thiswouldinclude10yearlock-inontheacquiredstrategicstake,nodirectorindirect transfers,permitted exceptions such as enforcement and penalties and intra-groupreorganizations and the enforcement shouldbe byParliamentand theNationalTreasury,and penaltiescan includemonetarypenalties andvoter suspension.
iv. Jointcommunication planincluding theNationalTreasury, CMA,NSE,CBKandSafaricom toreassureinvestorstoprovide clear,timelyandcoordinatedinformationthat reduces uncertainty,preempts speculations and reinforces confidence in Safaricom,NSE and Kenya's policy framework.The communication can include market structure and access, valuationandfiscalimpact,executionintegrityandregulatory continuityandprotections.

3. 105.ThestakeholderconcludedbyrecommendingthatParliamentapprovethe proposal andrequireitsexecution throughtheNSEblocktradingboard.The approachintends tosafeguardtransparency,upholdmarketintegrityand alignwithinternationalbestpractice.

3.4COMPETITIONAUTHORITY OF KENYA(CAK)

AppearingbeforetheJointCommittee,MrDavidKemei,DirectorGeneralCAK submittedthefollowing:

106.ThetransactionwouldreducetheState'sshareholdingto20%andincrease Vodacom'seffectiveholding to55%,resultingincontrol.Theynoted that Section41oftheCompetitionActdefinesamergerastheacquisitionof direct orindirect control over anotherundertaking.CAKismandated to reviewandapprovemergersthatmeettheprescribednotificationthresholds.
I07.Theproposedtransactionhasnotyetbeenformallynotified to CAK,but availableinformationindicatesitislikelytoresultinachangeofcontrol. ThischangeofcontrolfallswithinthemeaningofSections41-43ofthe Competition Act.Thetransaction isexpected tooccur atthe shareholder levelandisunlikelyto altertheexistingmarketstructure ornegativelyaffect competition.
108.TheAuthoritynoted thattheapplicabilityofRule8oftheCompetition (General)Rules,2019,concerningCOMESAnotificationrequirements.Given applicable thresholds,the transaction has a regional dimension.Upon formalnotification,CAKwillassessthetransaction'seffectsontheKenyan marketinaccordancewiththeCompetitionAct.

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109.He emphasized thatwhile theproposeddivestiture islikely to result ina marketstructure.Uponformalnotification,theAuthoritywillconductafull mergerreviewandissueitsdeterminationinaccordancewiththelaw.

3.5COMMUNICATIONAUTHORITYOFKENYA(CA)

Appearingbefore theJoint Committee,MrDavid Mugonyi,Director General CA submittedthefollowing:

s Commission of Kenya(CCK) on July 1st,1999,as a GSM Mobile Network OperatorinKenyatoprovidemobilecommunicationsservicesforaninitial periodoffifteen(15)years.Thelicencewas subsequentlyrenewed fora further ten(1o)years.
Il1.TheICTPolicyGuidelinesof2020,containedin GazetteNoticeNo.5472of 2020,initially provided for a minimum local equity participation requirement,mandatingthatentitiesseekinglicencestoprovideICTservices inKenya have atleast thirtypercent(30%) substantiveKenyan ownership, whether corporateorindividual.However,this wasamended by Gazette Notice No.3192 dated April 9th,2021,and further removed through an amendmenteffectedbyGazetteNoticeNo.11079datedAugust22nd,2023. The amendmentpermitsforeignownershipofuptoonehundredpercentum (100%) in companieslicensed toprovideICT services inKenya.Therefore, ICT licensinginKenya
112.They noted that theAuthority continuously monitors changes inlicensees' shareholdingstructurestoensureeffectiveimplementationandenforcement of thisstatutoryprovision.Applyingtheforegoingprovisionsto theproposed transaction,theAuthoritynotedthatthetransactionwillresultinVodacom Group Limited holdinga fifty-fiveper cent(55%) shareholdingin Safaricom PLC.
113.Accordingly,the Network Facilities Provider Tier 1(NFP-T1)Licence,and similarlywordedconditionsintheotherlicencesheldbySafaricomPLC, contain Condition18(Notificationof ChangeinShareholding).Theinclusion oftheselicenceconditionsobligateslicenseestonotifytheAuthorityofany changesinshareholdingandaccordstheAuthoritytheopportunitytoassess such changes to ensure compliance with prevailing policy,legal,and regulatory requirements,including considerations of public interest, competition,nationalsecurity,andstatutoryobligations relatingto spectrum licensing.

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I14.Pursuanttotheaboveprovisions,SafaricomPLCwrotetotheAuthorityon December 4th,2025,requestingfor theAuthority's approvalofchangein shareholdinginaccordancewiththeKenya Informationand CommunicationsAct,CAP411A.
115.ThepreliminarypositionoftheAuthorityisthattherequestfortheproposed changeofshareholdingcanbeaccommodatedconsideringthat:
i. Thereisnolocalshareholdingthresholdrequirementunderpolicy, laworregulations.
ii. The transaction retains local equity participation,through the governmentofKenya.
iii. The transactionhasbeen approved by the Cabinetasindicated in theSessionalPaperNo.3.

3.6 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENYA(AG)

I16.The Office of the Attorney-General submitted that the proposed partial divestitureof the Government shareholdingin SafaricomPLC,asproposed in theSessionalPaperNo.3of2025,wascorrectlyrootedin theConstitution andtherelevantlegalframework,particularlyArticles201and227ofthe Constitution,which emphasize sound management of public finances, transparency,accountability and value for money,as well as the Public Finance Management Act,the Privatisation Act,2025,the Companies Act, andtheCapitalMarketsAct.
processadministeredbythePrivatisationAuthoritysinceitwasdesignedas afocusedsaletoanexistingstrategicshareholderwithinapubliclylisted company,as opposed to broad-based privatization.The transaction was designedassuchbecauseitfellwithintheframeworkasamendedby the PrivatisationAct,2025,whichestablishedaspecificapprovalprocessforthe divestitureoftheGovernmentshareholdinginGovernment-linked Corporations,which requires theapprovaloftheCabinetand subsequently theapprovalbytheNationalAssembly,whilestillpermittingtheGovernment toretainastrategicstakeandrebalancetheGovernmentinvestment portfolio.
118.Thestakeholder furtherreiteratedthattheproposedtransactionhad adhered toallnecessary internal Governmentprocessesandapprovals, including Cabinet approvaland approval by theAttorney-Generalin BasedonitsreviewoftheSessional Paper,theCabinetMemorandumin supportofthesaidpaper,andtheproposedtransactiondocumentation,the OfficeoftheAttorney-Generalfoundthattheproposedpartialdivestiture

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya objectiontotheNationalAssemblytoconsiderandApprovetheSessional PaperNo.3of2025.

3.7CENTRALBANKOFKENYA(CBK)

Appearingbefore theJoint Committee,MrKamau Thugge,Governor,Central Bank ofKenya,submitted the following:

119.Safaricomwasincorporatedin1997andsubsequentlyauthorizedtooperate M-PesafollowingtheenactmentoftheNationalPaymentSystem(NPs)legal framework.Safaricom is listed on theNairobi Securities Exchange,with VodafoneKenyaLimitedholding40percent,theGovernmentofKenya35 percent,andthegeneralpublic25percent.Theproposedtransactionwould reducetheGovernment'sshareholding to20percentwhileincreasing VodafoneKenyaLimited'sstaketo55percent.Thedivestitureisexpectedto generate approximately KSh 244.2 billion (US$ 1.88 billion),including upfrontmonetization offuture dividends,tofinancepriorityinfrastructure projects.
120.Heemphasizedthatitsinvolvementinthetransactionarisesstrictlyfromits Regulations,2014,and theCentralBankofKenyaAct.As theregulator and control
121.In this regard,Regulation 8(1) of theNPS Regulations mandates CBK to evaluateandapprovechangesinthesignificantshareholdingofaPSP. orcontrol structuresdonotunderminefinancialstability,customerfund protection,oroperationalcontinuity.CBKclarifiedthatitsroleistherefore supervisory and prudential,rather than transactional or advisory on valuation.
122.M-Pesawasidentified byCBKas aSystemicallyImportantPaymentSystem (SIPS),meaning thatitsfailure could triggerwidespread financialinstability or materially impair the real economy. In 2025,M-Pesa processed transactionsvaluedatapproximatelyKSh83.7trillion-equivalenttonearly fourtimesKenya'sGDP.ItcurrentlyholdsaboutKSh250billionincustomer fundsintrustaccountsacrosslocalcommercialbanks.
payment transactions and serves over 32million active users,representing morethanhalfofKenya'spopulation.Theplatform isdeeplyinterconnected with commercialbanks and other financial institutions,and while alternatives exist,none match itsreach,liquidity,or network acceptance. Given this systemicimportance,any change in ownershipmust be carefully

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cybersecurityintegrity,orcustomerfundsafeguards.
124.OnDecember4,2025,Safaricomformallyapplied,requestinga"letterofno objection"fromCBKregarding theproposedchangeinsignificant shareholding.CBK confirmed thatuponreceiptof the application,it initiated acomprehensivereviewprocess.
125.TheBankissuedadetailedinformationrequesttoSafaricomseeking clarification on several matters,including the vetting of the proposed controlling shareholder, governance and control structures posttransaction,sources of acquisition funding,operational continuity plans, andmeasures to safeguard customer funds.CBKalso requested details regarding intra-group control rights and cross-border supervisory cooperationwiththerelevanthomeregulatorsoftheVodafone/Vodacom Group. The assessment remains ongoing, and CBK has not issued final approval.
126.CBKoutlined thekey prudentialpillars guiding its evaluation.First,it assesseswhether thetransaction wouldpreservefinancialstabilityand preventcontagionrisks arisingfromparent-groupfinancial distress.Second, itisensuringthatcustomerfunds,currentlyamountingtoapproximately KSh250billion,remainring-fenced andinsulatedfromgroup-levelrisks.
127.Third,CBKis examininggovernanceandlocal decision-makingautonomy to confirm that critical operational matters,including compliance and risk management,remain effectively overseen within Kenya.Fourth,it is andultimatebeneficialowners,focusingonfinancial soundness,integrity, and technical competence.Finally,CBK is evaluating systemic risk implications, enhanced supervisory reporting requirements,and the robustness ofcross-bordercooperation arrangements.CBK emphasized that its-oversightauthority mustnotbedilutedbythe proposed change in ownership.
128.CBKhighlightedthatKenyafacessignificantfiscal constraints characterized byrevenue underperformance and highlevelsof non-discretionary expenditure,including wages,debt servicing,county allocations,and essential public services.At the same time,concessional financing has declined globally,commercial borrowing remains expensive,and higher domesticborrowinghas crowded outprivate sector credit.In this context, CBKdescribedthedivestitureasaninnovativefinancingmechanism that wouldgeneratefiscal spacewithoutincreasingpublicdebt.Theproceedsare expected tofundinfrastructureprojectsinroads,energy,water,transport, andagriculture,areasconsideredcriticalforgrowthandemployment.

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129.As of September 2025,Kenya'spublic debt stood atapproximately KSh 12.05trillion,equivalentto68.9percentof GDP.CBKindicatedthatusing asset saleproceedsinsteadofnewborrowing supports the Government's medium-termfiscalconsolidation pathandalignswith the stateddebt accumulation,the transactioncontributestoimproveddebtsustainability metrics.
130.CBKprojected thatexpectedinflowsofapproximatelyUS$1.88billionwould increaseforeign exchangereservesfrom about US$ 12.39 billion(5.3months ofimportcover)toapproximatelyUs$14.28billion(6.2monthsofimport cover).Thisbuild-upofreserveswould strengthen Kenya'sbuffer against short-term external shocksandsupportexchangeratestability.A stronger reservepositionwouldhelpcontainimportedinflationandenhance macroeconomic resilience,particularlyinthe faceofglobalvolatilityin commoditypricesandcapitalflows.
131.CBKfurthernoted thattheKSh244.2billioninfiscalspacecreatedbythe transactionshouldreducetheGovernment's relianceondomestic borrowing.Lower domestic borrowing requirementswould sustain the crowdinginprivatesectorcredit.TheBankemphasized thatinfrastructure projectsfundedbytheproceedsshouldideallybethosealreadyprovidedfor preventexpenditureslippages.
132.CBKconcludedthatKenyaoperateswithinarobustregulatoryframework capableofsafeguardingfinancialstabilityandtheintegrityofthenational paymentsystem.Subjecttofinalregulatoryapprovalandsatisfactionof
133.From a macroeconomicperspective,CBK assessed the transaction aslikely toyield positive outcomes,includingincreased foreign exchange reserves, exchange rate stability,reduced domestic borrowing,lower interestrates, reiteratedthatitsapprovalremainsconditionaluponfullcompliancewith statutoryrequirementsandacomprehensiveassessmentofsystemicrisk considerations.

3.8OFFICEOFTHEDATAPROTECTIONCOMMISSIONER

AppearingbeforetheJointCommittee,MsImmaculateKassait,Director GeneralODPCsubmittedthefollowing:

134.That,any alteration in Safaricom'sownership structure,particularly an increaseinforeignshareholdingshould be accompaniedbyrobust clear,and

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya enforceablesafeguardstoensurestrictcompliancewithKenya'sdata protectionlegalframeworkandsafeguardtherightsofdatasubjects.

andorganizationalmeasuresinaccordancewithsection41oftheData ProtectionActtoimplementtheprinciplesin theActwhichmustguideall decisionsarisingfromorconnected tothedivestituretransaction.
136.Additionally,ODPCnotedthatthedivestitureshouldexplicitlysafeguardthe rightsofdatasubjectsasprovidedundersection26oftheDataProtection Act,includingtherighttobeinformedoftheuseofpersonaldata,theright offalseormisleadingdata,andtherightnot tobesubjecttoautomated decision-making without appropriate safeguards.These rights must not be diminishedorcompromisedasaconsequenceoftheproposedtransaction.
agents,suppliers,contractors,affiliates,and any third parties involved in dataprocessing,shouldberequiredtodemonstratefullcompliancewiththe DataProtectionAct.ThisincludesregistrationwiththeOfficeof theData ProtectionCommissionerasdatacontrollers and/or dataprocessorsin accordancewithSection18oftheActandconductofDataProtectionImpact Assessments(DPIAs)under Section 31 where processing activities arising fromthedivestiturearelikelytoresultinhighriskstotherights and freedomsofdatasubjects.

3.9OFFICEOFTHEAUDITORGENERAL(OAG)

138.TheOfficeoftheAuditorGeneralnotedthattheproposedpartialdivestiture oftheGovernmentshareholdinginSafaricomPLCwasbeingpursuedina challengingfiscal anddebtsituationcharacterizedbyhighpublicdebtlevels, increasing-costs ofdebt servicing,andlimited fiscal space which was appreciatedthepotentialoftheproposedtransactiontoprovidethemuchneeded non-debt financing for priority infrastructure investment,it expressed concern regarding issues of transparency,value for money,and thestrategicnationalinterestaspectsoftheproposedtransaction.
139.Specifically,thestakeholdersubmittedthattheSessionalPaperdidnot provideadequatejustificationfortheidentificationof theVodacom Group as thestrategicinvestorandwhetherotherinvestorsanddivestiture alternativesmighthavebeenconsideredintheprocessofsecuringthebest possible outcomeforthe GovernmentofKenya.Further,theAuditorGeneral pointedoutthatwhilethenegotiatedsalepriceandtheupfrontdividend monetizationofKsh.40.2billionwashighlyenticingintheshortterm,itwas

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPiCbyGovernmentofKenya likely to transform a regular andperpetual income source intoa single upfrontpaymentwhichmaynotbereflectiveof thevalue of theoutstanding shareholdingoftheGovernmentatthetimeofdivestitureintheabsenceof appropriatevaluationframeworkssuchasthediscountedcashflowand perpetualcashflowapproaches.

140.In addition,the Officenoted that theproposed divestiture of the shares of theforeignpartnerinSafaricomPLCinvolved thedisposalofcriticalnational infrastructure,especiallyin view of the company'spre-eminentposition in the fields of telecom,mobile money,as well as data-based services such as M-PESA,which are inseparably linked to the economic and social infrastructureof Kenya.As such,the proposed rise in foreign ownership posedpotentialrisksin theareasofnationalsecurity,datasovereignty, cybersecurity,andfinancialstability,especially if the eproposed strengthening of thegovernance frameworks inthe aftermathof the divestituredidnotoccur.
141.While theSessional Paperreferred to the agreed-uponprotections,such as the preservation of Kenyan members on the Board,restrictions on redundancies,as well as the continued funding of socialprograms,the Auditor-Generalemphasized thatsuch agreements should be enforceable under the relevant laws.Additionally,theOffice recommended that the proceedsofthedivestitureshouldbering-fencedexclusivelyfortheproposed infrastructure purposes,under a robust legal and governance framework, and thattherelevantauthoritiesshouldexerciseheightenedoversightover theprocessin theaftermathofthedivestiture inorder tosustainpublic confidence,aswellasnationalinterests.

3.10PUBLICPROCUREMENTREGULATORYAUTHORITY(PPRA)

142.Through awritten submission,theAuthority submitted that asguided under Section 4 (2) (d)of the PublicProcurement and Asset Disposal Act,Cap.412 procurementsorassetsdisposalswithrespecttowhichthisActappliesinvestments suchas shares purchased bycooperative societies,state corporationsorotherpublicentities".Therefore,thesaleofsharesbyapublic entitydoesnotfallwithinthescopeoftheActand is,therefore,outsidethe scopeoftheAuthority'smandate.

3.11INSTITUTE OFCERTIFIEDPUBLICACCOUNTANTS OFKENYA (ICPAK)

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya raising concerns overprice discovery and accountability.Ifnot addressed, theynoted that thiswillfueltheperceivedconcernthattheofferpriceis below Safaricom's all-time highofKSh.44.7in 2021,reinforcingpublic perceptions thattheassetmayhavebeensoldbelowitsintrinsicvalue.They recommendedtheneedtolink theproposedpremiumtoSafaricom's expected future earnings,sector outlook,and relevant macroeconomic trends,ratherthanrelyingsolelyonhistoricaltradingmetrics.Theyfurther proposedproviding a transparent explanation of thepricingmethodology, clearlystatingthereferencepriceandthecalculationofthepremium.

144.Theyhighlightedthatthroughthemonetizationoffuturedividends;future Governmentadministrationswilllosediscretionoveradependablerevenue sourcethatcouldhavesupportedrecurrentordevelopmentexpenditure.
145.ICPAKalsonoted that,Vodafone'snewshareholdingof55%,willresultin decision-making.
146.Theyemphasizedthatthedecisiontopursueaprivatetransactionrather than apublic offering has attracted criticism,which mayundermine public confidencein theprivatizationprocess.Theyrecommendedfortheneedfor revitalizeKenya's capital markets,particularly through public offerings and listingsontheNairobiSecuritiesExchange.
147.Additionally,they were also concerned with theperceivedweaknesses in transparencyandvaluationmaycomplicatefutureprivatizationeffortsby intensifying politicalandpublicresistance.TheynotedthatMTPIV emphasizes sustainable,long-term financing.Selling dividend-generating assetforone-timecapitalcontradictsthisprinciple.
148.TheInstitutemadethefollowingrecommendations;
i.A definedproportionof the divestitureproceedsshouldbe allocated toeachofthesectorsofEnergy30%,roads50%,water 10%and airports1o%tomanagetheseallocationstransparentlyand economicinfrastructure andsocialwelfare priorities,therefore supportingthegovernment'sagenda.
ii. Employmentsafeguardsbeextendedbeyondthreeyears,tocover severance and reskilling.
iii. Includeacomprehensiveriskassessmentaddressingdataprivacy, financialstability,andalternativefunding optionsinapostdivestiturescenario.Thistheynoted willinformpolicymakersof viable alternatives,strengthening long-term fiscal and digital resilience.

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iv. ICPAKhighlightedParagraph 3.2oftheSessionalPaperwhich statesthatthepartialdivestitureofSafaricomisexpectedtodeepen conductedoff-marketdirectlytoasinglebuyer.Suchastructure limitsparticipationbydomesticinvestors.
V. Divestitureofstrategicnationalassetsshouldbepermittedonlyas alastresort,afterdemonstrating thatallalternativefinancingand revenue-mobilisationoptionshavebeenfullyexploredand exhausted.

3.12KENYABANKERSASSOCIATION(KBA)

Government to fund government strategic projects especially on demand and competing priorities for infrastructure development this necessitated alternative funding arrangementsfrom theGovernmentof Kenya.
150.KBAappreciatedthattheenvisagedincreaseofVodacomshareholding,the citizens and financial services customers and the sector in general,will benefitimmenselyfromSafaricompotential tomobilizemorecapital for financial innovation through Vodacom as themajority shareholder.Such thatwillcatalyzedevelopmentofinnovativefinancialproductsandservices
151.Theynoted thatbyplacingmoreSafaricom sharesinfreefloatand aligning amajorportionwitha strategicinvestorlikeVodacom/Vodafone,theNSE long-termcommitmenttothecompany.
152.KBAnoted thatVodacom'smajorityshareholdingisexpected to instill global bestpracticein Networkdesignand optimisation,cybersecurity and data privacy,digitalplatforms(IoT,cloud,fintechinteroperability)and accelerate technology transferandadoption ofproven solutions,lowering execution risk.UltimatelySafaricomispositioned tobenefitfromImprovedCorporate Governance&InvestorConfidenceresultingtoa strongervalue of the companyfortheshareholders.

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153.Theyrecommendedthat5%ofthesharesunderdivesturebereservedtothe public tobroadenpublic ownership andparticipation in thisnationalkey asset.

3.13 THEKENYAASSOCIATIONOFSTOCKBROKERSAND INVESTMENT BANKS(KASIB)

154.The Kenya Association of Stockbrokers and Investment Banks (KASIB) supportedtheGovernment'sproposedpartialdivestitureofitsshareholding inSafaricomPLCandaffirmedthattheproposedtransactionpriceofKSh34 persharerepresentsafairandprofessionallyjustifiablevaluationfora strategicblocksale.KASIBobservedthatthedivestiturewillgenerate substantialimmediatefiscalresources,estimated atover KShs40billion, whichwillbeappliedtowardsinfrastructuredevelopment,debtreduction, andothernationaldevelopmentprioritiesatatimeofconstrainedfiscal space.TheAssociation justifiedits supportby notingthatprivatesector-led greaterefficiency,innovation,andvalue creation thanfull State ownership, whiletheGovernment'sretainedshareholdingwillpreservestrategic oversight.
Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE)Block Trading Board will safeguard information,orderlyexecutionofalargetransaction,andsecuresettlement under theCapitalMarkets regulatoryframework,therebyprotecting minorityshareholdersandreinforcingtheNsEastheprimaryplatformfor Stateassettransactions.
156.Thestakeholderproposedanamendmenttothetransactionstructureto maximizepublicbenefitandstrengthenKenya'scapitalmarketswherethe Governmentshouldincreasethetotaldivestitureto20percenttoofferan proceedstoapproximatelyKSh312billion,broadenpublicparticipationin ownershipofanationalasset,promotewealthdemocratization,andboost market liquidityand investor confidence inacapitalmarket thathas experienceddecliningactivitywhilenationalinterestswillremainprotected ofGovernmentboardrepresentationandvetorightsoncriticalcorporate without compulsory acquisition ofminority shareholders,and continued enforcementofobligationsrelatingtoemployment,localinvestment,data protection,competition,mobile financial services,and national security, whichcollectivelyensuresthatthetransactionwillnotamounttoalossof Governmentcontroloverthisstrategicasset.

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157.The Associationrecommendedacceleratedprivatizationsof other institutionsandInitialPublicOffering(IPO)s.

3.14LAWSOCIETYOFKENYA(LSK)

158.The Law Society ofKenya (LSK) opposed theproposed partial divestiture of the Government'sshareholdinginSafaricomPLCwhileacknowledging the mobilisingnon-debtfinancingforinfrastructuredevelopment.LSKstated that Safaricom,despite being a publicly listed company,constitutes a strategicnationalassetbecause of itsmarketdominance,itsroleasthe backbone of Kenya's telecommunications and mobile financial services infrastructure through M-Pesa,and its systemic importance to public finance,national security,and capital markets.
159.Theyemphasised thattheGovernmentholdsitsSafaricomsharesintrust for thepeopleofKenya,renderingtheproposeddivestituresubject to strict constitutionalsafeguards under Articles 10,95,201 and227of the Constitution,including theprinciplesofpublicparticipation,transparency, accountability,prudentuseofpublicresourcesandintergenerationalequity. WhileLSKrecognised thattheproposedsalecouldyield short-termfiscal relief,it found that the Sessional Paper prioritised immediaterevenue considerationsoverlong-termsustainabilitybyfailingtoadequatelyassess foregone dividend income,reduced strategicinfluence,and thelong-term fiscaland economicconsequencesof diminishingState ownershipinahighperforming,dividend-yieldingassetwithsignificantgrowthprospects.
160.LsKfurtherraiseddetailedconcernsregardingthestructureandgovernance implications oftheproposed transaction,noting thatthe salewould result inmajorityforeignownershipofSafaricomPLCandreducetheGovernment toaminorityshareholderwithlimitedabilitytoinfluencestrategicdecisions affecting national data infrastructure,mobile money systems,competition dynamicsandpricing.
16l.TheysubmittedthattheSessionalPaperlackstransparencyonthevaluation methodology, timing and sale structure,thereby exposing a critical public assettotheriskofundervaluationandunderminingconstitutional principlesoffiscalprudenceandaccountabilityunderArticle2o1.The stakeholdercriticizedtheabsenceofacomprehensivefiscalimpact assessmentquantifyinglong-termrevenuelosses,strategicspill-overeffects andintergenerationalimpacts,aswellasthefailuretoclearlyring-fenceand accountfortheintendeduseofproceeds.
162.LSK also highlighted significant gaps relating to public participation, minority shareholder protection,dispute resolution mechanisms,data sovereignty,cybersecurity and stakeholder protection,warning that

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya increasedforeigncontrolcouldweakenKenya'sregulatoryleverage,expose sensitivecitizen datatoforeignjurisdictions,and enableanti-competitive or market-distortingbehaviour.

163.Onthisbasis,LsKrecommended thatParliamentshouldrejecttheSessional Paper in its current form,require its revision following wider and more meaningful stakeholder engagement,and insist on a transparent, competitiveandindependentlyverifiedvaluationprocess,full disclosureof financial and market-risk analyses,clear ring-fencing of proceeds for verifiable infrastructure or debt reduction,and comprehensive national security, data sovereignty and fiscal impact assessments before any divestitureofSafaricom PLC could be lawfully,prudently and constitutionally approved.

3.15ANDERSENLLP

164.Thestakeholdersubmitsthattheysupporttheproposedpartialdivestiture ofSafaricomPLCbutraiseafewissuesconcerningthesame.Further,the stakeholderpinpointstheissuesthroughtheidentificationofafewclauses inthesessionalpaperthatarecontentious.
165.Onpreservationofnationalinterest,AndersonLLPwasconcern aboutdata security andurgesSafaricom toprovidecriticaldigitalinfrastructurewith financialandnationalsecurityimplications.
166.Inrelationto economicimperatives,the stakeholder supportstheproposal, commentingthatthedivestitureallowsthegovernmenttoraisecapital withoutincreasingdebtorraisingtaxes.
167.InrespecttoClause3onvaluerealization,thestakeholderisconcernedover thevaluationmethodologyand themismatchofsellingindollars.The pershare.Further,thereisforeignexchangeriskarisingfrom theconversion ofproceeds.
168.OnClause 4oncontinuedgrowthandinvestmentbySafaricomPLC,the stakeholderwelcomestheproposalandargues thatretaining exposure throughanon-controlling statepreservesvalueandbenefitsfromgrowth withoutconstrainingresources.
169.Thestakeholderobservesthat thesessionalpaperprovidesthatthe divestitureproceedswillbeallocated towardsinfrastructuredevelopment, but there islimitedinformation on governancesafeguardsforproceeds management.ThestakeholderrecommendsthattheNationalInfrastructure FundbeformedinaccordancewithSection24(4)of thePublicFinance Management Act (PFMA)togo through public participation and parliamentaryoversighttoreduceexecutionriskofthefund.

3.16SAFARICOMPLC

Appearingbefore theJoint Committee,DrNdegwa theCEOofSafaricomPLC noted thefollowing:-

170.proposed transactionbeforeParliamentisa shareholder-to-shareholder transaction between theGovernmentof Kenyaand Vodacom.Safaricom itself isnota counterparty to this transaction.The company is not selling shares, setting pricing,or negotiating valuation. Their role is limited to lawandcapitalmarketsregulations.
171.SafaricomfacilitatedthepublicationofaNoticeofIntentionon4thDecember 2025,asrequired under the Capital Markets Act and the CapitalMarkets (PublicOffers,ListingsandDisclosures)Regulations.
172.All commercial terms,including price and structure,remain matters between the transacting shareholders.Safaricom's responsibility is to ensure full regulatory compliance,timely disclosures,and continued operationalstabilitythroughouttheprocess.
173.He stated that the proposed transaction does not alter Safaricom's governance framework,regulatoryoversight,or national jurisdiction. Additionally,henoted thatSafaricomwillcontinuetooperatefullyunder Kenyan law.The companyremainslicensed,supervised,andregulatedby Kenyaninstitutions,including the Communications Authority of Kenya,the Central Bank,Capital Markets Authority,the Competition Authority of Kenya,and other relevant regulators. Safaricom remains listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange,and accountable to Kenyan enforcement mechanisms.
174.Vodacom Group has been a strategic shareholder since the company's inceptionandhasmaintainedrepresentationontheBoardforovertwo decades.Safaricomsubmitted thatVodacomhassupportedthecompany through multiple phases of growth,innovation,and expansion.
175.Further,Vodacom has played a key role in Safaricom's regional expansion, including entryinto the Ethiopianmarket,byproviding experience from multiple jurisdictions,technical expertise,and long-term investment intendedtoreinforcealong-terminvestmentorientationand strengthen Safaricom's access to global best practices,technology capabilities,and regionalmarketinsightsinsupportofthecompany'sVision2030ambitions.
alterits operationalmodel,leadership structure,or engagementwith key stakeholders.The companyindicated thatitsleadership teamremainsin

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culturedevelopedovermorethan25yearsremainsunchanged.
177.Safaricom reaffirmed its commitment to its local supplier,dealer,and partner ecosystem,which supportsthousandsof jobs and enterprises nationwide.These relationships remain a core strength of Safaricom's

3.17INSTITUTE OFCERTIFIED INVESTMENT AND FINANCIALANALYSTS (ICIFA)

178.ICIFAsupportedtheproposeddivestiture.Theynoted thatSafaricomPLCis aflagshiplistedcompanywhoseperformanceandownershipstructurehave far-reaching implications forKenya's fiscal position,capital markets,and digital financial ecosystem.Decisions regarding government ownership in immediatecommercialandfiscalconsiderations.

179.Safaricom'smarketcapitalizationhasattimesexceededKES1trillion,and indices and tradingvolumes.Asa result,changesin Safaricom's shareprice andownershipstructuremayhavesystem-wideeffectsonmarket confidenceandportfoliovaluationsacrossthefinancialsector.

180.Thehighlighted thefollowing;-

i. CapacityofthedomesticmarketKenya'sdomesticcapitalmarkets possessmorethansufficientcapacitytoabsorba15%equitystake inSafaricom.
ii. Impactonthecapitalmarkets.Safaricomaccountsforcloseto50% ofdailytradingvolumeson theNSE.Increasing thefreefloat
iii. consistentdividend-paying record.Increasing foreign ownership would result inhigher dividend outflows in foreigncurrency, exertingadditionalpressureonKenya'sbalanceofpayments.
iv. Policy,governance,and national interest. Safaricom is not an ordinarycommercialenterprise.Itsplatformsandservicesdirectly influencethedailylivesofmillionsofKenyansandunderpincritical sectorsoftheeconomy.

5. 181.Theyproposedthatthesaleofthe15%stakeinSafaricomLimitedshould notbetoaforeignentityandinsteadprioritiseadomesticallocation.Such an approachwould achievefiscal objectives while strengthening capital

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya markets,preserving foreign exchange,and safeguardingnational strategic interests.

3.18TECHNOLOGYSERVICEPROVIDERSOFKENYA(TESPOK)

182.Tespoksupportstheinitiativethataimstooptimisestateassetsfornational development,provided they are conducted with transparency,foster fair competition,and result intangible long-term benefits for the Kenyan economyanditsdigitaladvancement.
183.Thestakeholdernoted that,Safaricom PLC as a strategicallysignificant national asset and a major contributor to the country's digital transformation,financialinclusion andfiscalrevenue.Theyrecommended the following to ensure the divestiture process strengthens,Kenya's telecommunicationsand digitallandscape;-
i. Uphold and Strengthen Market Competition-Safaricom's market positionissubstantialandanychangeinitsshareholdingstructure shouldnotentrench dominance or discourage investmentby other Industry players. They proposed that the National Assembly,in conjunction with the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) establishaclearpost-divestituremonitoringframeworktoensure continued strict adherence to pro-competition principles, fair interconnectionratesandequitablespectrumallocation tofostera healthy,multi-playerecosystem.
ii. Ensure ProcessTransparency and FairValuation-The credibility of thisexercise hingesonabsolute transparencyin thevaluation methodologyand timing.Thegovernmentshouldpubliclydisclosethe comprehensive valuation report,subject to standard commercial confidentialitycarve-outsand therationaleforthechosendisposal method.A transparentprocesswill maximisepublictrust,achievefair valueforthenationalassetandbolsterInvestorconfidenceinKenya's capitalmarkets.
iii. Ring-fence Proceeds for Digital Infrastructure and Innovation The infusion of capitalfrom thisdivestiture presents aunique fiscal benefit.They proposed for a substantive portionof the net proceedstobestrategicallyreinvestedinto criticalnationaldigital infrastructureprojects.This could include:
b)Strengthening cybersecurityresilience frameworks:
a)Universalbroadbandaccess initiatives,especially in underserved andruralareas;
c)Funding for innovation hubs, digital skills training, and supportforSMEsand

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d)Modernisingdigitalgovernmentservices.
e) Thistargetedreinvestmentwouldcreatealastingdigital dividendforallKenyansandstimulatesector-widegrowth.
iv. Safeguard Strategic National Interests - Telecommunications is a sensitivesectorwithimplicationsfornationalsecurity,data sovereignty,andeconomicstability.Thedivestiturestructureshould include prudent safeguards.These may involve golden share provisions,consider limiting individual foreign ownership or other mechanismsapprovedbyrelevantregulatorstoensurethatnational newshareholdingstructure.
V. Maintain Stable Sector Governance - A sudden or poorly communicatedshiftinakeyshareholder'spositioncancreatemarket uncertainty.Thedivestitureplanshouldbeexecutedinaphasedand predictable manner,with clear communication to all market participants.

3.19AIRTELKENYA

184.AirtelKenyawasnotopposedtotheproposedpartialdivestitureinSafaricom PlcbytheGovernmentofKenya.Itbaseditbecauseitwillresultinchanges inSafaricom'sPlcshareholdingandnotits externalcontractual arrangements.However,they noted that they expect the Government throughitsregulatorybodiestoensurethatthereisalevelplayingfieldand faircompetitioninthetelecommunicationsector.

3.20JAMIITELCOM(JTL)

185.JTLexpressedgeneralsupportforthepartialdivestitureinSessionalPaper No.3of2025.Thecompany submittedthat theproposeddivestiture aligns with international bestpractices,particularlywhere governmentstransition from\_ownershipinmature\_commercial\_enterprises\_to\_focus\_on\_strategic public priorities.JTLfurther noted that thedivestiture wouldpromote capitalmarket development,enhanceliquidity,andstrengthen regulatory neutralitybyreducing potentialconflictsofinterestarising from state ownership.
186.Theyindicatedthatretentionofa20%strategicGovernmentstake,together with board representation,provides a prudent balance between fiscal objectivesandthesafeguardingofnationalstrategicinterests.
187.JTLsubmittedthattheproposedsaleisexpectedtodeliverseveralbenefits to the Kenyan economy.These include themobilisation of approximately KES 204billioninnon-debtrevenue fornationaldevelopmentprojects, particularlyininfrastructure sectors suchas energy,transport,water,and

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya digitaltransformation.Thecompanyfurthernotedthattheproposedpricing reflects apremiumvaluation,therebymaximisingpublicassetvalue.

188.JTL alsosubmitted thatincreasedstrategicparticipationbyVodacomGroup couldstrengthenSafaricom'sregionalcompetitivenessandenhanceits capacity toinvest in next-generation telecommunications networks,with positivespill-overeffectsacrossthewidersector.
189.Thestakeholderraisedthefollowingadditionalconcerns
i. Spectrum Concentration and Management-JTL raised concerns regarding the concentration and management ofradio frequency spectrum,which itdescribed as a finite andstrategic public resource.Thesubmissionnotedhistoricalasymmetriesinspectrum allocationandcautionedthatincreasedprivatecontrolfollowingthe divestiturecouldentrenchmarketdominanceifnotaccompaniedby clearsafeguards.

TheyrecommendedthatParliamentdirecttheCommunications Authoritytoundertake an audit ofexisting spectrumholdings, establish spectrum caps in high-demand bands,and develop a andcompetitiveuseoftheresource.

ii. Overall Regulatory and Market Impact on the Kenyan Telecommunications Sector-JTLnoted that the transaction materiallyincreasesprivatecontroloverahistoricallydominant operator.Withoutproactiveandcoordinatedregulatoryoversight, this shift risks entrenching anti-competitive market structures. Theyrecommended that the Communications Authority(CA)and the Competition Authority of Kenya(CAK)establish a joint, s andenforcecompetitionrulespre-emptively.
iii. Long-Term National Objectives as the Benchmark- They emphasisedthatthesuccessofthedivestitureshouldbemeasured against long-term national objectives,including sustainable competition,innovation,investment,and improvedconsumer outcomes.JTLcautionedthatexcessivemarketconcentrationcould undermine Kenya'sdigitaltransformationagendaandlimit consumerchoice.Additionally,theysubmittedthatacompetitive, multi-player telecommunicationsmarketisessentialforrealising theobjectivesofKenya'sDigital EconomyBlueprint andpositioning thecountryasaregionaltechnologyhub.
iv. Essential Facilities Access and National Roaming- JTL highlighted theimportanceoffairandnon-discriminatoryaccessto essential facilities,including telecommunications towers,fibre

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In addition,theynoted that Parliament should direct the CommunicationsAuthoritytodevelop andimplementa comprehensive National Roaming Framework,with transparent, cost-orientedpricingand enforceable quality-of-service standards. This will support nationwide service availability,reduce unnecessarynetwork duplication,and enhance consumer outcomes,particularlyinruralandunderserved areas.

3.21SAFARICOMDEALERS'ASSOCIATION

190.TheSafaricomDealersAssociationisaformallyregisteredbodyunderthe SocietiesAct(Cap 108,RegistrationNo.SOC/45649).Itrepresentschannel distribution and trading partners operating under Safaricom's Channel PartnerFrameworkAgreementsoverthecompany's25-yearexistence.
19l.TheAssociationpresenteditselfasafoundationalpillarofSafaricom's commercialinfrastructure.Itstatedthat itsmember partnershave collectivelyinvestedoverKsh1.otrilliontobuildandsustaindistribution infrastructure,enabling the acquisition and servicing ofover 50million customers.The network comprises approximately 434 key distribution agents,675,000 Lipa na M-Pesa merchants,and 1.15 million Pochi la touchpoints.
192.TheAssociationfurthernotedthatitsmembersfinancethefloat underpinning M-Pesatransaction processing.TheM-Pesa ecosystem trillioninFY2025,withdailytransactionvolumesreachingKsh98billion. Theassociationsubmittedthatitsnetworkdirectlyemploysover855,000 staffandsustainsover4.3milliondependents.
193.WithrespecttoSafaricom'staxcontribution,theynotedthatthecompany contributedKsh168.2billioninFYendingMarch2025,andoverKsh1.48 trillion since inception a performance the Association attributes in significantpart to itsownrolein theshared-prosperitybusinessmodel.

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194.The stakeholdersupports theproposedpartialdivestitureofSafaricomPLC, submittingthatthe2o%stakeallowsthegovernmenttohaveacontinued theassociationraisedafewconcernsabouttheproposalasfollows:
i. Impactondealercontractsandcontinuity-thedivestiturecould triggerindirectchangestoSafaricom'smanagementorpolicies, affectingdealeragreements.
iii. Nationalsecurityanddigitalinfrastructure-concernsondata privacyandaccesstoservicesinunderserved areas,asa shift towardsVodacom'sinternationalprioritiescouldcompromise theservices thatarecritical toKenya'sfinancialinclusion.
ii. Risks to local SMEs and Employment - greater foreign control may favour large-scale distributors,marginalizing local partners,and thisleadstojoblosses and SMEs'collapse.
iv. Transparencyandvaluation-thereisaneed forindependent auditstopreventundervaluationofnationalassetsandensure fairness.
195.TheyrecommendedvariousconcernsfortheinterestofSafaricom'spartner eco-systemtoParliament,including:
i. Amend thesessionalpapertoincludemandatorysafeguardsfor local partners
ii. Mandatestakeholderconsultationswithpartnerrepresentatives duringimplementation topreventanti-competitivepractices
iii. RequirereportingtoParliamentontheimpactofthedivestiture
iv. PrioritizeKenyaninvestorsinanyfutureofferingsto enhance localownershipandreduceforeigndominance
196.Thestakeholderconcluded by emphasizingtheneedforbalancedreformsto protectvulnerablestakeholderslikelocalpartners.

3.22 SAFARICOM DEALERS (CHECHE TELECOMM,CASHCOM LIMITED, KILIMANJAROLTD,EDTONTECH,SABENALTD,EASTZONE)

197.ThestakeholdersnotedthattheSafaricomDealersnetworkplaysacritical roleinthegrowthofSafaricomPLC.Theyareconcernedthatanyabruptor business closures,stranded investments and negative spill-over effects on thewidereconomy.
s uniquetotheKenya telecommunicationsmarketunlikeotherVodacom markets.Theynoted thatanyfuturerestructuringortransitionmustbethe

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya subjectofexplicitengagementandagreementbetweenSafaricomPLc, Vodacom Group andKenyan dealers rather thanunilateralalteration or withdrawal.

199.Additionally,they areconcerned ofindications thatSafaricomPLCisinthe process of offloading,restructuringormonetizingits subscriberbaseofover 50millionsubscribers.Theyrecommendedthatanyvaluationor considerationpaidforSafaricomsubscribesshouldincludevaluecreatedby dealers.
200.Theyhighlighted thatthegovernment'sshareholdingprovidedsafeguardfor local dealerinterestsnotinganychangeofcontroldiminishesthisprotection andexposesthedealerstounilateralcommercialdecisions.
201.Theyproposedseveral safeguardsfor dealerswishing to exit thebusiness:
i.Aone-offpaymentequivalenttoaminimumof20yearsofresidual andgoodwillcalculatedonthebasisofeachdealer'scustomerbase andhistoricalAverageRevenuePerUser(ARPU).
ii. Full compensation for physical infrastructure, franchise investmentsandstaffrelatedtransitionliabilities.
202.Fordealerswishing to continue they shouldbeguaranteed:
i. Preservationofresidual or equivalentlong-termrevenuemodel.
ii. Clearcontractual protection againstunilateral termination.
ili. Safeguardsaligned toanynewownershiporcontrol structure.

3.23TRANSCEND MEDIA GROUPLIMITED

ThroughitsDirector,the stakeholder submitted asfollows;-

203.In2016,thedirectorsofTranscendMediaGroupLimitedmadeacomplaint to the County Criminal Investigation Officer,Milimani regarding theft of tenderfloatedbySafaricomforprovisionofCreativeandDigitalServices. ForensicinvestigationshowedthatSafaricominfluencedandenticed employeesofTranscendMediaGrouptoleavetheiremploymentandwork fororinconjunctionwithSaracenLimitedinimplementationofthecreative
204.As a result of the foregoing infractions,the Directorate of Criminal Investigationsinitiatedinvestigationsoverpossibleviolationsofprovisions of theBriberyAct(2016) and despite several summons to the directorsand managementofSafaricomLimitedtoshedlightontheirpossibleprosecution forperpetuatingconflictofinterest andtheftofintellectualproperty,they ignoredand/ordefiedthesame.

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205.They noted that the Capital Markets(Securities)(Public Offers,Listing and Disclosures)Regulations (2012)require detailed disclosure or reporting of between thecompanyandTranscendMediaGroupLimited and thousands ofother claims in court,whatis theextentofprovisionby the Company of suchLiabilitiesandtowhatextentcanitbedeterminedassufficienttocover theexposure.
206.Thetaxpayersonwhosebehalf the GovernmentofKenyaholdsshareshave alegitimateexpectationtobenefitfromfulldisclosureofthelitigation exposureandwhetherthehugepayouttothegovernmentforthedivesture exposesthecompanyintheirabilitytodefraytheliabilities.
207.Tosecuretheinterestsofpotentialcreditorsand inordertoalignthe divestiture with constitutional principles,they proposed amendingor conditioning approvalof theSessional Paper to include mandatory safeguardsforallthecreditorsandafulldisclosureofthefinancial provisionsfortheliabilitiesprojectedtoariseoutoflitigationinvolvinglarge sumsofmoney.
208.Additionally,Safaricom creditorsbeprotected againstanyloss or disruption whichmayarisefromVodacom Groupacquiringandbecomingamajority shareholderafterthetransaction.

3.24TRANSPARENCYINTERNATIONALANDKATIBAINSTITUTE.

209.Thestakeholdersubmittedgeneralcommentsandrecommendationsto the proposed divestiture raises concerns regarding fiscalprudence, intergenerationalequity,transparency,value-for-money,andaccountability, which are all principles of public finance as per Article 201of the Constitution2010.
210.The proposedpartialdivestiture seeks toprioritizeshort-termreliefover long-termgains.Thisundermines theconstitutionalimperative(Article10), which is also aprinciple of asset disposal,for developmenttobesustainable. Themove does not safeguardpublicinterest,given that SafaricomPLCisa critical company not only inKenya's communication sector,but also in the digitaleconomyspaceand thefinancial system.
211.Additionally,theyhighlighted thatthereisalackof specificityinhow the KShs204.3billionprojected toberaisedwill beused.TheSessionalPaper doesnot clearlyidentify the specificprojects tobefinanced usingproceeds fromthesaleofthe15%stake.Thelackofaspecificandclearplanfor the

utilizationofthefundsdelegitimizes theurgencywithwhich the divestiture is soughttobeconcluded.
212.There hasbeen no proper justification for non-competitiveness in the sale of the15%GoKstakeatSafaricomPLC.Thisunderminestheimperativeto maximizevalue for money in thedisposalofassets,under section 3of PPADA.
213.TheproposedsaleofGoK's15%stakeinSafaricomPLCtoVodacomGroup raisescriticalconcerns aboutthefurthertransferofcontroloverastrategic nationalasset to externalinterests,which appears inconsistentwith the government'sstatedBottom-UpEconomicTransformationModel.
214.Theynotedthattherewasinconsistencybetweenwhatiscontainedinthe Sessional Paper and the information presented by the CS for National TreasurytotheJointParliamentaryCommittee,whenheappearedbeforeon 13thJanuary2026,onthematterontwolevels-there isarealriskof paymentofproceedsofthedivestitureintoafund(NationalInfrastructure disclosureprovidedintheSessionalPaperregardingthetermsofpayment byVodacom of theupfront amount ofKShs40.2billion.
215.Theproposedapprovaltimeframeof28daysoffersalimiteddurationthat restricts opportunities for comprehensive technical review,stakeholder time for in-depth fiscal analysis,stakeholder consultations, and public disclosure.
216.They emphasized thattheSessional Paperdoesnotgiveaproper explanation ofwhytheGoKwouldopttodivestsuchanasset thatisfinanciallystrong, market dominant,and akey driver to financialprosperity,inclusion,and digitalpublicinfrastructure.Theyrecommended thatParliamentaskfor inclusionofaprecisepublicinterestandstrategicassetanalysisbefore approvingthismove.
divestitureaimstohelpwithresourcemobilizationfordevelopment purposes,but thereisno clear explanation of thepreferred methodology as opposedtoothermechanisms.Theyrecommendedtoreevaluatethe objectivetoalignwithArticle201oftheCoK2010principlesofpublic finance.

218.Thestakeholderrecommendedthatthegovernmentof Kenyashould undertakeathoroughpublicinteresttestregardingtheproposed divestiture, given thecentral roleSafaricom PLCplays inKenya's governance and economy,exploreotheralternativestofinancingthebudgetanddevelopment projectsotherthanthedisposalofthe15%GovernmentstakeinSafaricom PLC,andthattheCommitteeshouldhaltitssessionsanddemandthatthe CSpresentarevisedPaper that accurately captures all detailsrevealedbut notcontainedinthePaper.
incorporateadetailed Cost-BenefitandFiscalRiskAnalysis,in compliance withPFMAct.

3.25KENYANATIONALCHAMBEROFCOMMERCEANDINDUSTRY

KNCCIsubmittedasfollows:

220.KNcCI is the apex body representing Kenya's private sector interests,with a presence in forty-seven (47) county chapters across the country.The environment and sustainable economicgrowth.In its submission,KNcCI emphasised the strategic importance of Safaricom PLC as a national economicasset,particularlyinrelationtodigitalpayments,micro,smalland medium enterprises(MSMEs),andfinancialinclusion.
221.Theysubmitted thatSafaricomPLCfunctionsasasystemicallyimportant economic utility.The company processes transactions exceeding KShs25 trillion annually through theM-Pesa platform,serves over 30 million users, andsupportsmorethanonemillionMSMEs.Safaricomfurtherunderpins lending. In fiscal terms, the company contributes an estimated KShs140160billion annuallyin taxesandremits approximatelyKShs15-20billion individendstoshareholders,includingtheGovernment.
222.KNCCIraised severalconcernsregarding theproposed divestiture.These include theriskofprioritising a one-offfiscalgain at theexpenseoflongtermdividend income and strategic influence.The Chamber expressed Kenyaninvestors,aswell aspotential exposureofpension funds and unit trusts.Additional concernsrelatedtocompetitionandgovernancerisks MSMEs,and diminished incentives for innovationwithin the digital ecosystem.
223.Further,KNCCIurged thatthe transactionbe treated asanational economic decision rather than a purely fiscal intervention.The Chamber

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya divestituretranchesand thering-fencingofproceedsforpublicdebt reductionandproductiveinfrastructureinvestment.KNCCIfurthercalled fortheimpositionofrobustregulatorysafeguardstoprotectpricing,data governance,MsMEaccess,andcompetitionwithin thetelecommunications anddigitalservicessector.

3.26WECARECBO

224.The stakeholder notedthat Safaricom PLC is Kenya's most profitable companyandacriticalnationalassetwhosevalueextendsbeyond commercial returns to include national digital transformation,financial inclusion,data sovereignty,innovation ecosystems,and national security considerations.TheGovernment's current minoritybut influential shareholding has historicallybalancedpublicinterest oversight with commercialbenefit.
225.Thestakeholderemphasized thatwhilethestatedobjectivesofresource mobilisation,debt reduction,capital market deepening,and broadening ownershiparelegitimate, theyrequirecarefulscrutiny froman whatit termed"short-term fiscalism,"cautioning that divesting ahighperforming asset toaddressimmediatefinancingneeds could undermine sustainable publicrevenue through future dividend flows.Further,they emphasizedthatevenpartialdivestituremayweakentheState'sstrategic influenceoverkey decisionsrelatingto datagovernance,pricingofessential digitalservices,andnationalinfrastructurepriorities.
226.WeCareYouth Organizationalsounderscoredequityand accessconcerns, notingthatwithoutdeliberate safeguards,thedivestiturecould disproportionatelybenefitinstitutionalandeliteinvestorsratherthan ordinary citizens,includingyoungpeople.The stakeholderfurther observed thattheproposedtransactionsetsaprecedentforthefuturetreatmentof otherprofitableorstrategicstate-linkedassets.
227.The stakeholder highlighted international experiences from the United Kingdom,SouthAfrica,andSingapore.Theyemphasizedlessonsrelatingto phased divestiture,transparent valuation,strong and independent regulation,and retention of strategic state influence over critical infrastructure.Thestakeholdernoted thattheseexperiences demonstrate therisksofundervaluationandweakenedpubliccontrolwheresafeguards areinsufficient.
potentialundervaluationofSafaricomPLCsharesandthepermanentloss oflong-termpublicrevenue.Theyhighlightedtheriskthatdivestiture proceeds couldbeused to address short-termbudgetarypressuresrather

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya revenueswithone-offfinancing.Thestakeholderfurtheremphasizedrisks related to erosion of strategicpublicinfluence,threatsto data sovereignty, weak enforcement of digital rights,and diminished publicparticipation.

229.Thestakeholderalsohighlighted thatyoungpeople,asthemost active users of digital platforms,are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of reducedpublic oversight in areas such as data protection,affordability of digital services,andaccesstoinnovationopportunities.
230.TheyrecommendedthatParliamentshouldonlyapprove theSessional Paper subjecttoclearconditionsandsafeguards.Thestakeholderhighlighted the needforcomprehensivecost-benefitandalternatives analysis,phased divestiturewithperiodicparliamentaryreview,ring-fencingofproceedsfor development-orientedinvestments,retentionofstrategicstateinfluence,and strengthenedpublicparticipationanddisclosuremechanisms.
231.WeCareemphasized thatSafaricomPLCrepresentsbothafinancialasset andapillarofKenya'sdigitalfuture.Theynotedthatdecisionsaffectingits ownershipstructurewillhavelasting implicationsforyoungpeople and future generations.They urged Parliament to approach the proposed divestiture with caution,transparency,and a firm commitment to constitutionalism andintergenerationalequity,emphasizingthatshort-term fiscal considerationsshouldnotoverridelong-termpublicinterest.

3.27THEINSTITUTEOFSOCIALACCOUNTABILITY(TISA)

theprocessandsubstanceof thetransactionfundamentallyviolated constitutional principles,statutory requirements,and the public trust doctrine governingpublic assets.The stakeholderfound theproposed sale tobe unconstitutional,economically imprudentparticularlygiven Safaricom'scentralroleinKenya's digitaleconomy,financialinclusion,and nationalsecurityinfrastructure.
233.The stakeholder expressed serious concern that theproposeddisposalofa 15percentstaketoVodacomwasundertakenwithoutalegallyestablished InfrastructureFundunderArticle206oftheConstitutiontoreceiveand ring-fencetheproceeds.Intheabsenceofsuchastatutorymechanism,the statedintentiontoapplyKsh244.5billiontowardinfrastructureremains unenforceableandexposesthefundstodiversionforrecurrentexpenditure, contrarytoArticles201and206.Thisriskisexacerbatedbytheinclusion ofanupfrontKsh40.2billionpaymentinlieuof future dividends,whichTISA viewedasaformofdisguisedborrowingthatsacrificedlong-term, sustainablerevenuestreamsforshort-termfiscalrelief,therebyviolatingthe principleofintergenerationalequity.

234.TheInstitutefurtherfaultedthevaluationanddisposalmethod,notingthat thedirectnegotiatedsaletoasingleforeignbuyerbypassed thecompetitive, transparentprocessesrequiredunderArticle227andthePrivatizationAct, 2025.ThestakeholdersubmittedthatthereductionofGovernment shareholdingfrom35percentto20percentwouldeliminatetheState's blocking minority rights,leaving itunable toinfluence critical decisions constitutionaldocuments.
235.Thestakeholderalsoraisedconcernsaboutthetransferofeffectivemajority control to Vodacom,aforeign entity,without any national security, competition,ordataprotectionimpactassessments.Safaricomoperates criticaltelecommunicationsandfinancialinfrastructure,includingsystems handlinggovernment communications,taxcollections,and security-related transactions.Theabsenceofbinding datasovereigntyandlocalization safeguards,andthefailuretoinvolvetheOfficeoftheDataProtection Commissioner,exposesmillionsofKenyans'personaland financial data to potential offshoreprocessing andforeignjurisdictional control,undermining bothprivacyrightsandnationalsecurityunderArticles238and theData ProtectionAct,2019.
236.Inaddition,thestakeholderfoundthepublicparticipationprocess inadequate.The31-dayconsultationperiodconductedduringtheDecember holidayseason,withoutdisclosure ofkeydocuments suchasindependent valuationreportsandtransactionadvisoryanalyses,fellshortof the constitutionalthresholdformeaningfulpublicparticipation.TheInstitute furthernotedthelackofsocial,gender,county,andemploymentimpact assessments,warning thatvoluntaryundertakingsonjobprotectionand corporatesocialresponsibilitywerelegallyunenforceableandinsufficientto safeguardKenyanworkers,localsuppliers,andvulnerablecommunities.
237.The stakeholderurged the Committees sittingjointly toreject Sessional PaperNo.3of2025in-itscurrent-form,asapprovalwould seta dangerous of strategic public assets through closed-door negotiations.Should the Governmentpersistwithpartial divestiture,TISAurgedfullcompliancewith the Privatization Act,transparent valuation and competitive disposal methods such as an Initial Public Offering,preservation of Government blocking minority rights,comprehensive impact assessments,and the establishmentofenforceablesafeguardstoprotectKenya'sfiscal sustainability,digitalsovereignty,andlong-termnationalinterests.

3.28OPERATION LINDAJAMII-PROF.FREDOGOLA

divestitureofSafaricomshareshadnotbeensubjected tomeaningfulpublic

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya participation hence lacked disclosure of valuationmethodology,sale structure,and timing.Healsoargued thattheproposed divestiturefailedto demonstratealignment with sustainabledevelopmentprinciples.Thus,he noted that the absence of transparency and public engagement rendered the processconstitutionallydefective.

239.HehighlightedthattheSessionalPaperwasinbreachofArticle201ofthe Constitution noting that the disposal of a profitable,dividend-yielding strategicassettoaddressshort-termfiscalconstraintsviolatedtheprinciple ofprudence,andthedoctrineofintergenerationalequity,bysacrificinglongtermpublicrevenue for immediate fiscalrelief.Additionally,Prof.Ogolla arguedthattheSessionalPaperviolatedArticle35oftheConstitutionby failure to publicly release independent valuation reports,fiscal impact assessmentsandnational securityordataprotectionimpactanalyses.The omission he argued,infringed upon the constitutional rightofKenyans to makeinformeddecisionsregardingpublicassets.
240.Prof.Ogollanoted thatadirectorpreferentialsaletoVodacomPLCwithout a demonstrably competitive and transparent process raises serious constitutional concerns,particularly where market valuation is unclear, alternative disposal mechanisms (e.g.,NSE retail allocation) are unexplored and minority shareholder protections are inadequatelyaddressed.He highlightedthatArticles238and239obligatetheStatetosafeguardnational security.The transfer ofcontrollinginfluence toa foreign entityposes a risk tonational communicationssecurity,datasovereigntychallengesunderthe DataProtectionAct,2019andvulnerabilityincontinuityofessentialpublic services.Theseriskshenotedhavenotbeenadequatelyassessedor mitigated.
241.Prof.Ogollahighlighted thatunder the CompetitionAct,theStatehas a duty topreventabuseofdominantmarketpositions.Hearguedthattheproposed sale risked entrenching foreign monopoly power,weakening regulatory leverage over pricing,access,and universal service obligations and undermining faircompetitionintelecommunicationsand financial technology markets.He noted that selling strategic assets to fund the National Sovereign WealthFund defeated the conceptualand economic fundintoashort-termfiscalinstrumentrather thanagenerationalwealth drivenconditionalities.
242.Prof.Ogollarecommendedtheproposeddivestitureberejectedinitscurrent form noting that any future divestiturebe subjected toindependentand transparentvaluation,full publicparticipation,parliamentary scrutiny.He alsorecommendedaminimumof5o%ofanydivestedstakebeallocatedto retail investors through the NSE.Comprehensive impact assessments be

conductedonfiscalsustainability,nationalsecurityanddataprotection, competitionandmarketstructureandcontinuityofpublicandcontractual obligations.

3.29 CENTRAL ORGANIZATION OF TRADE UNIONS(COTU)

243.The stakeholder submitted that they support the partial divestiture of SafaricomPLCasstrategicdevelopmentintervention.Thepartialdivestiture willallowtheGovernmenttounlockvaluefromanexistingpublicasset, generatingsubstantialnon-taxrevenueforpriority development interventionswhileavoidingadditionaltaxationorunsustainableborrowing. Further,the retentionof asignificant minorityshareholding bythe Governmentpreserves strategicpublicinterestinSafaricomPLCbecauseit ensuresinfluenceoverkeystrategicdecisions.
244.Thestakeholder highlightedthat the partialdivestiture presents an Safaricom sharestoSaccos,pensionfundsandcooperative societieswhich sets up workers as active participants to value creation.However,the stakeholderstressesthatsupportfortheNationalInfrastructureFundmust beaccompanied byrobust governance and accountability mechanisms. Workers,through theirpension contributions and labour,are among the largestindirect financiersofinfrastructureandnationaldevelopment. Further,infrastructureinvestmenthas thehighestemploymentmultiplier effects whenprojectsarelabour-intensive,locallyanchored,andlinked to domesticsupplychains.
245.Thestakeholdersubmittedthattheywishedtoalignthemselveswiththe intendedobjectiveofthesalewhichistounlockcapitalforinfrastructure that creates jobs,lowers the costof doingbusiness,and restoreshopeto PLC,withtheproceedsearmarkedasseedcapitalfortheestablishmentof theNational Infrastructure Fund(NIF)toaddress Kenya'sinfrastructure deficit,stimulatejob creation,lower the cost of doing business,deepen industrialization,andunlock long-term economic growth,is a sound and forward-lookingpolicychoice.
246.Internationalexperiencedemonstratesthatwellgovernedinfrastructureand sovereigninvestment fundscanplayatransformativeroleinnational development when anchored in strong institutions,professional management,and clear public accountability.International analysis highlights keylessons from countries such as Singapore,China,Australia, and the United Arab Emirates,where strategicasset monetizationand disciplined investment vehicles have accelerated infrastructure delivery, expanded employment,strengthened industrial capacity,and improved living standards.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

247.The stakeholder enlisted strategic proposals in support of the Sessional Paperasfollows:
i. Development-orientedandinclusivedeploymentofdivestiture proceeds-allproceedsarising fromthepartialdivestitureof SafaricomPLCbestrictlyring-fencedanddeployed through the NationalInfrastructureFundforclearlydefineddevelopment priorities
ii. Protection ofpublicinterest,workers,and inclusive ownershipsafeguardsmustincludeprotectionofjobsandlabourstandards, mandatory unionization and collective bargaining coveragefor workers
iii. Transparencyandgovernance-fundcreationmustfollowhighest standards of transparency,including regular public disclosure, independentaudits,parliamentaryoversight,andclearinvestment mandates.
iv. WorkerRepresentationinGovernance
V. UnionizationandLabourStandards
vi. ProtectionofSafaricomWorkers
248.The stakeholder concluded by reiterating support for the proposed partial saleof the Government'ssharesinSafaricomPLC,specificallyon thebasis thattheproceedsarering-fenced asseed capitalfortheestablishmentof the National InfrastructureFund.Thesupportisgroundedintheconvictionthat this policy choice is intended to address Kenya's infrastructure deficit, accelerate job creation,lower the cost of doing business,support industrialization,andpromotelong-term,inclusive economic growth.

3.3OCONSUMER FEDERATIONOFKENYA(COFEK)

249.COFEKnoted thatanydivestmentofpublicsharesshouldfirstprioritize Kenyan citizens,cooperatives,pension funds and retail investors.Foreign whenalternativesexist.
250.COFEK raised concerns on whether the Government has adequately Kshs34.Theyalsoraisedconcernaboutwhether thiswastherighttimeto sellandwhether thepotential sellingata discountcrystallized short-term fiscal relief at the expenseof long-term value.Additionally,they inquired on whether publicparticipation wasconducted and whetheritwas substantive, inclusiveandinfluentialormerelyprocedural.
251.cOFEK recommended the jointcommittee toretain the shares while improvingfiscaldisciplinecould avoidunnecessarydilutionofpublicwealth. COFEK noted that assetdisposals should be the last resort and not

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya convenient.Additionally,theyrecommendedthejointcommitteetodemand fulldisclosureonvaluation,beneficiariesandalternatives.

3.31COMMUNICATIONWORKERS UNION(COWU-K)

252.TheStakeholderproposedtheamendmentofSessionalPaperNo.3of2025 toincorporateworkers'rights.Theynotedthatthe proposedchangein ownershipshouldnotunderminetherightsofthousandsofKenyanswho driveSafaricom'svaluecreation.Approximatelyover5oooemployeesfrom SafaricomPLCoccupyroleseligibleforunionmembershipunderArticle41 of the Constitution ofKenya,theLabourRelations Act,and International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 87 and 98.Despiterepeated efforts byCowU-K,Safaricom'smanagementhashistoricallyresistedformalunion recognition, denying employees their right to organize and bargain collectively.TheStakeholderurgedthetwoCommitteessittingjointlyto ensurethatSafaricomevolvesintoanenterprisethatrespectsworkers' rightstofreedomofassociation andcollectivebargaining,shielding them fromanti-uniondiscriminationandpromotingvoluntarynegotiations
253.Inlightoftheseconsiderations,thestakeholderwasoftheopinionthatthe partialdivestitureshouldproceedonlyifVodacomGroupcommitstothe formalrecognitionoftheunionandguaranteestherightsofemployeesto Recognition Agreement with CowU-K within threemonths of the transaction's closure,concluding a collective bargaining agreement within sixmonths,and ensuringthatno employeeisvictimized or dismissed for participatinginunionactivities.Additionally,SafaricomPLCshouldformally adoptVodacomGroup'sHumanRightsPolicyaspartofitsinternalhuman resource framework,thereby embedding international labour standards withinitsoperationstoalignSafaricomPLCwithglobalbestpractices,and promote sustainable governance,stability,and fairness within one of Kenya'smoststrategicnational assets.

3.32 KENYA NATIONALMICRO AND SMALLMANUFACTURER SERVICE PROVIDERS UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION(KENAMISMASPU)

254.KENAMISMASPUisanationalUmbrellabodyrepresentingMicro,Smalland Medium Enterprises (MSMEs),youth-led enterprises and informal sector ofKenya'sMSMEandyoutheconomy.Itsplatformssupportdallybusiness operations through mobile payments (M-Pesa),access to credit,digital concerned that reduced Governmentownership may result inincreased

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

255.Youth-ledandmicro-enterprisesfearashiftawayfrominclusivefinancial serviceswould haveimmediatenegativeeffectsoncashflow,employment, andhousehold Income forMSMEs.While theproposeddivestituremay generateshort-termrevenue,MSMEsandyouthurgeParliamenttoconsider the long-term benefits derived from dividends,taxation,and economic stability enabledbySafaricom'soperations.Sellingstrategicshareswithout clearreinvestmentplansrisksunderminingsustainableeconomicgrowth.
256.SafaricomholdssensitivefinancialandpersonaldataformillionsofMSMEs andyouth.AnydivestituremustpreservestrongGovernmentoversight to safeguard data sovereignty,consumer protection,and national economic security.

257.ThestakeholderrecommendedthatthejointCommittee

i. Conducts a comprehensive MSME and youth impact assessment beforeapprovingdivestiture.
ii. Retains sufficient Government shareholding to protectpublic and MSMEinterests.
iii. Ring-fencesthe proceed fordebtreductionorMSMEandyouth economicempowermentinitiatives.
iv. digitalinclusion.
V. Ensure continued consultation with MSMEs,youth groups,and informalsectorrepresentatives.

3.33FEDERATIONOFKENYAEMPLOYERS(FKE)

258.TheFederationsubmittedthattheysupport theprivatizationofstate-owned enterprises as long as this improves the efficiency,effectiveness,and performanceoftheseenterprisesbothintheshort-termand long-term.In addition,theprivatizationshouldmeettheconstitutionalrequirementsand protectthepublicinterestsofKenyaascountryandhercitizens.Itshould alsoprovidemore employmentand developmentopportunitiesforKenyans. Lastly,privatization should protect both the strategic interests and the NationalsecurityandsovereigntyoftheRepublicofKenya.
259.Theystated thatinafreemarketeconomy,ashareholderhas therightto sellhis shares in anycompany theyhave interestin to anywillingbuyer. The government stake in Safaricombelongs to the people ofKenya and therefore the citizensretain therightto decidewhether theywant their stake inSafaricomtobesoldornot.
260.Thegovernment'sdecisiontosellthe15%shareinSafaricomshouldonly happenifitisinthebestinterestofthecitizens(bothin the short-termand

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPICbyGovernmentofKenya

sovereigntyoftheRepublicofKenya.Additionally,theyraisedconcernsas towhether the salewill increase Safaricom'sefficiency,performance and effectivenessandincreasethedevelopmentopportunitiesforKenya.
261.TheFederationwasconcerned thatsellingthe15%staketoVodacom reducesKenya'sstakeinSafaricom therebyunderminingKenya'sNational securityandstrategicinterests.SafaricomisKenya'sCrowellanditsfuture performance isbright.It is important that a bigger stake isheld by the Kenyans either through government shareholding orcitizens shareholding. Safaricomis acompanywhosefuture dividendsandsharevaluewill create significantwealthforShareholdersinthelongrun.Thesesharesneed tobe in thehands ofKenyans.Safaricomisnotjustinvolvedinitscorebusiness, it has a bigger impact on Kenyans through its Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR).
262.In addition,Vodacom is already a major shareholder(40%) andhencewill becomeacontrollingshareholderwith theacquisitionof15%additional shares(55%).They were concerned on what will happen to the future of SafaricomifKenya'sstrategicdevelopmentalandNationalSecurityinterests arenotalignedwithVodacominterests.Safaricomisamajorplayerand enablerofdevelopmentandeconomicempowermentacrossKenya.Kenya (government stake plus individual Kenyans stake)needs to maintain a majorityshareholdinginSafaricom.Forexample,whathappensifoneday Vodacom,with55%shareholding,decidesthatSafaricom should delistfrom theNairobiSecuritiesExchangeandlistforexampleonLondonSecurities Exchange?Kenyawouldhaveverylittlesayinthe foreignpolicyof Vodacom's parent country.Safaricom has significant impact on the wellbeingofKenyansandtheeconomyatlargeanditshouldnotbe unnecessarilyexposed to this externalrisks.

3.34HON.NDINDINYORO,CBS,MP

263.Inhis submission,Hon.NdindiNyoro,CBS,MPnoted thattheproposed sale of15percentof theGovernmentofKenya'sshareholdingconstitutesa transactionofexceptionalscaleandsignificance.Henotedthatitisthe largestdivestitureinbothsizeandvalueundertakenbythegovernment since independence and,as such,must be subjected to thorough public participation and robust national debate.Inhisview,onlya transparent and people.
approachthetransactionwiththepostureanddisciplineofaprudentseller. ratherthandefendingatransactionthatmaydeliversub-optimaloutcomes.

predetermineddealratherthantomaximizenationalvalue.

265.Hon.Nyoro further sought clarity regarding the individuals involved in negotiating the transaction.Heraised concerns that some participantswho ostensiblyrepresentedtheinterestsof thepeopleofKenyawereneither publicofficersnorformally contracted agents ofthe Government,callinginto questionthelegitimacy,accountability,andtransparencyofthenegotiation process.
266.Hon.Nyoro noted that as recently as late 2021,before Safaricom's investmentinEthiopia,the company's sharepriceon theNairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) stood at approximately KSh 45,implying a valuation operation isapproaching operationalbreak-even and hasnotmaterially erodedcorefundamentals.
267.Heexpressedconcernthatproponentsofthetransactionareerroneously anchoring the valuation primarily on prevailingmarketprices.While stock notnecessarilyreflectintrinsicorfundamentalvalue.Thisisparticularly trueinbearishmarketconditions.Heobserved thattheNSEhasremained depressed foranextendedperiod,resultinginwidespread undervaluation of listedcompanies.
268.Hestressed thatcurrentmarketconditionsmakerelianceonsharepricean unreliableandpotentiallydamagingbenchmarkforvaluation.Although therehasbeenabriefbullish correction,themarketremainsstructurally bearish.Heillustrated thispointwith several examples:
I. KenyaPowercurrentlyhasamarketvaluationofapproximatelyKSh themostrecentfinancialyearandholdingassetsvaluedatoverKSh 400billion.Hequestionedwhetheritwouldbeprudenttosellany stakeinsucha companybasedonmarketprice,evenatasubstantial companywasvaluedatunderKSh4billion,despitenofundamental changes,underscoring the volatility and unreliability of market pricing.
II. KenGen has amarket capitalization ofroughly KSh 60 billion,yet reportednetprofitsofaboutKSh10billioninthelastfullyearand holds assets exceeding KSh 5oobillion.He questionedwhether any rationaldivestiturecouldbejustifiedonthebasisofmarketvaluation alone.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

III. despite consistently generating over KSh 5 billion in net profit annually,carrying no debt,holding cash and cash equivalents exceedingKSh 41 billion,andpossessingnet assets of more thanKSh 50billion.Hearguedthatsellingsuchan assetbasedonmarketprice wouldbeimprudent.
IV. Thebanking sector similarly demonstrates systemicundervaluation, withmostbankstradingbelowbookvalue.Forexample,KCBtrades atapproximately0.58timesbookvalue,Equityat0.75,andDTBat aroundO.3.Alllocalbankstradebelowbookvalue.Hequestioned undersuchcircumstances.

3. 269.Basedon theseexamples,Hon.Nyoronoted that,itwouldnotbeprudent forKenya tonegotiatesuchasignificanttransactionusing theprevailing marketpriceastheprimaryvaluationbenchmark.Hefurtherobservedthat historicalevidencedemonstratesthatblocktransactionsandcontrol-related sales consistently attract substantial premiums over marketprices.He cited severalexamples: 4. 。 REA Vipingo,which was trading at KSh 27.50 before the ultimatelyreceivedanofferofKSh70plusaKSh15top-up, resultingina finalprice of KSh 85.The transaction,concluded 209percent. 5. Bamburi Cement,acquired bytheAmson Group,traded belowKSh cent. 6. appearstodisposeofastrategicnationalassetatadiscountrelativeto historicalpeakprices. 7. 271.Hon.Nyoroquestionedhowthecurrentbuyerwasidentifiedandwhether alternativebidders wereconsidered.Heargued that achieving optimal pricingrequiresacompetitivebiddingprocess.Hefurtherquestionedhowa specificshareholderwasselectedinapubliccompanycontextwhererights of first refusal do not automaticallyapply.In his view,an open and internationalcompetitiveprocesswouldalmostcertainlyunlockgreater value. 8. 272.Heargued thatKenya could achieve superioroutcomesby selling thestake toa different telecommunications operator or strategic investor. Such an

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya approachwouldenhanceboardbalanceandvotingdynamics.Selling the staketoan existingmajority shareholder,hewarned,confersunduevoting shareholdersortheKenyanpublic.Retaining thestakewould alsoallow the Governmenttoactasabalancingforceinshareholdervoteswhennecessary.

273.Hon.Nyoro outlined several alternative strategies that,in hisview,werenot adequatelyconsidered:
I. The Government couldhavepursued a demergerofSafaricom into three distinct entities:telecommunications services,financial services,and towerinfrastructure,beforeanysale.Heargued thatthe combinedvaluationofthesestandaloneentitieswouldlikelyfar exceed thevaluationoftheintegratedfirm.
II. Safaricom could be cross-listed on major international exchanges, such as theLondon StockExchange,to enhance visibility,deepen liquidity,and attractglobalinstitutional investors.
III. Following these steps,the Government could then initiate an open international bidding process,selecting the offer that delivers the highestvalueand strongeststrategicalignment.
274.He questioned the urgency underpinning the transaction,asking why Kenya'smostvaluablepublic asset shouldbe sold ata discount andunder apparent time pressure.Additionally,he raised concerns regarding the securitizationoffuturedividends.Herequesteddisclosureofthetermsof this arrangement and questioned the rationale for monetising future Governmentrevenue streams today,particularly given Kenya'slong-term fiscal needs.
275.He alsosoughtclarityonhowmuch theGovernmentintendstoborrow againsttheproceedsofthesale.Ifthefundsareearmarkedfordevelopment projects,herequestedadetailedlistofsuchprojectsandanexplanationof objectives.

3.35MR.LAWRENCEMUTUGI

276.The stakeholder opposed the partial divestiture of SafaricomPLC and adds that if it isthegovernment's onlyoption to generatefundsfor key thesaleofshares.
277.HeraisedconcernsovertheKsh34valuationnotingthisbasedonthe"Sumof-the-Parts"(SOTP) model used by financial experts and activists,the intrinsicvalueisKsh7O+.HestatedthatM-PesaisaFintechArmthatis valued atKsh45-50per share asastandaloneglobalfintechleader.Onthe

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya TelecomInfrastructure,SafaricomisvaluedatKsh20-25pershare(Towers, Fiber,5G).theEthiopiaUpsidehasafuturevalueofa 120Mpopulation marketadds Ksh10-15 per share.Hence the totalIntrinsicvalueof SafaricomwouldbeKsh75-90pershare.

278.SellingatKsh34ignores the"ControlPremium"thusVodacom shouldpay forgainingmajoritycontrol andresultsin apotentiallossofoverKsh250 BilliontoKenyantaxpayers.
279.Herecommended suspending the saleuntilan independent Sum-of-thePartsValuationReportistabled,prioritizingaPublicRightsIssuetoallow Kenyanstobuytheseshares atafair value,andmaintaining State ownershipat aminimum of 25.1%toprotectnational datasovereignty.

3.36MSEMLYNNGWIRI

280.ThestakeholderisopposedtothepartialdivestitureofSafaricomPLCunder theSessionalPaperNo.3of2025initsentirety.Heoutlines thefollowing reasonsforhis opposition—
i. Safaricomisastrategicnationalassetandthereforeofpublic interest.Kenyamayriskbecomingapassiveregulator without actual control,which is similar to outsourcing a key public entity.
ii. Thevaluationandpremiumjustificationof sharesis questionableasitisundervalued.Theimplicationofthisis that theKenyanpublicmaybe short-changedbecausethevaluation islessthanthetruevalueoftheasset.
ii. pre-negotiatedevenbeforeparliamentaryandpublicscrutiny. ThereisaviolationofArticle118,anditimpliesthatthepublic is acting like arubber stamp to a premeditated complex transaction.
iv. Circumventionofproperlegal oversightbecauseitwouldrequire a transparentcompetitivebiddingand CMAoversight,butthe sessional paperseemstobypassimportant procedural safeguards.Theimpactofthisisthattheexecutivecanuse Parliamenttodisposehighvaluedassetsthroughatailored processthatminimizesscrutiny.
V. Vagueness and risksin theuseofproceeds,asthereisnolegally bindingmechanismtoensuretheestimatedKsh.203billionis ring-fencedfor thestatedprojects.Theimpactofthisisthatit risks sacrificinglong-term fiscal sustainability for short-term budgetaryrelief.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningand theSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatization on theConsiderationof theSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

vi. Reduced competitionasVodacomgainsundisputedcontrolof thepublicfloatconcernsbecauseitdoesnotincreaseonthe NSE.The implication is that market concentration increases, leadingtohigherpricesforKenyanconsumers.
vii. ErosionofKenyanCorporateIdentityandsocialfootprint,with its implications,isKenya losingitsinnovative capability.
viii. Alternative financing ignored andprecedentrisksetfor future fiscal gaps.The implication is a cycle of divestments damaging thestate'sportfolioofincome-generatingassets.
ix. Conflict in regionalintegration and nationalinterest,with the implicationbeingthatnationalinterestsmaybesubordinateto thecommercialstrategyofaforeignentity.
X. Inadequateriskassessmentoffuture dilution,whichcanlead to thegovernmentbeingmore exposed to thedecisions of thenew controlling shareholder.

6. 281.The stakeholdernoted that,thedivestiture is fraughtwithlegal,financial and strategicperils andundervalues a strategic asset.Heproposed that the National Treasury to explorealternativefinancingmechanisms and design a transparentandinclusiveprocess.

3.37MR.FRANCISWANJIKU

282.FrancisWanjiku is anAdvocateof theHigh CourtofKenya and apublic policyadvisor.Hesupported thedivestitureofGovernmentfrombusiness and commercial activities,including Safaricom.However,he raised key concernsasoutlinedbelow.
i. Absenceofadisclosedindependentvaluationorfairnessopinion supportingtheKES34pershareprice.TheStatemaybeforegoing materialcapitalandincomeupsidewithoutadequatepublic disclosure.
ii. The pricing relies primarily on a 6-month VWAP,which is insufficient for a strategicasset sale.There isno disclosure of intrinsicvaluation analyses orindependentfairness opinions.
iii. ProjecteddividendsofKES55.7billionaremonetisedforKES40.2 billion,implying a 28%haircut.This approach prioritizes shorttermfiscalreliefoverlong-termrevenuestability.
283.Theproposed termstransfersignificantcapitalandincomevaluewithouta publiclydisclosed independentvalidation.Given thequantifieddownside (KES 45-60bn estimated shortfall) and thelonger-term fiscal implications.

76

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

3.38MRJUSTUSATUTI

284.Thestakeholderwasopposedto thesaleofthe15percentshareof the GovernmentofKenyainSafaricomPLCto theVodacomgroupon thebasis that the transaction is untimely economically,fiscally irresponsible,and againstpublicinterests.Safaricomis currentlyperforming exceptionallywell withhighprofits,regular dividendpayments,andhigh growthprospects.It isunnecessaryatthisstagetodivestthecompanywithallitsbenefitsto the country.Thetransactionisaresultoflostfuturedividendpaymentsasa resultofdivestingthecountryofcontrolofacriticalnationalresource.Itis ameansofprovidingaquickfinancialfixratherthanadevelopment solution.In addition,according to the stakeholders,the transaction is primarilyameansbywhichaforeigninvestorgainscontrolasamajority shareholder.ThisislikelytocompromisetheabilityofKenyaasacountry tocontrolitscriticaltelecomsinfrastructureaswellasitscontroloverMPesaservicesamongotherfinancialservicesofferedbySafaricom.

3.39MSSHARONRAYNX

285.Thestakeholder rejectedthesaleof Safaricom sharesand the foreign SafaricomPLCwasbuiltthroughthesharedinvestmentandsacrificeof Kenyan citizens.Therefore,these assets should stay under Kenyan ownershipandcontrol.Anyplanstosell shouldfocusonKenyaninvestors, foreignentitiestotakemajorityownershipisseenasunfairandharmfulto national sovereignty,economicindependence,and long-term publicinterest.
286.Thestakeholderaddsthatsellingassetstosolvefiscalproblemsismisguided withouteffective anti-corruptionmeasures.Theynoted thatpublicfunds losttocorruptionerodetrust,makingitunlikelythatproceedsfromasset saleswouldbeprotectedorusedfordevelopment.Theongoinglossofpublic wealth due tocorruptionishighlighted asakeyreasonfor the shrinking middleclass.Asaresult,the stakeholderurged theParliamentto stopall asset sales,keep strategicenterprises underpublic ownership,and instead focusonstronglawsandenforcementtotrulytackleanddetercorruption.

3.4OMRCOLLINSODHIAMBO

287.ThestakeholderconditionallysupportedthepartialsaleoftheGovernment's 15per centstakeinSafaricomPLC,aslongasstrongconsumerprotection andregulationareinplace.Hehighlightedthepotentialbenefitofthepartial saletotheGovernmentinraisingfundstodevelopinfrastructureandcutting relianceonpublicborrowing.He,however,raised somereservationsabout thepotentialimpactsofthereducedshareholdingbytheGovernmentonthe affordabilityofSafaricom'sproductsandservices,particularlyM-Pesa.He observedthateven thoughpriceincreasesmaynotoccurin thenear term,

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya thereducedpubliccontrolmayunderminetheregulationofpricingand strongregulation,especiallyinrespectto theregulation ofessentialservices andconsumerprotection.

3.41MSANNKAMAU

288.Thestakeholderrejected theproposedpartialdivestitureon thebasisthat thetransactionhadbeenundertakeninamanner thatwaseconomically unsound,legallyquestionable,and inconsistentwiththe State'sfiduciary dutytoholdpublicassetsintrustforpresentandfuturegenerationsinlight of the Constitution ofKenya and thePublicFinanceManagementAct.She toits dominantmarketin mobilemoney services,long-term dividend track record,and contribution to a sustainable digital economy in Kenya.A decreaseintheGovernment'sshareholdingmateriallyweakensitsabilityto influence governance,pricing,data protection, and public interest considerations,therebyunderminingintergenerationalequitybyconverting a long-term,income-generating assetinto short-termfiscal proceedswithout aclear,ring-fencedreinvestmentframework.
289.Inaddition,thestakeholderraisedconcernsregardingthe structureofthe transaction,noting that the sale to an existing dominant shareholder effectivelyamountedtoarelated-partytransaction,withheightenedrisksof conflict ofinterest,regulatory capture,and minority shareholderoppression. Itwassubmitted thatincreasedforeigncontrolcouldexposethecountryto risks relating to data sovereignty,national security,and the stability of critical financial infrastructure,given Safaricom's central role in mobile money transactions,publicrevenue collection,socialprotectionpayments, andemergencyresponsemechanisms.
290.Thestakeholderfurthermaintainedthatthepublicparticipationprocess had been inadequate in both timing and reach,limiting meaningful engagement by ordinary citizens, employees,agents,and rural users who dependedonSafaricom'sservicesforlivelihoodsanddailytransactions.

3.42MRDAVIDTOLE

291.The stakeholder submitted that he supports the proposal for the partial divestiture of Safaricom PLC,butinsists thatitssuccess depends onthe prudentmanagement of theproceeds.He suggested different conditionsfor implementation:
i. Specificprojectprioritizationandring-fencing-thegovernment mustmovebeyondgeneraldescriptionsofinfrastructureand publishabindingscheduleofspecificprojectstobefundedover thenext5-10yearsin education,health androads.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

ii. Transparency and quarterly reporting-toprevent mismanagement,the governance frameworks must be robust, such asfund managerspublishing quarterlybalance sheets and publicexpenditure.
iii. Strategicassetallocation(80:20rule)-allocationofproceedsto followastrictstatutorysplitsuchthat80%goestothe infrastructurefundtotargethigh-impactprojects,while20%to thesovereignwealthfundtobeinvestedinhigh-returnfinancial instrumentsforfuturegenerations.

3. 292.He concludedby stating that if the safeguards are enshrined in the implementationframework,thenthedivestiturecanspurKenya'seconomic leap,butwithouttransparency,Kenyacanlosea strategicasset.

3.43MRPETERMUIRURI

293.Thestakeholdernotedthathe'snotopposedtothePartialdivestiture, however,he'sconcernedthatsellingahighlyprofitableandwell-managed nationalassettoraise short-term fundsrisksweakeninglong-termpublic income value.He highlighted that Safaricom has consistently generated dividendsandeconomicbenefitsforthecountryandwithoutclear,binding, andtransparentguaranteesonhowtheproceedsfromthissalewillbeused, thiswill createa realrisk that the fundsmaybemismanaged leaving Kenyanswithreducedownershipandnolastingdevelopmentimpact.
294.The stakeholderproposed theprocess begradual,transparent,and strictly tied to specific,audited projects with strong parliamentaryand public oversight.Additionally,theGovernmentmustretainmeaningfulcontrol and ensure thatSafaricomcontinues to serveKenya's strategicandeconomic interests.

3.44THRYVCAPITALPARTNERSLLP

295.THRYVCapitalPartnersLLPisaninvestmentsyndicatefocusedonenabling everydayKenyanstoparticipateinalternativeassetclasses,withafocuson technologystartups.THRYVistheprincipalinvestorin PopoteInc. (Delaware,USA),which wholly owns Popote Innovations Ltd.(Kenya),a softwaredevelopmentfirm.Thememorandumissubmittedonthegrounds thatasignificantasset,M-PesaPlus,jointlyownedbySafaricomandPopote, hasnotbeendeclaredorvaluedintheproposedSafaricomshareacquisition byVodacom.
296.In2014,Popote'sfounderpresentedafintechconcepttoSafaricom,leading totheexecutionof aNon-DisclosureAgreement(NDA).Theconcept identifiedagap inM-Pesa's existing solutions:the failure toaddress the expendituremanagementneedsofmicroandSMEbusinesses.Followingthe

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya upgradeofSafaricom'sM-Pesasystemto"G2"inearly2016,development accelerated,involving more than 1o0 Safaricom staff across three departments;Financial Services,Enterprise BusinessUnit,and Consumer BusinessUnit.

297.Amajormilestonewasreachedin August 2017whenSafaricom commissionedmarketresearchfirmKantarMillwardBrown(KMB)toassess the concept.KMB's findings werepositive,recommending the solution be named"M-PesaBusiness."Safaricom'sowninternaldocument,the"Popote s originatedfromB2B/Cpayments,withthenewsolutionprojectedtocapture 7-10%ofthethenactiveM-Pesacustomerbase,estimatedat2-2.5million users.
298.On17thAugust2017,Safaricomformally appointedPopoteas apartner and confirmeditsintenttowhite-labelthesolutionundertheM-Pesabrand.A contract was finalisedand executed bybothpartieson24thApril2018,with the solution stage-named"M-Pesa Plus."
299.Despite contractual commitments and aplanned July2018 launch, Safaricomfailedtoproceedwithoutprovidinganycredibleexplanation. Popotecontinuedtomaintainthesolutionandawaitedanewlaunchdate. In June 2021,Safaricom independentlylaunched two apps;M-Pesa Super AppandM-PesaBusinesswhichPopotenotedboresimilarities toM-Pesa Plusfeatures.AttemptsbyPopotetoseekclarificationfromSafaricom'sCEO Peter Ndegwa,as well as senior executives at M-Pesa Africa,Vodacom South Africa,and Vodafone UK,were not substantively addressed.Popote subsequentlyinvokedthecontract'sarbitrationclause.Notably,acrossthe entireengagementperiodfrom2014to2018,thereexistsnodocumentation justifyingthedecisiontoaborttheM-PesaPluslaunch.
300.Safaricom'sown projectionsestimated thatM-PesaPluswould generate cumulativerevenuesofKEs96.66billionoveritsfirstfiveyearsofoperation. Popote'spilotofthesolutionvalidated theseprojections,processingovertwo million transactionsand generatinguniteconomicsexceedingSafaricom's business case estimates.Despite this,between 2019 and 2024,Safaricom forfeited the opportunity torealise at leastKES96.66billion inincremental revenue.
301.Comparablefintechspend-managementplatforms launched around the sameperiodhave seenextraordinaryreturns:Revolut(London,2015) grew fromanestimatedUSD17.8milliontoUSD75billionby2026(a421,248% ROI),whileM-Pesa's valuationgrew only293%over the sameperiod (from USD1.4billionin2015toUSD5.5billionin2026),illustratingthecostof themissedopportunity.

3.38MRJUSTUSATUTI

284.Thestakeholderwasopposed tothesaleofthe15percentshareof the GovernmentofKenyainSafaricomPLCtotheVodacomgrouponthebasis that the transaction is untimely economically,fiscally irresponsible,and against publicinterests.Safaricomis currentlyperformingexceptionallywell withhighprofits,regular dividendpayments,andhighgrowthprospects.It isunnecessaryatthisstagetodivestthecompanywithallitsbenefitstothe country.The transaction isaresultoflostfuturedividendpaymentsasa resultofdivestingthecountryofcontrolofacriticalnationalresource.Itis ameansofprovidingaquick financialfixratherthanadevelopment solution.In addition,according to the stakeholders,the transaction is shareholder.ThisislikelytocompromisetheabilityofKenyaasacountry tocontrolitscriticaltelecomsinfrastructureaswellasitscontroloverMPesaservicesamongotherfinancialservicesofferedbySafaricom.

3.39MSSHARONRAYNX

285.The stakeholder rejected the sale of Safaricom shares and the foreign SafaricomPLCwasbuiltthroughthesharedinvestmentandsacrificeof Kenyan citizens.Therefore,these assets should stay under Kenyan as citizens can financially support and maintain these assets.Allowing foreignentitiestotakemajorityownershipisseenasunfairandharmful to national sovereignty,economic independence,and long-termpublic interest.
286.Thestakeholderaddsthatsellingassetstosolvefiscalproblemsismisguided withouteffective anti-corruptionmeasures.Theynoted thatpublicfunds saleswouldbeprotectedorusedfordevelopment.Theongoinglossofpublic wealthduetocorruptionishighlightedasakeyreasonfor theshrinking middleclass.Asaresult,thestakeholderurged theParliament to stop all assetsales,keep strategicenterprisesunderpublicownership,andinstead focusonstronglawsandenforcementtotrulytackleanddetercorruption.

3.4OMRCOLLINSODHIAMBO

287.Thestakeholderconditionallysupportedthepartial saleoftheGovernment's 15per cent stake in Safaricom PLC,aslong as strong consumer protection andregulationareinplace.Hehighlightedthepotentialbenefitofthepartial saletotheGovernmentinraisingfundstodevelopinfrastructureandcutting reliance onpublicborrowing.He,however,raised somereservationsabout thepotentialimpactsofthereducedshareholdingbytheGovernmentonthe affordabilityofSafaricom'sproductsand services,particularlyM-Pesa.He observed thateven thoughpriceincreasesmaynotoccurinthenearterm,

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya thereducedpubliccontrolmayundermine theregulationofpricingand consumerprotectioninthefuture,andthustheParliamentshouldensure strongregulation,especiallyinrespecttotheregulationofessential services and consumerprotection.

3.41MSANNKAMAU

thetransactionhadbeenundertakeninamannerthatwaseconomically unsound,legally questionable,and inconsistentwiththe State'sfiduciary dutytoholdpublicassetsintrustforpresentandfuturegenerationsinlight oftheConstitutionofKenyaand thePublicFinanceManagementAct.She financial,andsocio-economicvalueofSafaricomPLC,especiallywithregard toits dominantmarketinmobilemoney services,long-term dividend track record,and contribution to a sustainable digital economy in Kenya.A decreasein theGovernment'sshareholdingmateriallyweakensitsabilityto influence governance,pricing, data protection,and public interest considerations,therebyunderminingintergenerational equityby converting along-term,income-generatingassetinto short-termfiscalproceedswithout aclear,ring-fencedreinvestmentframework.
289.In addition,the stakeholderraisedconcernsregardingthe structure of the transaction,noting that the sale to an existing dominant shareholder effectively amounted toarelated-partytransaction,withheightenedrisksof conflict ofinterest,regulatory capture,andminority shareholder oppression. risks relating to data sovereignty,national security,and the stability of critical financial infrastructure,given Safaricom's central role in mobile moneytransactions,publicrevenue collection,socialprotectionpayments, andemergencyresponsemechanisms.
290.Thestakeholderfurthermaintainedthatthepublicparticipationprocess had been inadequate in both timing and reach,limiting meaningful engagement by ordinary citizens,employees,agents,and rural users who dependedonSafaricom'sservicesforlivelihoodsanddailytransactions.

3.42MRDAVIDTOLE

291.The stakeholder submitted thathe supports theproposalfor thepartial divestitureof Safaricom PLC,butinsists that itssuccess dependson the prudentmanagementoftheproceeds.Hesuggesteddifferentconditionsfor implementation:
i. Specificprojectprioritizationandring-fencing-thegovernment mustmovebeyond generaldescriptionsofinfrastructureand publishabindingscheduleofspecificprojectstobefundedover thenext5-10yearsineducation,healthandroads.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

ii. Transparency and quarterly reporting -toprevent mismanagement,thegovernanceframeworksmustberobust, such asfundmanagerspublishingquarterlybalance sheets and performancereportand apublicly accessiblewebportal totrack publicexpenditure.
ili. Strategicasset allocation(80:20rule)-allocationofproceeds to followastrictstatutorysplitsuchthat80%goestothe infrastructurefund to targethigh-impactprojects,while20% to thesovereignwealthfund tobeinvestedinhigh-returnfinancial instrumentsforfuturegenerations.

3. 292.He concluded by stating that if the safeguards are enshrined in the implementationframework,thenthedivestiturecanspurKenya'seconomic leap,butwithout transparency,Kenya canlose a strategicasset.

3.43MRPETERMUIRURI

293.The stakeholder noted that he's not opposed to the Partial divestiture, however,he'sconcerned thatsellingahighlyprofitableandwell-managed nationalassettoraise short-termfundsrisksweakeninglong-termpublic income value.He highlighted that Safaricom has consistently generated dividendsandeconomicbenefitsforthecountryandwithoutclear,binding, thiswillcreatearealriskthat the fundsmaybemismanagedleaving Kenyanswithreducedownershipandnolastingdevelopmentimpact.
294.The stakeholder proposed theprocess be gradual,transparent,and strictly tied to specific,audited projects with strong parliamentary and public oversight.Additionally,theGovernmentmustretainmeaningfulcontroland ensurethatSafaricomcontinuestoserveKenya'sstrategicandeconomic interests.

3.44THRYVCAPITALPARTNERSLLP

295.THRYVCapitalPartnersLLPisaninvestmentsyndicatefocusedonenabling everydayKenyanstoparticipate in alternative asset classes,with afocus on technology startups.THRYV is the principal investor in Popote Inc. (Delaware,UsA),which wholly owns Popote Innovations Ltd.(Kenya),a softwaredevelopmentfirm.Thememorandumissubmittedonthegrounds thatasignificantasset,M-PesaPlus,jointlyownedbySafaricomandPopote, hasnotbeendeclaredorvaluedintheproposedSafaricomshareacquisition by Vodacom.
296.In2014,Popote'sfounderpresentedafintechconcepttoSafaricom,leading totheexecutionof aNon-Disclosure Agreement (NDA).Theconcept identifiedagapinM-Pesa'sexistingsolutions:the failuretoaddressthe expendituremanagementneedsofmicroandSMEbusinesses.Followingthe

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya accelerated,involvingmorethan1ooSafaricomstaffacross three departments;Financial Services,EnterpriseBusiness Unit,and Consumer BusinessUnit.

297.AmajormilestonewasreachedinAugust 2017whenSafaricom commissionedmarketresearchfirmKantarMillwardBrown(KMB)toassess the concept.KMB's findings werepositive,recommending the solution be Business Case Justification,"confirmed that only 7%of M-Pesa flows originatedfromB2B/Cpayments,withthenewsolutionprojectedtocapture 7-10%of the then activeM-Pesa customerbase,estimatedat 2-2.5million users.
confirmeditsintenttowhite-label thesolutionundertheM-Pesabrand.A contractwasfinalised and executed by bothparties on 24th April 2018,with the solution stage-named"M-Pesa Plus."
299.Despite contractual commitments and a planned July 2018 launch, Safaricomfailed toproceedwithoutprovidinganycredibleexplanation. Popotecontinued tomaintain the solution andawaited anewlaunch date. In June 2021,Safaricom independently launched two apps;M-Pesa Super App andM-PesaBusinesswhichPopotenotedbore similarities toM-Pesa Plusfeatures.AttemptsbyPopotetoseekclarification fromSafaricom'sCEO PeterNdegwa,aswellasseniorexecutivesatM-PesaAfrica,VodacomSouth Africa,and Vodafone UK,were not substantively addressed.Popote subsequentlyinvoked the contract's arbitration clause.Notably,acrossthe entire engagementperiod from2014to2018,there existsno documentation justifyingthedecisiontoaborttheM-PesaPluslaunch.
300.Safaricom'sownprojectionsestimated thatM-PesaPluswould generate cumulativerevenuesofKEs96.66billionoveritsfirstfiveyearsofoperation. Popote'spilotofthesolutionvalidatedtheseprojections,processingovertwo million transactionsand generatingunit economics exceeding Safaricom's business case estimates.Despite this,between2019and 2024,Safaricom forfeited the opportunity torealise atleastKES96.66billionin incremental revenue.
301.Comparablefintechspend-managementplatformslaunchedaround the sameperiodhaveseenextraordinaryreturns:Revolut(London,2015)grew fromanestimatedUSD17.8million toUSD75billionby2026(a421,248% ROI),whileM-Pesa'svaluationgrew only293%over the sameperiod(from USD1.4billionin2015toUSD5.5billionin2026),illustratingthecostof themissedopportunity.

313.The Residentswere first sensitized on the Sessionalpaper before the commencementofthePublicHearings.Thepublicappreciatedthe remainsakeynationalassetwhoseownershipstructuredirectlyaffects Kenya's economy,communication 1systemsandfinancialservices. Participantsgenerally called for the entire divestitureprocesstobeguided bytransparency,fairnessandprotectionofthepublicinterest.

3.48 Nairobi County (KICC)

314.ResidentsofNairobiCountyexpressedvariedviewsregardingtheproposed divestiture of government shares,with many participants supporting the proposalbecauseitwouldhelpreducegovernmentborrowing.Supporters businessenvironmentwouldremainstableandthatallstaffwouldbe extendedbeyond theproposedthreeyearstoatleasttenyearsormoreto safeguardworkers'livelihoods.Theyfurtheremphasizedtheneedforfirm guaranteesthatallproceedsfromthedivestiturewouldbechannelledinto adedicatedinfrastructurefund,ratherthanbeingabsorbedintorecurrent paymentofKSh40billionindividendsbepartlyused toorganizeyouth workshops and skills-based training programmes aimed at enhancing employabilityandreducingyouthunemployment.
315.However,concernswereraisedregardingthestructureoftheproposedsale. Someparticipants suggested thatthegovernmentshould sell 10per centof the shares to the openmarketandonly5percentto theVodacom Group, citingnationalinterestconsiderations.Theyargued thatsellingthe shares atmarketrates,therebyofferinglittlevaluetoKenyanswhile disproportionatelybenefitingVodacom,despitethesharesbelongingto the Kenyan-public.
316.Additionally,residentswarnedthatsellingthefull15percentstaketothe Vodacom Groupwouldincrease itsownershipto55%,making itthe dominantshareholder.Theyexpressedconcernthatsuchdominancecould decision-makingwithinSafaricom.Questions were alsoraised about the valuation process,with participants demanding transparency on the methodologyusedtoarriveattheKSh34persharepriceandtheidentityof the valuer.Another group proposed that the shares be offered on global marketstoattractawiderpoolofforeigninvestors,arguingthatcompetitive biddingcouldresultinahighervaluationthantheoneproposedbythe VodacomGroup.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

ii)RightofFirstRefusal:Thestakeholder thereisneed forinclusionof aclauserequiringthat,intheeventVodacomGroupseekstodivest anyportionofitsenhanced55%stake,theGovernmentofKenya shallhavethefirstrightofacquisitionatfairmarketvalue.
iv) protection law.
V) M-Pesa governance:The stakeholder recommended strengthening the governance provisions to ensure that any future sale or structuralseparationofM-PesafromSafaricomrequiresexplicit governmentapproval.
vi) Legalanchoring:Theyraisedconcern that theproposeduseof divestitureproceedsiscontingentonlegalproceedingsthathaveyet toberesolved,specificallyregarding the anchoringof the fund in eitheraSovereignWealthFundorNationalInfrastructureFund neitherofwhichisyetlegallyestablished.
310.TheyurgedParliament to criticallyreview theproposaland ensure that nationalandyouthinterestsarefullyprotectedbeforeanyapprovalis granted.

3.47PETERNDUNGU

3ll.Thestakeholdersubmittedthathismemorandumsoughttoclarify prevailing misconceptions surrounding the proposeddivestiture while affirmingitspotentialbenefits.HenotedthatthevaluationofSafaricomPLC was grounded in internationally accepted methodologies,including the Income Approachthrough theDiscountedCashFlowmodel,theMarket Approach,and theAsset-BasedApproach.Inhisview,theDiscounted Cash Flowmethodinparticularprovidesamoreaccuratereflectionofthe company'sintrinsicvaluebyfocusingonprojectedfuturecashflowsrather thanshort-termmarketsentiment.Hefurtherarguedthatawell-structured divestiture can strengthen operational eficiency,corporate governance,and market discipline,while still preserving meaningful local participation throughinstitutionalandretailinvestorssuchaspensionfunds,unittrusts, SACCOs,andindividualshareholders.

COUNTYPUBLICHEARINGS

312.TheJointCommitteeconductedCountyPublicHearingsacross30counties tocollectviews frommembersof thepublicandstakeholderson the GovernmentofKenya'sproposeddivestitureof15%shareholdingin SafaricomPLC.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

307.TheMinistryspecifically addressed threecategoriesof concernraisedduring stakeholderengagements:
Nationalsecurity:TheMinistrysubmittedthatSafaricom'sroledoes notreplacetheconstitutionalfunctionsofprimarynationalsecurity organs(Kenya Defence Forces,National Intelligence Service,and NationalPoliceService),andthatapartialdivestiturehasnomaterial bearingon theiroperational capacity.
i) Critical informationinfrastructure:The Ministry noted that the ComputerMisuseandCybercrimesActandtheNationalComputer and Cybercrimes Co-ordination Committee(NC4)providearobust statutoryframeworkgoverningcriticalinformationinfrastructure, andthatSafaricom'sobligationsunderthisframeworkwillremain unaffectedbytheownershipchange.
ii) Data sovereignty:TheMinistryaffirmed that the applicablelegal regimecomprisingArticle31(c)and(d)oftheConstitutionandthe Data Protection Act will continue to govern data generated by Safaricomregardless of the shiftin shareholding.

3.46YOUTHTOGETHERUNDERONEVOICE

308.Theystatedthatthedivestitureiswithinthecurrentadministration's reliance on Safaricom for key government programmes,including the Hustler Fund,E-Citizen,government-to-person transfers,and the fertiliser concernthatareducedstakecouldforeclosesimilaroutcomesinthefuture.
38millionKenyansascentraltoSMElivelihoods,digitalfinancialinclusion, andyouthemployment.Itframesthedivestitureasagenerationalissuewith long-termconsequencesforyoungKenyans.

Concerns

AbsenceofaStrategicNationalInterestClause:Thestakeholder submittedthatParagraph1.2oftheSessionalPaperlacksaclearly definedmechanismtopreventthefundmobilisationobjectivefrom creatingapermanentstrategicdeficitforfuturegenerations.
i) Dividend rights waiver:They raisedconcernthat Paragraph 2.3, whichprovidesforthesaleofdividendrightsontheretained20% stakefor Ksh40.2billion,effectivelyrenderstheGovernment's remainingshareholdingnon-performingandfinanciallyunattractive futureadministrations.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

302.M-PesaPlus constitutes a significantintangible asset thatmustbevalued usingmethodologiessuchasDiscountedCashFlow(DCF)orNetPresent Value(NPV)andfactoredintoSafaricom'ssharepricepriortoanytransfer of majority ownership.Failure to do so,it is contended,would constitute an
303.The solutionremainsfullyoperational and accessibleto invitedbetausers on web,the Google Play Store,and the Apple App Store,maintained continuouslyby Popoteunder its contractual obligations. THRYV Capital Partnersproposedthefollowing:
i.Safaricomshareholdersshouldbeformallynotifiedoftheexistence ofM-PesaPlusandinvitedtoparticipateasbetauserstoformtheir ownindependentassessmentofitsvalue.
ii. expert firm to valueM-Pesa Plus,includingthe jointlyowned intellectual property which includes market research reports, business case documentation,customer journey documents, technicaldesigndocuments,andreservedwebdomains.
ili. Popotemust be involvedin anyproductdemonstrationsor documentationreviews,givenSafaricom'sdemonstratedtrackrecord ofinternally suppressingknowledgeofM-PesaPlus.
iv. Uponvaluation,thesharesalepriceshouldbeadjustedupwardto reflectthedeterminedvalueofM-PesaPlus.
304.THRYVCapitalPartnersLLPurgedtheCommitteetoensurethatthevalue ofSafaricom'sownershipinterestinM-PesaPlusisfullyaccountedforand unfairlyprejudicescurrentequityholders,exposes therestructuredentity to legal risk, and deprives theKenyan economy of the multiplier effects of a fully commercialised M-Pesa Plus.

3.45MINISTRYOFINTERIORANDNATIONALADMINISTRATION

305.The Ministry supported the divestiture noting that the it is a fiscally innovativemechanismtomobiliseresourcesfortheBottom-UpEconomic Transformation Agenda(BETA) withoutrecourse to additional taxation or borrowing.
306.Theynotedthatthetransactionwillyieldbenefitstothecountryincluding mobilisation offundsforpriority infrastructure sectors including energy, roads,aerospace,water, and digital information;preservation of a governmentstakewithcontinuedboardrepresentation;acommitmenttono acquisition-related redundancies within threeyears;the retention ofa KenyanChairmanandindependentdirectors;andtheprospectofenhanced competitivenessandgrowththroughincreasedVodafoneparticipation.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

317.Conversely,membersofBungelaWananchifromKayolestronglyopposed theproposeddivestiturealtogether.Theywarnedthatthesalecouldexpose scandals,such as NYS and SHIF,calling for greater accountability and cautionbeforeproceedingwiththeproposal.

3.49ManderaCounty

318.PublicparticipationinManderaCountywasconductedattheMandera SocialHallinManderatownon3rdFebruary2026with51%supportingand 49%rejectingtheproposal.Theysubmittedasfollows:
319.Theresidents sharedmixedviewson theproposed sale,but themajority wereinsupport,drawingreferencefromtheirpresentpredicamentsandthe shortcomingsin theregion.They stated thattheysupport thesaleof shares views in Parliament.They acknowledged their numerous problems, including immense drought,claiming thelives ofanimals,and so believe thatthepartialdivestituremight,inaway,help solve theirpredicaments. Further,residents submitted thatif thegovernment has seen thatit can make profits from the partial sale,then they support the proposed divestiture.
320.Some of the residents opposed the sale,stating thatcitizenswill be affected lossofbusinessaffiliatedwithSafaricom.Othersbelievedthatthecounty themascomparedtothelackofwaterandelectricity.IftheSafaricom divestiturewouldsolvetheirlackofroadsandwaterproblems,thenthey wouldsupportthesale.Theresidentsacknowledged thatthedivestiture wouldhurtSafaricomdealers,businessesandshops,itwouldleadtoloss ofjobsforyouth,and for thatreason,donot supportthe saleof shares.

3.50 Machakos County

321.PublichearingswereconductedattheMavokoNGCDFOfficeinMachakos Countytocollectviewsfrommembersofthepublicandstakeholdersonthe Government of Kenya's proposed divestitureof 15%shareholdingin SafaricomPLCwithwith82%of theparticipantssupportingwhile18%were ofadifferentview.
322.Oneofthemainconcernsraisedwas theGovernment'sdecision tochoose Vodacomasthepreferredbuyer.Membersofthepublicquestionedwhy Vodacomwasselectedoverotherpotentialinvestorsandwhetheranopen

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya andcompetitive process wasconducted.Stakeholdersurged the Governmenttopubliclydisclosetheselectioncriteriaused,theduediligence undertakenandthereasonsthatmadeVodacomstandoutaboveother possiblebidders.Participants emphasized thatwithoutclearjustification the interestswhichcouldundermineconfidenceinthedivestitureexercise.

323.Thepublicalsoraisedstrongconcernsregardinghowtheproceedsfrom the salewould bemanaged.Participantsinsistedthatthefundsmustbering fencedandprotectedfrombeingabsorbedinto thenationalbudgetwhere thepurpose ofthedivestiture.Stakeholdersrecommendedthe establishmentofaclearlegalandfinancialframeworktoensure accountability yincludingaspecialaccountwithstrictparliamentary oversightandregularauditsbytheAuditorGeneral.Theyfurtherproposed that the Government shouldprovideperiodicreportsto thepublicon the amountgeneratedandhowthefundsareutilized.
324.Anothercriticalissueraisedwasthemethodologyused todetermine the share price.Participants expressed concern that the shares could be undervaluedleadingtolossofpublicwealth.TheycalledfortheGovernment toengageindependentfinancialexpertstoundertakeatransparent whetheritwasguidedbymarketperformanceorotherrecognizedvaluation methods.Thepublicemphasized thatpricingmustreflect thetrue value of Safaricomsharesinorder tosafeguardnationalresources andensure fairnessinthetransaction.
325.Further,stakeholders strongly recommended that theproceeds from the divestitureshouldbedirectedstrictlytothehealthsectorandnottoany other development projects.They noted that Kenya continues to face challenges in healthcare including inadequate equipment,shortage of medicines,understaffing and poor hospital infrastructure.Participants urged thatthefunds shouldbeused toequiphospitals,improveaccess to qualityhealthcare,supportuniversalhealthcoverage and strengthenservice deliveryinpublichealthfacilitieespeciallyinruralandmarginalizedareas. Theyinsistedthatallocatingthefundselsewherewoulddilutetheimpact anddefeatthepurposeofsellingsharesinsuchastrategiccompany.
326.Participantsalsoemphasized theneedtofloataportionof thesharesto the publicinorder toallowordinaryKenyanstobenefitfromthedivestiture. Theystatedthatcitizenparticipationthroughpublicshareownershipwould promoteinclusivity,economicempowermentandpublicconfidenceinthe transaction.Thepublicurged that theprocessshould bemade accessible andaffordablewithadequatesensitization to ensuremoreKenyanscan participate.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

327.Finally,while thepublicacknowledged that some shares couldbe sold to Vodacom asa strategicinvestor,participants insisted thatsafeguardsmust beputinplacetopreventVodacomfrombecomingthemajorityshareholder. TheynotedthatSafaricomplaysavitalroleinKenya'sdigitaleconomy, telecommunicationsandmobilemoneysystemsandthereforecontrolofthe companyshouldnotbeconcentratedinasingleforeignentity.Stakeholders recommendedthattheGovernmentshouldmaintainabalancedownership structurebysettinglimitsonhowmanysharesVodacomcanacquireand ensuringthatthepublicretainssignificantparticipationinthecompany.
328.In conclusion,the public hearings in Machakos County revealed strong interest and concern regarding the proposed divestiture.The public fencingofproceeds,crediblevaluationofshares,strictallocationoffundsto the health sector,wider publicparticipation through floating shares and measuresto ensureVodacomdoesnotbecomeamajorityshareholder. Participantsurged theGovernmentandParliamenttoensurethedivestiture processiscarriedoutopenly,fairlyandinamannerthatsafeguardsnational interestwhiledeliveringdirectbenefitstotheKenyanpeople.

3.51NyandaruaCounty

2026atSt.AnthonyHall,EngineerTownwith68%rejectingthedivestiture while32%supportedit.Theoppositionofthedivestiturewasmainlydriven byconcernsaboutfeasibility,transparency,timing,accountability,andthe protectionofpublicinterestin theuseof theproceeds.
330.Severalparticipants questionedwhetheracomprehensivefeasibility study hadbeenconductedbefore theproposalwasmade.Theyemphasizedthat theGovernmentshould firstfocusoncompleting stalledprojectsbefore SessionalPaperdidnotclearlyoutlinethespecificprojectstobefunded usingtheproceedsfromthedivestiture.Thisraisedfearsthatthefunds couldbedivertedtounintendeduses,suchasfundingrecurrentexpenditure orthesettlementofpendingbills.Participantsrepeatedlysoughtassurances infrastructurefundhadnotbeenclearlyestablishedorlegallyprotected.
331.Amajorconcernwasrelatedtotheproposal to sell the sharesexclusivelyto VodacomGroup.Membersofthepublicquestionedwhyotherpotential buyers,including Kenyan investors and the general public,were not considered.TheyalsoexpressedconcernthatallowingVodacom toacquire the majority shareholding could result in higher tariffs,reduced considerationofpublicinterest,anddiminishedGovernmentinfluenceover Safaricom'sstrategicdecisions.Additionalconcernswereraisedabout

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya national security,withincreased ownershipby a foreign company in Safaricomwhichprovidedcriticaltelecommunicationsandfinancialservices infrastructure.

332.Membersof thepublicalsoquestioned theadequacyofpublicparticipation. They observed that public engagement exercises are often perceived as proceduralformalities,withpublicviewsrarelyreflectedinparliamentary decisions.Concernswerefurtherraised thatthetimelineforconsidering the theSessionalPaperbedeferred untilafter thegeneralelectionstoallowfor broaderpublicdebate.

3.52NakuruCounty

333.ResidentsofNakuru County voiced their reactions to the government's proposeddivestitureof15percentofitssharesinSafaricom,whichareset tobesoldto theVodacomGroup.Amajorityof theresidentsexpressed strong supportfor the proposal,arguing that the salewould raisemuchneededfundstofinancecriticalinfrastructureprojects.Theynoted thatsuch projectsoftenforcethegovernment torelyheavilyonborrowing,increasing thenational debt.Accordingto theresidents,proceedsfrom the salecould ease this pressure and provide an alternative source of development financing.
334.Thoseinfavourfurtherproposed thatpartof thefundsbeusedtoconstruct theRironi-MauSummitRoad.Theystated thattheroadwouldsignificantly reduce trafficcongestion along the busycorridor,improve transportation efficiency,andboosteconomic activityby easingthemovementofgoodsand underserved andrural areas.Theyarguedthat access toreliable electricity would support industrial growth,improve livelihoods,and help Kenya transitionintoa24-houreconomy.
335.However,a small section ofthe attendees,estimated atone outofevery200, opposed theproposedsale.They argued thatKSh 204billion,the expected revenuefrom the divestiture,represents onlya small fraction of thenational budgetand maynot significantly addressKenya's financial challenges.
336.The dissenting group ofrations 1:200 also raised concerns over national sovereigntyandcontrol.Theycautionedthatsellingtheentire15percent stake to Vodacom could give the company excessive influence over Safaricom'sboard decisions,potentially affecting key business operations withinKenya.Theyproposed thatifthesharesmustbesold,priorityshould

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya begiventoKenyaninvestorstoensurelocalownershipandsafeguardthe country'seconomicandstrategicinterests.

3.53 WajirCounty

PublicparticipationinWajirCountywasconductedon4thFebruary2026 atthe ICT Hall in Wajir town with 84% supporting and 16%rejecting the proposal. Theysubmittedasfollows:

337.Theresidentssharedmixedreactions totheproposed divestiture,with the majoritysupportingthegovernment'sdecisiontoreduceitsshareby15%. Theystatedthatthesalesofsharesmaybenefitthecitizens,butSafaricom agentsand dealers,aswellasSafaricom shares,should beincreasedin the regionafterthesale.TheyadvocatedforashareofbenefitsfortheNorth Eastern people,and iftheirproblems,such as water,electricity androads, wouldbesolved.
338.Someresidentsopposedthepartialdivestiture,statingthatitmaylead to thelossofcriticalinfrastructuresuchasM-Pesaandalossto thecountry, aswewouldbegivingoutimportantinformationtoforeigners.Theyraised concerns about thelootingoftheproceedsof thesale,statingthatthereis noguarantee and thatcorruption,which has been a menace to any developmentdreams,isstillatlarge.Theybelievethatthegovernmentmay obtainmoneyfromelsewhere,butSafaricomcanbelefttooperateasitis.
339.Theresidentspointedoutconcernsaboutdatasecurityandrelatedrisks when a foreign entity,in that case,Vodacom,is given total control of a decisionsthat could hurtcitizens.Questions were raisedonwhythe National Infrastructure Fund targets commerciallyviable projects only. Therewasafeelingthatmoremoneywouldbeallocatedtootherbetter areas while the marginalized areas stay more marginalized affecting the marginalized communities.The residents'plea included ring-fencing a as they advocatedforbalanceddevelopmentin thecountry.

3.54Kitui County

340.PublicparticipationinKituiCountywasconductedon4thFebruary2026at theKitui Multi-PurposeHall,with51% supporting,while49%rejected it
34l.Theparticipantsstatedthattheywantedafulldisclosureoftheownership structure ofVodacom Group,notingwith concern thatsince Vodacomis majorityownedbytheBritishmultinationalVodafone,anyfurthersaleto strategicnationalasset.Thisdistrusttowardtotalforeignconsolidationled toavigorousdebateonthemethodologyusedtodeterminetheSh34share

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPiCbyGovernmentofKenya pricewhereresidentsarguedthattheVolumeWeightedAveragePrice (VWAP)usedby the Treasurymaynotaccuratelycapture the company's long-term value orits recent expansion into international markets like Ethiopia.

342.Theforum further emphasized theneed toring-fenceallproceedsarising fromtheproposedtransaction,withparticipantsinsistingthattheKSh.204 billionshould be directed exclusively towardprioritysectors such ashealth, education,andwaterratherthanbeingabsorbedintotheConsolidatedFund tosupport debt servicing orrecurrentexpenditure.Participantsfrom Kitui alsoproposed that the Government consider splitting the proposed 15 percentdivestitureso thatasignificantportionofthesharescouldbeoffered totheKenyanpublicthrough theNairobiSecuritiesExchange insteadof transferringtheentireblocktoasinglecorporateinvestor.
343.This approach,they argued,would broaden local ownership and strengthen publicparticipationinthecompany.Theforumfurtherstressedthatthe Vodacom frombecoming a majority shareholder,noting that preserving the nationaldatasovereigntyandensurethatSafaricomcontinuestooperateas aKenyaninstitutionserving theinterestsofits citizens.

3.55NyeriCounty

344.PublicparticipationinNyeri Countywasconducted on4thFebruary2026at Nyeri Cultural Centrewith53%supportingwhile47%rejectedit.Support of the divestiture was largely dependent on the establishment of strong safeguards to ensure transparency,accountability,protection of national interests,andeffectiveuseoftheproceeds.
345.Participantsexpressedlimited trustinParliament'sabilitytosafeguardthe the 2027GeneralElections,thetimingof theproposalcould beperceived as politicallymotivatedrather than economically driven.
346.Severalparticipants opposed the divestiture due to concerns on cyber security,digitalsovereignty,andnationalsecurity,notingthatSafaricom hostscriticaldataandinfrastructurethatsupportkeygovernment operations.Othersraisedconcernsaboutlackofsufficienteconomic governance,the lackof comprehensivedigital reforms,and thelimited involvementofotherkeyinstitutionsin discussions ofthe transaction.
347.Issues of accountabilityand transparency featured prominently. Participantsquestioned thedecision toidentifyVodacomastheexclusive buyer,the absence ofa competitive biddingprocess,and thelackof clarity

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

regardingVodacom'sdirectors.Additionalconcernswereraisedabout potential joblosses,lossofgovernmentdividendincome,and the gradual erosionofpublicassets.
348.Despitetheseconcerns,someparticipantssupportedtheSessionalPaperon employmentstability,orthelong-termfinancialpositionoftheState.
349.Overall,viewsexpressed inNyeri County reflected cautiousand conditional supportforSessionalPaperNo.3of2025,subjecttosignificantsafeguards andamendments.

3.56KerichoCounty

350.Residents of Kericho County raised several concerns and proposals in Safaricom.Asectionof theparticipantsarguedthatitwouldbemore appropriateforthesharestobesoldtothepublicratherthantothe VodacomGroup.Theyreasoned thatpublicparticipationin thepurchase wouldpromotewiderlocalownership,enhance transparency,and ensure thatKenyancitizensdirectlybenefitfromassetsthatbelongtothem.The theremustbeequityinthedistributionofresourcesacrossallregionsofthe country.Theyemphasized thatfundsraised fromthedivestitureshould benefitallcountiesfairlyandnotbeconcentratedinafewareas.
KSh40 billion againstfuture dividends.They argued thatreceivingthefunds inadvancewouldenablethegovernmenttoimmediatelyfinancepriority infrastructureprojects,rather thanwaitingfor dividendpayments spread over severalyears.In addition,the residents observed that constructing infrastructure,particularlyroads,is significantly-cheapertoday-than-in-the future due to rising costs ofmaterialsand labour.They supported the government's approach,describingit as a home-grown solution that reduces relianceon externalborrowing,which often comes withstrict conditions imposedbylenders.
352.However,asectionofthecitizensargued thatsellingsharestotheVodacom proposed6billionsharesintotheopenmarketcouldnegativelyaffectsupply anddemanddynamics,leadingtoadrop-insharepricesbelowtheproposed KSh 34per share,ultimatelyreducing the value realized from the sale. Despite this,some participants proposed amendments to the Sessional Paper tostrike abalance.They suggested that10per cent of the shares be

sold to thepublic,whileVodacombe allowed to acquire only5per cent.This, theyargued,wouldprevent excessive concentrationofownershipand protectnationalinterests.Concernswerealsoraisedregardingemployment protection.Residentsproposed that theredundancyperiodprovidedforin theSessionalPaperberevised fromthecurrentthreeyearstoalonger durationtoenhancejobsecurityforaffectedworkers.

353.Lastly,participants emphasized the importance of transparency and thefundsmustbering-fencedandstrictlyusedfortheirintendedpurposes, particularly infrastructure development,to ensure that the divestiture deliverstangiblebenefitstothecountry.

3.57Kirinyaga County

354.Publicparticipation in Kirinyaga County was conducted on 5th February 2026at theNG-CDFHallinKirinyagaCentralwith65%supportingwhile 35% rejected the divestiture.Amajority of the participants expressed conditionalsupportforSessionalPaperNo.3of2025,subjecttosubstantial amendments to the proposed divestiture framework.Opposition and reservations were mainlybased on concerns about transparency, accountability,valuation ofthe shares,choice of thebuyer,anduse of the proceeds.
355.Participantsquestioned theprioritizationofprojectsproposedtobefunded using the proceeds,noting that other critical areas such as education, agriculture,and completion of stalled projects requiredurgentattention. They felt that thebasis for selecting theproposedprojects wasnot clearly explainedintheSessionalPaper.
356.Severalparticipants opposed thesaleof shares toa foreignentityand questionedwhyVodacomhadbeenidentifiedasthepreferredbuyer.They expressedconcernthatincreasedforeigncontrolcouldweakenGovernment oversight,votingpower,andvetoauthority,therebyreducingpubliccontrol overastrategicnationalasset.
357.Concerns about accountabilityand managementof the proceeds were repeatedlyraised,withparticipants referring topastcasesofmisuseof publicfunds andcalling forlegallyenforceable ring-fencing measures. Questionswerealsoraised aboutthe adequacyofpublicconsultation,with afterkeydecisionshadalreadybeenmade.
358.Participants furtherquestionedthevaluationandpricing ofthe shares, observing thatSafaricom'sshareprice appeared toberisingand thatselling at thecurrentvaluation could deny thegovernmenthigherfuturereturns. Alternative approaches suggested included offering the shares to thepublic,

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya allowingmultiplebidders,and splittingthe shares topromote competition and better price discovery.

359.Overall,views expressed inKirinyaga Countyreflected conditional support for Sessional Paper No.3of 2025,based on the need for improved transparency,competitive disposal methods,strong accountability measures,andprotectionoflong-termnationalinterests.

3.58 Baringo County

360.ResidentsofBaringo CountyexpressedsupportfortheproposedSessional Paper,butwithkeyamendmentsaimedatsafeguardingnationalandpublic interests.Participants particularly emphasized the need to revise the proposed redundancy period,noting that the current provision could negatively affect employment.They recommended that theredundancy thesharestothepublicwouldpromotewiderKenyanownershipandprevent excessivecontrolby theVodacomGroup,whichisa foreigncompany. Accordingtotheparticipants,allowingVodacomtoacquire thefull15per centstakewouldgiveitundueinfluenceoverSafaricom'soperationsand strategicdecisions.
361.Concerns were alsoraised regarding the saleprocess.Residents questioned whetheranybarrierspreventedthegovernmentfromofferingthesharesto otherpotentialforeign investors.Theyproposed that thesalebeopened to competitivebiddingto ensure transparency,attractbetterpricing,and avoid monopolizationofcontrolbyasingleshareholder.
362.Despite these concerns,many participants supported partial divestiture, notingthatSafaricomisalreadyastableandprofitablecompany.They observedthatsellingaportionofthegovernment'sshareswouldnot negatively affect thecompany'soperationsorperformance.The residents furtherstatedthatif theproceedsfrom the saleareintended forpublic benefit,such as the construction of hospitals,roads,and investment in education,thenthegovernmentshouldproceedwiththesale,providedthat propersafeguards and accountability mechanisms areputin place.

3.59 Kisumu County

PublicparticipationinKisumu Countywas conductedatMama Grace Onyango SocialHallon6thFebruary2026with76%supportingwhile24%rejected the divestiture.Theysubmittedasfollows:

363.Theresidentsunderscoredtheimportanceofpublicparticipationatevery stage of theprocess.During thepublicparticipationhearings,a section of

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya theresidents supported theproposed divestiture,albeitwithreservations. TheyemphasizedthattheproceedsfromthesaleofSafaricomsharesshould beutilizedfor thedevelopmentofinfrastructure such asroadsandfor the provisionofelectricityandwaterservicesandthattheseproceedsshouldbe distributed equitablyacrossall counties.Someparticipantsnoted that the divestiture could help ease the country's debtburden;however,they emphasizedtheneedforfiscaldisciplineandcautionedthattheGovernment shouldstrivetolivewithinitsmeans.

364.On the otherhand,a section of theresidents opposed thedivestiture,raising Participantsquestionedwhetherthe Governmentwould applythefunds transparentlyand,inamanner,consistentwith thestatedobjectivesand furthersoughtclarificationonwhethertherewouldbeafeedback mechanism tothepublicafter thesaleinorder toenhanceaccountability.
365.Participantsalsocautionedagainstthesaleofstrategicgovernmentassets, particularly thosethatdirectlybenefit thepublic.They expressed theview thatloss-makingassetsshouldinsteadbeprioritizedfordivestiture,noting that thesaleof profitablestrategicassetscouldundermine national ownership.Theyfurtherrecommendedthatthetargetedinfrastructure projectsthatwillbedevelopedfromtheproceedsofsaleshouldbeclearly identifiedanddisclosedtothepublic.
366.Some residentsquestionedwhy the shareswere sold toa foreignentity rather thanbeingoffered tothepublicthroughanInitialPublicOffer(IPO). In addition,residentsrecommended thata competitivebiddingprocess shouldhavebeenundertaken insteadoffocusingonaparticularbuyer, notingthat thisapproachcouldenhance valuerealizationandwealth creation.Additionally,theyemphasizedtheimportanceofensuringthatall regions ofthecountrybenefitequitablyfrom thesaleof theSafaricom shares.

3.60EmbuCounty

367.Public participation in Embu County was conducted at IFAD Hall on 6th February2026with86%supportingwhile14%rejectedthedivestiture.
368.MajorityofEmburesidentsexpressed support for theproposedpartial divestitureof theGovernmentofKenya's shareholdinginSafaricomPLC, termingitatimelyandprogressivemoveprovideditishandled with forum,theresidentsnotedthatthedivestiturecouldhelptheGovernment raisemuchneededrevenuefor developmentprojectswhileeasingpressure caused byrisingpublicborrowing.However,they emphasized that the

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

successoftheexercisewill largelydependonhowopenand accountable the entireprocessis,particularlyonhowtheproceedswillbeutilized.
369.Theresidentswarnedthatanylackoftransparencycouldleadtolossof publicfundsanderodepublicconfidenceinthedivestiture.Theystatedthat althoughthemovecouldunlockfundsforcriticalinfrastructureprojectsand strengthengovernmentfinances,the Governmentmustensuretheprocess isclean,credibleandfreefrom corruption.
370.Theresidentsfurtheremphasizedthatthedivestiturewill onlybebeneficial ifstrictoversightmechanismsareputinplace.Theyadded thatopenness inthesaleandbiddingprocesswouldreassureKenyansthattheexerciseis genuinelymeant toserve thepublicinterest.
371.TheyalsourgedtheGovernmenttopubliclydiscloseallbiddersandthe successfulparty,noting thatwhilepublicdeclaration of the saleisagood step,accountabilitymustbemaintained throughouttheentireprocess.

3.61Murang'aCounty

372.PublicparticipationinMurang'aCountywasconductedon6thFebruary theproposalwhile35%supportedit.Viewsexpressedbymembersofthe public reflected strong opposition and conditional support,with the dominantpositionbeingthattheproposalrequiredsignificantamendments, strongersafeguards,andclearerjustification.
373.Amajorityof the participantsopposed thesaleofSafaricomshares altogether,arguing thatSafaricom remainsahighlyprofitablenational asset thatgeneratessubstantialrevenueforthegovernmentthroughdividends. revenue leakages,recovering stolen public funds,supporting productive sectors like agriculture, expanding Safaricom into new markets,or borrowingagainstfuturedividendincome.
374.Additionally, other participants expressed concern that continued economicsovereigntyandquestionedwhatotherassetsmightbesoldinthe
375.Concernswererepeatedlyraisedregardingtransparencyandaccountability. Participantsquestionedhowthedecisiontoselltheshareswasmade,who negotiatedonbehalfofthegovernment,whether thenegotiationswereopen andcompetitive,andsoughttofindout whoweretheadvisors tothe transaction.TheexclusivityofVodacomGroupastheproposedbuyerwas

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPICbyGovernmentofKenya

membersof thepublicwerenotgivenpriority.Many calledfor thesharesto be sold to Kenyans,floated to thepublic,or offered through a competitive biddingprocesstoensurevalueformoneyandprotectnationalinterest.
376.Participants expressedapprehension thatallowingVodacom Groupto become the largest shareholder could weaken Governmentinfluence over Safaricom'sstrategicdecisionsandunderminepublicinterest considerations.Someproposed reducing thepercentage of shares tobe sold, withsuggestions thatVodacom's acquisitionbecapped at10percentwhile the remainingsharesbe offered tomembersof thepublic,includingpersons withdisabilities.OthersarguedthattheGovernmentshouldinsteadseekto remainthelargestshareholderinSafaricom.
377.The use of proceeds emerged as anothermajor concern.Participants questionedwhycertainprojectshadbeenprioritisedforfundingwhileother pressingneedssuchaseducation,health,andcompletionofstalledprojects had not been adequately considered.There was strong demand for assurancesthat theproceedswouldbe ring-fencedandprotected from misuse,with some participants proposing that the funds should only be utilisedafterthe2027GeneralElectionstoavoidpoliticalinterference.
378.Issues of national security, data protection,and employment stability were alsoraised.ParticipantsquestionedhowKenyan datawouldbe safeguarded s wouldbeprotectedatSafaricom'sboardlevel.Othersraisedconcernsabout thelong-termjobsecurityof Safaricom employeesfollowing theproposed3yearguaranteeoftheemployeesintheSessionalPaper.

3.62KakamegaCounty

2026atMagharibi HallinKakamega townwith63%supportingtheproposal while37%rejectedit.
380.The residents ofKakamega shared mixed views on the proposed divestiture. Mostparticipantsraisedconcerns aboutthelackofpublicawarenessof the publicparticipationexercise,statingthattheyshouldhavebeenadequately alerted.Theresidents whoopposed thepartial divestiturestatedthat,from the previous sale proceeds,none of thefundshas been accounted for,with thepresence ofmassive corruptionloopholes once the sale of shares is completed.Theyinsistedontheneedforaccountabilityoftheproceedsfrom thesalebecauselossoffundsisconsideredafrequentoccurrencewhenever suchsalesgo ahead.Further,citizensdo notbenefit from the saleof governmententities,and thereareconcernsaboutthelossofbusinessby Safaricom dealers and M-Pesa operators,with job losses expected for Safaricomemployees.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

381.Theresidentssubmittedthatthegovernmentisafraidofraisingtaxes,which iswhytheychoosetoprivatizegovernmententitiesandthatthegovernment to raise money for development.They opposed the sale,stating that the government should target institutions that are not profitable,and a profitableentitysuchasSafaricomisanationalheritageandhenceshould notbesold.Further,theresidentsopposed thesalebecauseofmistrustof governmentofficialswhoendupmisusingthemoneyand also thelackof accountabilityonthesame.
382.Someresidentssupported thepartialdivestiture,acknowledgingthatthere isaneedforinfrastructure development,theylackroads,and there are no governmentcontroloveratelecomcompany,whichmayharm theresidents privacy,so a reduced share will help maintain citizens'freedom.The and thatif thereisalaw thatcanbedevelopedtocurbthestealingofpublic money,then thedevelopmentdreamscanbeachieved.
383.Someoftherecommendationsfromtheresidentswhosupportedthepartial divestitureincludedtheneedfor thegovernmenttoincluderescuecenters in the infrastructure development plans,accountability to the National InfrastructureFundandthattheresidentsshouldbenefitfromtheprocess intermsofdevelopment.Theysubmittedthattheproceedsshouldhelp developthedilapidatedroadsin Kakamega,theRailwaylineshouldbe developed all the way to Butere,develop the Kakamega Airstrip,and all stalledprojectsinKakamegashouldbeaddressed through theproceeds. Further,theresidentsaskedforthegovernmenttocomeupwithguidelines toringfencesomeofthefundsforprojectsinKakamegaandgiveaccessto SMEstobenefitfrom theinfrastructureprojects andthattheprojectsshould notbeawardedtoforeigners.

3.63 West Pokot County

384.Residentsof West PokotCountyexpressedsupportforthe proposed divestiture,stating that it would facilitate development,particularlyin marginalisedregions.Participantsobserved thatmanyareas within the countycontinuetofaceseverechallenges,includinglimitedaccesstoclean andsafewater.Insomeregions,residentsstill sharewatersourceswithwild animals,highlighting theurgentneedforinvestmentinessential infrastructure.
385.Theresidentsfurthernoted thatitisprudentfor thegovernmenttoutilise relyingonadditionalborrowing.TheypointedoutthatKenya'spublicdebt,

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya estimatedatapproximatelyKSh12trillion,hasreachedlevelsthatconstrain further borrowing.In this regard,participants viewed the proposed sale of 15per centofgovernment shares asapracticalandresponsible approach toraisingfunds.

386.However,they emphasized thattheproceedsfrom the divestiture should be directedexclusivelytowardscommerciallyviableandimpactful infrastructure projects,rather than being used for recurrent government expenditure.Accordingto theresidents,channelingthefundsintolong-term developmentinitiativeswoulddeliversustainablebenefitstothecountry.
387.Participants also proposed that at least half of the proceeds be allocated to allocation wouldpromote equity,addresslongstandingregional disparities, andensurethatallpartsofthecountrybenefitfairlyfromthedivestiture.

3.64 TharakaNithi County

388.Public participation in Tharaka Nithi County was conducted at Katwana CountyHallon9thFebruary2025,with82%oftheparticipantssupporting, while18%wereofadifferentview.
389.Participants who supported the proposal emphasized that while development financing is necessary,the Sessional Paper does not clearly identify the specificprojects tobe funded.They argued thatwithouta detailed,itemized list of projects,including cost estimates and implementationtimelines,itisdifficultfor thepublictoassesstheimpact and fairness of the proposal.The absence of this clarity,in their view, weakens transparency and limits meaningful public oversight.
legallyenforceable safeguards.Theystressed that the funds should be protectedfromdiversionandplacedunderastructuredaccountability frameworkwithregularreportingobligations.
391.Additionally,they noted that proceeds raised from the divestiture be equitably distributed across counties,witheach countyidentifying and prioritizing itsmosturgent developmentneedsto avoidperceivedregional imbalance.
392.Someparticipantsrecommended that5%of thesharesbeoffereddirectly to Kenyancitizens,with 10%sold toVodacom,asa wayofpromotinglocal ownershipandpreventingexcessiveconcentrationofcontrol.
393.However, concerns about corruption were raised with several residents citing pastinstancesofmismanagementofpublicfundsandquestioningwhether adequatesafeguardsexisttopreventsimilaroutcomes.

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394.Theresidents stated thatSafaricom isa strategic andprofitablenational asset,and participants cautioned thatreducing government ownership couldweakennational control.Additionally,concernswereraisedaboutjob couldfacerestructuringorlayoffsonceforeigncontrolincreases.

3.65KiambuCounty

395.PublicparticipationinKiambuCountywasheldInKiambuPolytechnicon 9thFebruary2026with75%rejecting theproposalwhile25%supported it. Most participants questioned motives for selling a profitable,incomegenerating national asset that consistently pays dividends to the Government.Concernswere raised that the proposedadvancedividend amountedtoadisguisedloan,offeringshort-termfiscalreliefwhileexposing thecountrytolong-termrevenueloss.Participantsfurtherquestioned the valuation of the shares,arguing that theproposed price undervalued the asset and unreasonablyfavoured Vodacom,particularlyin the absence of an open,competitivebiddingprocess.
396.Strongviewswereexpressedon thechoice ofVodacomas thepreferred buyer,with manyparticipants warning that a foreign majority shareholder would likely exert controlover strategic decisions,repatriate profits,and prioritiseshareholderinterestsovernational considerations.Related to this was deep concern abouttheprotectionofKenyandata,especiallyin the contextofcloudcomputingandemergingartificialintelligencetechnologies, aswellastheadequacyofsafeguardsoncetheproposedthree-year transition period lapses.Participants also expressed unease about the limitedboardrepresentationthatwouldremainwith theGovernmentand thepotentialimplicationsforemploymentsecurityofSafaricomstaffbeyond theinitialprotectionperiodofthreeyears.
397.Several participants questioned why alternative options such as cutting recurrentgovernmentexpenditure,sealingcorruptionloopholes,prioritising recovery of lost public funds,managing domestic debt, selling nonperformingassets,orfloatingthesharestoKenyanswerenotfullyexhausted before opting to sell Safaricom shares.Otherschallenged the stated use of theproceeds,noting thatmanyoftheproposedprojects alreadyfall within clearingpendingbillsandcompletingstalledprojects.
398.Aminorityofparticipants supported theproposed saleon thebasisof revenuemobilisation,developmentfinancing,andfiscal efficiency.However, accountability,improved public participation,and robustmechanismsto nationalelectionsin2027.Overall,KiambuCounty'ssubmissionsreflected

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya astrongdesirefordecisions that safeguard long-termnationalinterest, strengthen governance,and preserve Kenyan ownership and control of strategicnationalassets.

3.66VihigaCounty

399.Publicparticipation in Vihiga County was held at thePraise Centre Church inMbaleTown,on 9thFebruary 2026,where 48% supported theproposal, and52%rejectedit.Theysubmittedasfollows:
400.Residents expressed both support andreservationsregardingtheproposed partialdivestiture.Those supporting theproposalemphasized that the proceedscouldfacilitateinfrastructuredevelopment,stimulate economic growth,create employment opportunities,and reduce the tax burden on citizens, provided the funds are prudently managed and equitably distributedacrosscounties.
401.Participants raised concerns regarding thepotential transfer of controlling interest to a foreign entity,noting thatincreased foreign ownership could affect national interests,corporate decision-making,data sovereignty, service affordability,and corporatesocial responsibilityobligations.They recommendedthatownershipdilutionshouldbestructuredinamanner thatsafeguardsnationalstrategicinterests.
402.Residents emphasized theimportance of ensuringequitable distribution of theproceeds througha structuredand transparentframework.They called fortheestablishmentandoperationalizationoftheNationalInfrastructure Fund throughlegislation to ensure accountability,transparency,andringfencingofproceedsforintendedinfrastructure and developmentpurposes.
403.Someparticipantsrecommended thataportionofthesharesshouldbemade availabletoKenyancitizensthroughpublicofferingmechanismstopromote local ownership and prevent excessive concentration of ownership by a single foreigninvestor.Theyfurtherproposed thattheGovernmentshouldconsider incorporatingbuy-backprovisionstosafeguardlong-term nationalinterests.
404.Concerns were also raisedregarding theproposed valuation of the shares at Kshs.34per share,with residents urging the Government to ensure that the sale price reflects fair market value,long-term economic potential,and nationalstrategicconsiderations.
ensureeffectiveutilizationof proceedsandpreventmisuseofpublic institutional safeguards,noting concerns arising from past instances of publicresourcemismanagement.

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406.Participantsfurtherrecommendedthatproceedsshouldnotonlybe sectors,includingindustrialization,manufacturing,and value-addition,to supportsustainableeconomicgrowthandlong-termnationalproductivity.

3.67 Uasin Gishu and Nandi County

407.Participantslargelysupported theproposalwithamendments.Acommon recommendationwasthatonly8%ofthesharesbesoldtoVodacomGroup rather than15%.Manycontributorsargued thatKenya'sfiscalchallenges expenditure.Consequently,theyemphasized the need tolegally safeguard andring-fence theproceedsbefore anydivestitureisundertaken.
408.Alternative views emerged,with some participants proposing that the substantialdevelopmentfinancingandreducerelianceonborrowing.These participants argued thatsuchanapproachcouldsignificantlyease the budgetdeficit.
409.Other contributors proposed a restructured allocation,suggesting that 6% besoldtoVodacomGroupand9%floatedtothepublic.Thisproposalwas framed as a mechanism topreserve national sovereignty,particularly in relationtodatasecurityandstrategiccontrol.
410.Employmentconsiderationsalsofeaturedprominently.Participants recommendedthattheSessionalPaperincorporatesprovisions toensure that atleast75%of Safaricom employeesremainKenyan after a specified transitionperiod.
41l.Concernswereraisedregarding thefiscalimpactof the transaction.Some questionedwhethertheprojectedKSh.244billionwouldmateriallyaddress budget deficitsthat have historically approached KSh.1 trillion. could influence pricing decisions,potentially making Safaricom services moreexpensive.
412.OtherparticipantsindicatedthattheSessionalPaperoughttohave providedalistoftheprojectstheproceedsofthedivestiturewillbeutilized on,notingthatthisinformationwouldfosteraccountabilityand transparency.
413.TherewerealsoproposalsthattheSessionalPapercontainsabuy-back provisionthatwillprovideafuturesafeguardshouldtheGovernmentwish tobuybackitssharesfromVodacomoranyothershareholder.

414.In terms of the proposed changes in Safaricom Board membership,other contributorsproposedthatpersonswithdisabilities shouldbeconsidered. Therewere alsoproposalsfor theproceedstobeutilizedformental indigents.
415.Therewerealso concernsfrom someparticipantson theprudenceof the advancedividends,whether therewouldbefurtherdivestituresinfuture, and thelackofaconclusivelistofinfrastructureprojectstheproceedswill be utilized on.There was also a proposal from one participant who was of theview thatthe Governmentdisposesofallits shares inSafaricomPLC.

3.68Meru County

416.Public participation in Meru County was held at Kamunde Hall,on 10th February2026,where34% supported theproposal and66%rejectedit.The questioning the urgency of selling a profitable,dividend-paying asset, arguingthatthegovernmentcouldinsteadrelyonsteadydividendincome to finance development projects.Theyviewed the proposed sale as a shorttermfinancingsolutionthatcouldunderminelong-termrevenuestability.
417.Concernswerealsoraisedthatsellingtheentire15%staketoVodacom wouldresultin majority foreign control,potentiallyreducinggovernment influence over strategic decisions.Participantsproposed floating the shares through an IPO to increase Kenyan ownership,widen participation,and preventconcentrationofpowerinasingleshareholder.
418.Data security emerged as a significant concern, given Safaricom's control of sensitive personal and financial databelonging tomillionsof Kenyans. Residents cautioned that increased foreign control could raise national securityrisks ifnotproperlyregulated.
419.Questionswerealsoraisedaboutthetransparencyofthevaluationprocess, particularlyhowtheKShs.34sharepricewasdetermined.Participantscited limited disclosureregardingtransactionaladvisors,projectselectioncriteria, contractors,monitoringmechanisms,and long-term employeeprotections. Overall,skepticism was expressed about whether the proceeds would be purposes.
420.Theresidents proposed floating the shares in Nairobi SecuritiesExchange at Kshs.34 to be purchased byKenyans.

3.69 Kisii County

421.Publicparticipation inKisiiCountywasconducted in at theAgricultural Training College(ATC)in Kisii town on 11th February 2026with 53% supportingtheproposalwhile47%rejectedit.

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Safaricom.Thosesupportingthepartialdivestiturestatedthattheproceeds willhelpfundprojectsandgeneratemoneyfordevelopment.Further,itwill benefitthecitizensintermsofwaterandelectricity.Theyadvocatedforthe educationandhealthsectorstobeconsideredindevelopmentandthatthere shouldbeguidelines toensurethatfundsareputtoproperuse.However, theyraisedconcernsaboutwhetherthesalemayaffectanytransaction operationsofSafaricom.
423.Theresidentsopposingthepartialdivestiturestatedthatanythingrelatedto publicfundsisassociatedwithcorruption,andasaresult,Kenyansendup suffering.Further,there is wastage by the government,and there is no guaranteed developmentevenwhen thegovernmentborrowsloansmeant forinfrastructure.The residentsvoicedmistrustofthe governmentand governmentofficialsregarding the usageofproceedsfrom the sale and managementoffundsingeneral,andproposed thatthegovernmentshould look elsewhere to generate money,not Safaricom.Moreover,theresidents thereforethedivestitureisnotanoption.
424.TheresidentsemphasizedthatSafaricomisaprofit-makingcompany,and thegovernmentisbenefitingalotfromdividendsobtainedthroughtheir35% stake,andtherefore,itissufficientfordevelopmentratherthanfocusingon thesaleof shares.Further,there wereconcerns aboutdataprotection becauseofthemuchcontrolobtainedbyaforeignentity(Vodacom).The residentsaskedforassurancesfrom thegovernmentthatthemoneywould lossofmoney.Theyfurtheraskedthegovernmenttoconsiderthesharingof functionsamongthethreearmsofgovernmenttoensuremoneyissavedfor otherfunctions.TheyaskedforEACCtoacceleratetherecoveryofcorruption fundstohelpfundgovernmentprojects.

3.70 Taita taveta County

425.PublicparticipationinTaitaTavetaCountywasconductedinMwatateNGCDFHallon11thFebruary2026with55%rejectingtheproposalwhile45% supportedit.Whileafewparticipantswelcomed theproposalasapossible waytostimulateeconomicgrowthandraisefundsfordevelopment,many othersapproachedthematterwithcautiononaccountability,ownership, andnationalinterest.
proceedsfromthesalewouldbeused strictlyfortheintendedpurposes. They submitted that,before selling a profitable national asset, the Governmentshouldfirstdemonstratestrongeractioninsealingcorruption

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya loopholes and reducing wastage,The call to ring-fence the funds was repeated,with participants emphasizing that the money should not be

427.Thequestionofwhoshouldbuytheshareswasraisedin thediscussion. Manyresidents opposed theidea to sell toVodacom,arguing that the shares shouldinsteadbesoldtoKenyanssothatownershipremainslocalandthe financial benefits continue tocirculatewithin the country.Some suggested limitingthepercentagesoldtoVodacomtoonly5percentwhile theother10 percentportiontocitizensorlocalentities.Othersproposedfloating the sharestothehighestbiddertoensuremaximumvalue.Alongsidethiswas concernaboutthesafetyofKenyandataandwhethertheproposedbuyer, Vodacom could weaken Government influence over a strategic national asset.
428.Residents also submitted that education,water,health,agriculture,and food security are urgent areas that deserve immediate attention.Many participants questionedwhetherlarge-scaleinfrastructureprojects should take precedence over pressing socialneeds,especially when some families continue to strugglewith schoolfees andaccess tobasicservices.Even among thosewho supported the sale,therewere strongrecommendations thattheproceedsmustvisiblyimproveessential sectors such ashealthcare andyouth empowerment,includinginvestmentinICTand digital hubs.
429.With thecountry moving toward the 2027GeneralElection,the timingof the proposalwasanotherissueraised.Someresidentsfeltthatthismaynotbe the most appropriate moment to undertake such a significant transaction. Othersquestionedwhether the sale is along-term strategy or simply a shortterm response to fiscal pressures.There were suggestions that underperforming Governmententitiescouldbeconsideredforprivatization insteadofaconsistentlyprofitableonelikeSafaricom.
430.Participants alsohighlighted theneedforbetterpublic sensitization.Some feltthatcitizensshouldhavebeenmorethoroughlyinformedaboutthe proposal before the publicparticipation exercise,noting thatmeaningful engagementrequiresadequateunderstanding.Theyrecommendedthatlocal leaderstake amore activerolein explainingnationaleconomic decisionsto communities.

3.71KajiadoCounty

431.Participants largely supported the proposed divestiture,emphasizing that the proceeds should be equitablydistributed across constituencies to enhancevisibility and accountabilityoffundedprojectsatthelocal level.

432.Supportersargued thatthetransactionwouldbebeneficialincreatingfiscal spaceandreducingrelianceonborrowing,particularlyinlightofKenya's risingpublicdebt,whichtheynotedhasexceededKSh.12 trillion.
433.Contributorsacknowledgedimprovements ingovernancepractices, highlighting thatpublicparticipation nowplaysa central role inpolicy decisions, consistent with constitutional requirements.Participants contrasted this with past administrations wherepublic assets,including hotels,were reportedly sold withoutadequate citizen involvement.They further recommended thatproceeds from thedivestiturebeutilizedto finance infrastructure development,particularly road construction within Kajiado County.Employmentconcernswere alsoraised.Someparticipants proposedthattheSessional Paper extendthegraceperiodforredundancy protectionstosafeguardworkers.
434.Alternativeviewsemergedregardingthesalestructure.Severalcontributors recommended that sharesbe floatedtothe public rather than sold Vodacom's shareholdingincreasesignificantly.

3.72Samburu County

435.PublicparticipationinSamburuCountywasheldinMaralalVocationCentre on12thFebruary2026with63%supportingtheproposaland37%rejecting it.These views reflectedboth supportandopposition to the proposed divestiture.Supportersindicated that the transaction would allow the governmenttomobilizefundswithoutimposingadditionaltaxes.Theyurged thegovernmentthattheproceedsbedirectedtowardpressinginfrastructure challenges,particularly poor road networks and weak mobile network coverage,whichtheystatedcontinuetohindereconomicactivityandservice deliveryinthecounty.
436.Someresidentsproposedthataportionofthesharesbeofferedtothepublic toencouragebroadercitizenparticipationandlocalinvestment.Theyalso calledfora structuredfeedbackandreportingmechanism tokeepresidents informedabout projects fundedthroughtheproceedsandtheir implementationstatus.
437.Thoseopposing,however,warned thatselling thesharestoVodacom could proposedpriceofKShs.34undervaluesthecompany,notingthatSafaricom shareshavepreviouslytradedaboveKShs.4o.Theyraisedconcernsabout thevaluationmethodologyandwhetherthegovernmentwouldreceivefair marketvalue.Participantsalsohighlightedtheabsenceofclearsafeguards toguaranteethattheproceedswouldbeusedexclusivelyfordevelopment purposes.Alternativeproposalsincludedleasing thesharesoropeningthe

value.

3.73HomabayCounty

438.PublicparticipationinHomabayCountywasconducted attheNG-CDFHall inHomabayTownon13thFebruary2026with90%supportingwhile10% rejectingtheproposal.Thepublicwassensitizedonthesessionalpaperand thereafterallowedtogivetheirviewsontheproposedpartialdivestiture.
439.Theresidents shared mixedfeelings about the proposed partial divestiture, but the majority were in support, stating that foreign loans and external debt have been hurting the country and, therefore, raising money for infrastructure from other means was necessary.Further, theproceeds will amidstthenumerousdebts.Theresidentsadvocatedforbetterroadsand socialamenities,andtheneedforVodacomtogivebacktothecommunity after the sale.They also asked thegovernmenttoprotect thepublicwhile carryingoutthesale.
440.Someoftheresidentswhodidnotsupportthepartialdivestituresubmitted thatthegovernmentshouldlookforanotherinvestorwhocanpaymorethan theKshs.34per shareis currentlyinplace.Further,there areexpectations conditionsandfearofalackofprotectionofworkers.Concernswereraised aboutwhowill manage theNational InfrastructureFund andhow thefunds willbeallocatedtoprojectdevelopment.

3.74Mombasa County

44l.Public participation in Mombasa County was conducted in the Kenya MethodistChurch Hall-Tononoka on13thFebruary2026 with79% supportingwhile21%rejectingtheproposal.Whilemostparticipants supported theproposalasitis,asectionofresidentsexpressed conditional support,emphasizing the need for safeguards,clarity,and strategic amendmentsbeforefullyembracingthedivestiture.
442.Thosewhosupported theSessionalPaperviewed itasanopportunity to accelerate infrastructure development and strengthen Kenya's economic trajectory.There wasconfidencethattheproceedsbechannelled into asferry transportforMombasa residents.The proposal asper Sessional Paper 3of2025representedprogressandapracticalsteptoward modernizationandlong-termnationalgrowth.
443.However, a larger portion of participants supported the proposal subject to amendments.AcentralconcernwasthefutureofSafaricomemployeesafter

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

threeyears.Residentssoughtassurance thatstaffwouldbeprotected and thattheiremploymenttermswouldnotbeadverselyaffected.
444.Therewerealsosignificantconcernsregardingthelong-termimplicationsof Vodacom potentially becoming the majority shareholder.Participants questionedhowthisshiftmightaffectnationalcontrol,revenuestreams,and strategicdecision-making.Theissueof datasecurityemerged strongly,with residents expressing apprehension about a foreign-owned companyholding substantialinfluenceoveratelecommunicationsfirmthatmanagessensitive dataformillionsofKenyans.
445.On themanagementof proceeds,manyparticipantsemphasized thatfunds shouldnotbeabsorbedintotheConsolidatedFund.Theyadvocatedforthe creationofadedicatedandring-fencedInfrastructureFundtoensure transparency and accountability.Questionswere raised about the sustainabilityofsuchafundandwhethertheGovernmentmightresortto continuedprivatizationtokeepitoperationalinthelongterm.
446.Onallocation of shares,severalparticipantsproposed that sharesbesold whollyorpartlytoKenyancitizensratherthanprimarilytoVodacom.Others suggestedabalancedapproach,allowingbothVodacomandtheKenyan public to participate.The underlying sentiment was to ensure local ownershipandparticipationremainsafeguarded.
Government should first seal corruption loopholes,reduce wastage,and explore alternativerevenue-raisingmechanismsbeforesellingaprofitable national asset.Additionally,questions were raised about procedural inassetsalesbutnotalwaysinborrowingdecisions.
448.Whiletherewasrecognitionof thepotentialdevelopmentalbenefitsofthe partial divestiture,residentsconsistentlycalledforstrongeraccountability measures,employeeprotection,nationalinterestsafeguards,andclearlongtermplanning.

3.75Kilifi County

449.Participants generally supported the proposed divestiture,noting that the saleofSafaricomsharescouldhelpreduceborrowing,easedebtpressures, andcreatefiscalspacefordevelopment.Contributorsemphasizedthatsuch measuresmay alsocontributetoloweringthetaxburdenoncitizens.
450.Participantsrecommendedthatproceedsfromthedivestiturebedirected towardinfrastructure development,particularlyroadconstruction.Itwas emphasized that funds should support both Countyand National Government roads,rather than being limited to national projects

alone.Strong emphasis was placed on inclusivity,with participants noting thattheviewsofcitizens shouldberespectedduring parliamentary deliberations.
451.Contributorsfurtherstressed thathistoricallyunderservedareasmustnot be neglected,proposingthata substantial shareof proceeds,some suggested up to8o%,beallocated toruralroaddevelopmentwithinconstituencies. Several participants recommended that allocations follow an equitable distributionframeworksimilartoNG-CDF,consideringinfrastructuregaps across constituencies.
452.Alternative proposals emerged regarding the sale structure.Some participantsrecommendedthatsharesbesoldtothepublicratherthanthe Vodacom Group, citing concerns over ownership concentration. Employment safeguardswere alsohighlighted.Participantsproposed that tenyears toenhancejob security.

3.76KwaleCounty

453.Public participation inKwale County was conducted at Kwale Cultural Centreon14thFebruary2026with88%supportingthedivestitureand12% opposingit.Supportersof theproposalindicated thattheproceedscould accesstocleanandreliablewater.
454.Residents stressed thatwater scarcity remains a majorchallenge affecting households,schools,and health facilities,and urged that water emphasized thattheproceedsmustbestrictlyring-fencedandsubjectto clear accountabilitymechanisms.However,concerns were raisedregarding the timingof the sale,given itsproximity to the electionperiod.Participants developmentalactivities.
455.Additionally,concerns were also raised about the reason of selling a profitable and strategic national asset,with many noting that the governmentwouldforgofuturedividendincomethatcouldprovide sustainablerevenue over time.Someparticipantsproposedpostponing the sale until after elections,while others suggested leasing the shares or exploringalternativefinancingmechanismsthatwouldallowthe governmenttoretainownershipwhilestillraisingfunds.

CHAPTERFOUR

4.O KEYISSUES RAISEDBYSTAKEHOLDERSANDCOUNTY SUBMISSIONS REGARDING THE PROPOSED PARTIAL DIVESTITURE OF THE 15%GOVERNMENT SHAREHOLDING IN SAFARICOM PLC.

Introduction

456.Thissectionconsolidatesthematicareasfrombothoralandwritten submissionsreceivedfromindividualstakeholders,professionalbodies,civil society actors,labour representatives,private sector groups,and members of the public during hearings conducted across thirty (3o) counties concerning the proposedpartialdivestitureof15 percent Government shareholdinginSafaricomPLCtotheVodacomGroup.
457.The public expressed general support for the proposed divestiture, recognizingitspotentialtogenerateresourcesfornationaldevelopmentand infrastructure financing.However,stakeholders consistentlyraised critical issuesandconcernsthatmustbeaddressedbeforethetransaction proceeds.Theseincludevaluation transparency,timingand fiscal prudence, foreign majority control, national sovereignty,governance of proceeds, equitableallocation,employmentprotection,data security,andconsumer safeguards.
458.Publichearingswereprecededby sensitizationon the contents of the SessionalPaper.Participantsbroadlyacknowledged Safaricom PLCasa strategicnationalassetwhoseownershipstructurehasdirectimplications for Kenya's economy,telecommunications systems,mobile money ecosystem,publicrevenueflows,andfinancialservicesinfrastructure.While views varied between support,conditional support,and opposition, submissions consistently emphasized the need for transparency,fiscal prudence,constitutional compliance,protection ofnational interests,and intergenerationalequity.

4.1 Independent Valuation and Share Price Concerns

459.AsignificantnumberofstakeholdersquestionedtheproposedpriceofKSh 34pershare.Concernscenteredontheabsenceofapubliclydisclosed arguedthatrelianceonasix-monthVolumeWeightedAveragePrice(VWAP) isinsufficient fora strategicassetsale and does not reflectintrinsic valuationmethodologies such as discounted cash flow analysis,control premiums,orlong-term earnings forecasts.
460.FrancisWanjikuandothercontributorshighlighted theriskthattheState publicdisclosure.Particularattentionwasdrawntothemonetizationof

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

projecteddividendsofKSh55.7billionforanupfrontpaymentofKSh40.2 billion,implying an estimated 28% haircut. This was interpreted as
46l.StakeholdersestimatedapotentialdownsideshortfallofbetweenKSh4560billion if valuation assumptions areinaccurate.County submissionsfrom Machakos,Nyandarua,and Nairobi similarlydemanded disclosure of the valuationmethodology,identity ofthevaluer,andindependentexpertreview tosafeguardpublicwealth.

4.2 Timingof the Transaction and Fiscal Prudence

462.Several stakeholders opposed the transaction,citing the prevailing performanceofSafaricom.TheycontendedthatSafaricomPLCiscurrently profitablewith strong growth prospects and a consistent dividend paying record,the divestiture was likely to denyKenyans the company's future prospects.Similarly,they argued that divesting a high-performing asset converts along-term income-generating resource into short-termproceeds withoutclearfiscalnecessity.
463.Additionally,other stakeholders contended that, the transaction may constituteaquickfiscalfixratherthanastructuraldevelopmentsolution. Concerns were raised thatsurrendering predictable future dividends weakensfiscalresilienceandmaycontradictconstitutionalandstatutory fiduciary obligations to safeguard public assets for present and future generations.

4.3 Sovereignty,Majority Control, and Strategic National Interests

464.AmajorareaofconcernrelatestotheincreaseofVodacom'sownershipto 55%,thereby making it the majority shareholder.Stakeholders,including individual citizens,civil society actors,and county participants,expressed apprehensionthatmajorityforeigncontrolcouldweakenKenya'sinfluence overstrategicdecision-makingwithinSafaricom.
465.GivenSafaricom'sdominantrole in telecommunicationsand itsM-Pesa platform's central function in financial transactions,tax collection,social protectionpayments,and emergency transfers,increased foreign control wasviewed asraisingpotentialrisks to data sovereignty,national security, andfinancialsystemstability.

4.4 Consumer Protection and Pricing Regulation

reducedGovernmentshareholding.Concernswereraised thatdiminished publicownership may weaken indirect pricing influence over essential servicessuchasM-Pesa.Whileimmediatetariffincreaseswerenot

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

anticipated,stakeholders cautioned that long-term affordability and equitableaccesscouldbeaffectedifprofit-maximizationprioritiesoverride publicinterestsafeguards.
467.TheNationalAssemblywasurged tostrengthenregulatoryframeworksto financialservicesandtelecommunicationsinfrastructure

4.5 ProjectPrioritization and Sectoral Allocation

468.Publichearingsrevealed stronginterestinhowproceedsfromthedivestiture would be allocated,with participants emphasizing that funds should prioritize critical sectors such as health,infrastructure,electricity,water, distribution across all regions,ensuring that marginalized areas benefit fairly,and stressed that ongoing or stalled projects should be completed before new initiatives are undertaken.Additionally,some submissions youthemployment,and droughtmitigation tomaximizesocialand economic impact.

4.6 Employment and Dealer Ecosystem Protection

469.Participantsraisedconcernsaboutpotentialjoblossesaffectingemployees, agents,andSafaricomdealers.Manyrequestedthatemploymentprotection clausesbeextendedbeyondtheproposedthree-yearperiodtouptoten years.Therewerefears thatrestructuringfollowingmajority control could disrupt MSMEsdependenton Safaricom'scommissionstructures. Stakeholders proposed enforceable employmentprotections,contractual safeguards for dealers,andparliamentarymonitoringofpost-transaction employmentoutcomes.

4.7 Public Participation and Transparency

470.While residents appreciated the opportunity to participate in hearings, severalsubmissionsquestionedwhethertheengagementperiodwas sufficientandwhetherpublicviewswouldmeaningfullyinfluence parliamentary decision-making.Participants suggested that the timeline wastooshortandproposeddeferringconsiderationforbroaderdebate. Across counties,therewere callsforgreater transparencyregardingbuyer selection criteria,due diligence findings,feasibility studies,valuation reports,andtransaction advisory analysis.

4.8 Alternative Transaction Structures

471.Itwastheviewsofsomestakeholders thattheNationalTreasuryexplore alternativedisposalmechanismsbeforeproceedingwithanegotiatedblock saletoVodacom Group.Thesealternativedisposalalternativesmayinclude:
√ Opencompetitivebiddingtoattractmultipleinvestors;
√ Cross-listing on international exchanges;
√ Floating a portion of shares toKenyan retail investors;
√ Splittingthe15%stakebetweenVodacomandthepublic;
Gradualphaseddivestituretied to auditeddevelopmentmilestones.
472.ParticipantsfromMachakos andNairobi specificallyemphasizedtheneed to allow ordinary Kenyans to purchase shares to promote inclusivity and economicempowerment.

4.9 Ring-fencingof the DivestitureProceeds

473.Public hearings highlighted the critical need to ring-fence the proceeds from theproposed divestiture,ensuring thattheestimatedKSh204-244billion islegallyprotectedandnotdiverted torecurrentexpenditureorunrelated projects.Participants recommended dedicated accounts,quarterly reporting,parliamentary oversight,onlinepublic disclosure,and statutory priority sectors such asinfrastructure,health,education,and water,while equitablybenefiting all regions,including marginalized areas.

4.10 Controlling Interest and Its Implications

474.Akeyconcern raised bythepublicwas thepotentialimpactofforeign majoritycontrolifVodacomacquiredadominantstake,whichcouldweaken government influence over strategic decisions,data sovereignty, employment,and public revenue flows.Stakeholders proposed capping Vodacom'sshareholdingbelowmajoritycontrolandallocatingaportionof the 15 percent stake toKenyaninvestors or the public,ensuring that Safaricomremainsanationallycontrolled strategicassetwhilesafeguarding long-term economic, social, and governance priorities.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.OCOMMITTEEOBSERVATIONS

475.TheJointCommittee receivedsubmissionsfrom forty-threestakeholder organisations and institutions,as well asviews frompublicparticipation hearings conductedacross thirty counties.These submissions addressed, among others,economic,fiscal,legal,governance,and national security issuesrelatingtoSessionalPaperNo.3of2025ontheproposedpartial divestiture of theGovernmentof Kenya's15percentshareholdingin SafaricomPLCtoVodacomGroup.
476.Upon consideration of the Sessional Paper,stakeholder submissions, constitutionalrequirements,and applicablestatutoryframeworks,theJoint Committeemadethefollowingobservationsunderthematicareas:

5.1VALUATION

477.TheJoint Committee observed that,theNational Treasury in November, 2025enlistedtheservicesofKCBInvestmentBankLtdtoundertakeafull independentvaluationofSafaricomPLCshares.Inarrivingattheproposed offerpriceofKES34.00pershareforSafaricomPLC,thevaluationemployed various assumptions,projections and weighting thatwas applied across the variousvaluationmethodologies.
478.Thevaluation applied multiple recognized approaches to determine thefair valueofSafaricom PLCshares.TheDiscounted Cash Flow(DCF)method producedavalueofKES 18.51perordinaryshare,whiletheDiscounted DividendModel(DDM)approachyieldedavalueofKES23.61per share. KES22.32(low),KES26.19(average),andKES33.50(high),whilePrice-toEarnings (P/E) multiples implied a range of KES 10.62 (low),KES 17.08 (average),andKES25.01(high).Thesemethodologiescollectivelyconsidered projected cash flows, dividends,market comparables,and historical trading performancetoarriveatavaluationrange.
479.TheJointCommitteeacknowledgesthattheuseofmultiplevaluation methodologiesstrengthenedthetechnicalrobustnessof theexercise. However,it emphasizes the need for enhanced transparency in such assumptionsandtheprovisionofanindependentfairnessconfirmation,to safeguardthepublicinterestandstrengthenaccountabilityinfuture divestitures.

5.2Pricingof Safaricom PLC Shares and MarketDevelopments

480.The Joint Committee recognized stakeholders'concerns that prevailing the time ofexecutionofthe agreement and thetablingof Sessional PaperNo. 3inDecember2025,thesix-monthVolumeWeightedAveragePrice(VWAP) ofSafaricom PLC shares stood at approximatelyKSh.27.50per share, translatingtoamarketcapitalizationofaboutKSh.1.158trillion(USD8.979 billion). Following negotiations with the strategic investor,the final transaction price was set at KEs 34.00 per share,representing a 17-19 percentpremiumabovetheprevailingmarketpriceatthetime.Thispriceis alsoabove thesix-monthVWAPand thehigh-end EV/EBITDAimplied valuationrange.
481.TheJointCommitteefurtherobservedthatfollowing thetablingofthe SessionalPaper,thesharepriceofSafaricomPLCappreciatedsignificantly, from approximatelyKSh.27.50 per share to aboutKSh.33.95per share by February 2026,thereby effectively aligningwith theproposed transaction price.Notwithstanding this upward movement,the six-month volumeweightedaveragepriceasofFebruary2026remainedatapproximatelyKSh. 27.50pershare.
482.TheJointCommitteenotedthattheincreaseinsharepricewaslargely driven by positive market sentiment surrounding the proposed partial divestiture,as wellas the Company's declaration ofahalf-yearinterim dividend of KSh.O.85 per share.In this regard,the Joint Committee observedthatthenegotiatedtransactionwithanexistingstrategic shareholder reflects a premium over the historical average price, underscoring both thestrategicimportanceof the transaction and the safeguardsputinplacetomitigatetheriskofundervaluation.
483.TheJointCommitteeconcludesthat thefinalnegotiatedpricereflectsa premiumoverrecentmarkettradinglevelsandalignswithsubsequent marketmovements.Nevertheless,it stressesthattimelydisclosureofpricing assumptions and independent fairness confirmations remain essentialto protecting public interest, reinforcing accountability,and maintaining investorandstakeholderconfidenceinfuturedivestitures.

5.3BuyerIdentification

484.TheJointCommitteenoted theconcernsraisedbymembersofthepublic regarding whether alternative strategic investors,either Kenyan or international,wereconsidered beforeselecting VodacomGroupas the strategicbuyerforthesharesinSafaricomPLC.TheJointCommitteealso reflectedonwhetheracomparative assessmenthadbeenundertaken to

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

determineifotherpotentialinvestorscouldhavedeliveredsuperiorfinancial orstrategicvaluetotheGovernment.
485.Inevaluatingtherationaleforselecting VodacomGroup,theJoint minimizesexecutionrisk,preservesmarketconfidence,andavoidspotential influentialshareholder.TheJointCommitteefurthernotedthatalternative disposalmethods,includingaPublicOffering,couldhaveexerteddownward pressure on the share price due to increased market supply and market volatility,therebypotentiallyreducingthevaluerealizedbytheGovernment.
486.Additionally,theJoint Committee consideredthecross-listingmethodas another possible option.However,itwas observed that cross-listingwould have exposure to foreign market volatility and currency risks.Such and create uncertaintyin pricing,therebyundermining the objectiveof maximizingshareholdervalueandensuringtransactioncertainty.
487.TheJointCommitteeisoftheviewthatengagingVodacom Groupas the strategicinvestorprovidedbenefitsintermsofexecutioncertaintyand stability in corporate governance.For future divestitures,the Joint Committeerecommends documenting the rationale for buyer selection, includingtheconsiderationofotherinvestorsandevaluationoftheir proposals,to enhance transparency,strengthen public confidence,and ensureoptimalvaluerealization.

5.42025 DividendsEntitlementClarity

488.TheJointCommitteeobserved thattheSessionalPaperdoesnotclearly specify entitlement todividends declared for the 2025 financialyear, particularlyifthedivestitureisapprovedandcompletedbeforeSafaricom PLCs-financialyear-end-on31stMareh2026.TheSessionalPaper-also-does notclarifywhetherthetransactionisstructuredonanex-dividendorcumdividendbasis.Theabsenceofexplicitclarificationcreatesuncertainty regardingthefiscalimplicationsandtheeffectivetransactionvalue. Dividendentitlementmateriallyaffectsthenet considerationtothe Governmentandthereforerequirescleardisclosuretoavoidambiguity, unintendedrevenueloss,orpost-completion disputes.
489.UnderSection 142oftheCompaniesAct,Cap486,dividendsdeclaredbya the timeof declaration,unlessthecompany'sarticlesofassociationprovide otherwise.Accordingly,theGovernment,astheshareholderforthefull2025 financialyear,islegallyentitledtoanydividendsdeclaredforthatyear,even

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya ifthe divestiture is completed before the financial year closes.The transactionmustalso clearly specifywhetheritisonanex-dividend(buyer doesnotreceive thedividend)or cum-dividend(buyerreceives the dividend) basis.

490.TheJoint Committeeisof theview that theGovernment shouldreceiveall dividends declared for the 2025 financial year,as it held the shares transaction consideration of KSh.204 billion,which does notinclude the 2025financialyeardividends.

5.5NationalSecurity

491.TheJointCommitteenotedthatSafaricomPLCprovidescriticalservices essentialfornationalsecurity.Itsnetworksandplatformssupport governmentcommunications,payments,andfinancialflows,whicharevital for thefunctioningofpublic services and the stabilityof the economy.MPESA,for instance,serves over 32 million active users and accounts for approximately95percentofretailpaymenttransactionsinKenya,making Safaricom'sinfrastructuresystemicallysignificant.
492.TheJointCommitteefurtherobservedthatunderSection4oftheComputer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act,Cap 79C,Safaricom PLC,as an owner and operatorofcriticalinformationinfrastructure,isrequiredtoreportany imminent threatstoitsinfrastructuretotheNationalComputerand Cybercrimes Co-ordinationJoint Committee(NC4).NC4,in turn,reports to mitigatethreats.Theintendedpartial divestiturewillnotlessen Safaricom PLC'sroleorobligationsandwillhavenonegativeimpacton theprotection ofcriticalinformationinfrastructure.
493.TheJointCommitteeisoftheviewthatthedivestitureshallnotcompromise thesecurityandresilienceofSafaricomPLC'snetworks.Safeguardsmustbe maintainedtoensureuninterruptedoperationsand protectionof systemicallyimportantinfrastructurecriticaltonationalstability.

5.6Digital Infrastructure and Data Sovereigntyy

494.TheJoint CommitteeobservedthatSafaricom'sdigital infrastructure, s financial ecosystem.Public concerns have been raisedregarding data sovereignty,specificallytheriskthatsensitivecitizeninformationcouldbe exposed tooffshoreprocessing orforeignjurisdictional control.

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

495.TheJointCommitteeemphasized thattheprincipleofdatasovereigntywill continuetobeupheldfollowingthedivestiture.Digitaldatageneratedby Safaricomwillremain subjecttoKenyanlaw.Specifically,Article31(c)and (d)of the Constitution,which guarantees theright toprivacy,and theData ProtectionAct,2019,which governs theprocessingof personal data and sets outtherightsofdatasubjectsandobligationsofdatacontrollersand processors,will continue to apply.Compliance with these laws,alongside Sections 25,26,and41of the Data Protection Cap 411C,ensures that citizendataremainsprotectedunderKenyanjurisdiction.
496.TheJointCommitteealsonotedthattheSessionalPaperdoesnot comprehensivelyaddress binding datalocalisation safeguards,but emphasizedthatSafaricom'sobligationsunderexistinglawwillnotbe diminished.TheJointCommitteeisoftheviewthatwhilethepartial divestiture willalter shareholding structures,it must not compromise compliancewithdataprotectionlawsorthesecurityofnationaldigital infrastructure.Bindingmeasuresshouldbeinplacetosecurecriticaldata, maintain service continuity,and protect national interests,thereby preservingpublictrust andmitigatingtheriskof foreigninterference.

5.7 Legal and Constitutional Frameworks

497.TheJointCommitteenotedthattheproposeddivestitureofSafaricomPLC Section 87A of the Public Finance Management(PFM) Act,Cap 412A, providesthelegalbasisfortheGovernmenttodivestsharesinstate corporations,ensuring that such transactions are conducted with transparency,accountability,andvalueformoney.
498.TheJointCommitteefurtherobservedthatthisdivestitureofGovernment SafaricomPLCsharesdoesnotfallunderthePrivatizationAct,2025,as Section 4ofthe Act-explicitly-excludescertain-transactions,including-the saleofgovernmentsharesinagovernment-linkedcorporationinaccordance withthePFMAct,saleofsharesinthesecondarymarket,rightsissuesto existingshareholders,balancesheetreorganisationsthatmaydilutepublic shareholding,and salesbypublicfundsor countygovernments.Thislegal framework,therefore,allowsfor partialdivestiturewhileenablingthe Government toretaina strategic stake,maintain influence over corporate governance,and safeguardnationalinterests.

5.81 Business Continuity and Shared Prosperity

499.TheJointCommitteenotedthatSafaricom's shared-prosperitybusiness modeldependsonitsextensivedealernetworkandagentecosystem,which

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPICbyGovernmentofKenya supportsover855,0o0directemployeesandmorethantwomillionphysical Biasharaoutlets.Thesepartnersareessentialto thesmoothfunctioningof thepayments ecosystem and thebroaderfinancialinclusion agenda,asthey rely on predictable commissions,tariffs,and long-term business continuity tomakesustainedinvestments.

500.TheJoint Committeeobserved thatanydisruption to thebusinessmodel, including changes to tariffs,commission structures,or service delivery, could negativelyimpactboth dealers andconsumers.Protecting dealer networks,ensuring fair and transparent pricing,and maintaining reliable confidenceindigitalfinancialservices.
501.Inthisregard,theJoint Committeeemphasized thecontinuedrelevanceof the ConsumerProtection Act,Cap501,which prohibitsunfair,misleading, orexploitativeconductandprovidesmechanisms for consumerredress. CompliancewiththisAct ensuresthatconsumersofessential digital financial services,includingM-PESA,areprotectedagainstunfairpractices, enjoy transparent fees,and have access to effective complaint-handling mechanisms.
502.TheJointCommitteeisoftheviewthattheSharePurchaseAgreementand dealer networks,uphold fair tariffs,and maintain the shared-prosperity businessmodel.Thesemeasureswill safeguard business continuity,protect both consumers and partners,and ensure that the socio-economicbenefits andcommunities.

5.9PaymentinLieu ofFutureDividends

503.TheJointCommitteenoted thattheSessionalPaperrefers toanupfront paymentofKSh.40.2billionbyVodacominsteadoffuturedividendsonthe Government'sresidual20percentshareholding.
504.Regardingtherationalefortheamount,theJointCommitteeobservedthat negotiationsfortheupfrontdividend appeartohaveconsidered theresidual valueofthe20percentGovernmentshareholding,thepremiumoffered by Vodacom,and timingconsiderationsfor cashflow.Questionsremain asto why the figure was set atKSh.40.2billion.The Committee also noted that theGovernmentwillhave torepayKSh.55billioninsixyearsforfuture dividendsontheresidual 20percentshareholding.
505.TheJoint Committeefurther noted that theupfront dividendprovides immediatefiscalbenefits,includingliquiditytofundstrategicinvestments,

JointReportoftheDepartmentalCommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationontheConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya supportgovernmentprograms,andstrengthen cashflowmanagement.In addition,theanalysisshows thatreceivingKSh.40.2billion todayand repayingKSh.55billioninsixyearsimpliesafundingcostof5.6percentas thefuturevalueofKSh.40.2billion,whichisbelowthe11.3percent sovereignyieldforthesametenor.

506.On a present-value basis,KSh.55 billion,discounted atmarketrates,is worthapproximatelyKSh.29.3billiontoday,yettheGovernmentwould receiveKSh.40.2billion,representing aKSh.10.9 billion gain in favour of theGovernment.Lookingforward,if theKSh.40.2billion wasinvested at marketrates;itwouldgrowtoroughlyKSh.75billioninsixyears,meaning theproposedrepaymentofKSh.55billionisKSh.20billionlowerthan the fairfuturevalue.Inthistransaction,Vodacomiseffectivelyforegoing approximatelyKSh.20billion that it wouldotherwisehaverealizedat prevailingmarketrates.
507.Further,theJointCommitteeobserved that,basedonthestrongfinancial performanceandgrowthtrajectoryofSafaricomPLC,whichremainsoneof the best-performing telecommunications companies in the region,the projectedKSh.55billioncouldpotentiallyberealizedevenbeforethelapse ofthesix-yearperiod.
508.TheJointCommitteeconcludesthattheproposedupfrontdividendfavors the Governmentboth from present-value and future-value perspectives, providingimmediatefiscalresourceswhileensuringthattherepayment obligationisbelow themarket-determined costof funds,making the transactionfinanciallyadvantageous.

5.10 Ring fencing and Use of Divestiture's proceeds

509.TheJoint Committeeobserved thatthe proceeds fromthe transaction, estimatedatapproximatelyKSh.244.2billion,areintendedtobering-fenced exclusivelyforinvestmentincommerciallyviableinfrastructureprojects, including energy, transport, water, as well as airports and seaports. This ensures that theresourcesgeneratedfrom thedivestiturearedirected towardprojects thatpromotelong-term economic growth andnational development.
510.TheJointCommitteeobservedthattheproceedswillprioritizeprojectsthat are commerciallyviableand basedon nationaldemand,support the completionofongoinginitiatives,andremainsubjecttooversightbythe National Assemblyunder theproposedNationalInfrastructure Fund Bill, 2026(BillNo.1of 2026).Thisapproach reinforces accountabilityand ensures that the funds are used strategicallyto generate tangible developmentoutcomes.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25onthePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

5ll.TheJointCommitteeisoftheviewthatallproceedsarisingfromthe proposeddivestiture shouldbedepositedinto theNationalInfrastructure Fund to ensure transparency,accountability,and their exclusive application towardprioritynationalinfrastructureprojects.

5.11 Commitments by Vodacom and Enforcement in the Share Purchase Agreement

512.TheJointCommitteeobservedthatseveralcommitmentsmadebyVodacom inSessionalPaperNo.3of2025arenotexplicitlyreflectedintheShare SafaricomFoundation,protectionofemployeeredundancyrightsandthe retentionofKenyanleadershipandgovernancestructureswithinSafaricom PLC.WhiletheSessionalPaperindicatesthatthesemeasuresareintended tosafeguard socialimpactinitiatives,maintainoperationalstabilityand ensure leadership continuity,their absence fromthe legallybinding
513.TheJointCommitteenotesthat thesecommitmentsmustbe formally incorporated into the Share Purchase Agreement and where necessary, supportfortheSafaricomFoundationandtheretentionofKenyan leadershipandgovernancestructureswithinSafaricomPLC.Thisincludes clear provisions to uphold the shared-prosperity business model and maintainKenyanleadership andgovernancestructures,which are essential
514.TheCabinetSecretaryoftheNationalTreasuryshouldensurethatallsocial, operational,andgovernancesafeguardsoutlinedintheSessionalPaperare legally binding in the Share Purchase Agreement.Doing so will protect employees,dealers,partners,and communities,maintain stakeholder confidence,andsecure thelong-term socialandeconomicbenefitsofthe transaction.Binding and,wherenecessary,amending these commitments intheagreementwill alsoreinforceaccountability,providelegalrecoursein case ofnon-compliance,and strengthenpublicconfidencein the divestiture process.

CHAPTERSIX

6COMMITTEERECOMMENDATION

515.TheJointCommittee,havingconsidered theSessionalPaperNo.3of2025 on Partial Divestiture of Safaricom PLCbythe Government of Kenya, RECoMMENDthat pursuanttosection 87(A)of the Public Finance Management Act,Cap.412A,the House ADoPTs theReportof theJoint CommitteeontheconsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2025on PartialDivestitureofSafaricomPLCbytheGovernmentand
(1).REsoLVEsTHAT,pursuanttoprovisionsofsection87(A)ofthePublic Finance Management Act, Cap. 412A,the House APPROVES the SessionalPaperNo.3of 2025onPartialDivestitureof SafaricomPLC by the Government of Kenya;and
(2).FURTHER,RESOLVESasfolloWS-

Effective date;

I. Theeffectivedatefortheapprovalshallbe1stApril,2026orsuch later date whenall regulatory approvals that form condition precedentinparagraph4.1oftheSharePurchaseAgreementshall havebeenobtained.
II. The Cabinet Secretaryfor the National Treasuryshall upon inparagraph4.1oftheSharePurchaseAgreementundertakeand completethetransactionthroughtheBlockTradePlatformofthe NairobiSecuritiesExchange.

Upfront payment to be made in lieu of future dividends;

III. TheGovernmentofKenyashallreceiveKenyashillingsFortybillion and twohundredmillion(KSh.40.2B)asupfrontpaymentinlieuof futuredividendsontheresidualtwenty(2o)percentshareholding aspertheDividendPurchaseAgreement.

Proceeds to bepaid into the National Infrastructure Fund;

IV. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Share Purchase Agreementand theDividendPurchaseAgreement,theproceedsof thedivestitureshallbepaidintotheNationalInfrastructureFund.

No redundancy ofexisting staff;

V. Tosafeguardagainstlossofjobsforexistingstaff,thereshall beno acquisition-relatedredundanciesinSafaricomPLC.

JointReportoftheDepartmental CommitteeonFinanceandNationalPlanningandtheSelectCommitteeon PublicDebtandPrivatizationon theConsiderationoftheSessionalPaperNo.3of2O25on thePartial DivestitureinSafaricomPLCbyGovernmentofKenya

Preserve the existing business model with Safaricom PLC dealers, agents and other business partners;

VI. The Cabinet Treasuryfor theNational Treasury shallensure that, within ten(10)yearsofthe divestiture,there shallbenomaterial change to the current shared prosperity business model in Safaricom PLC thatwillprejudice the existing Safaricom PLC dealers,agents and other business partners.

Signed..

Signed. Hon. Abdi Shurie, CBS, MP Chairperson Select Committee on Finance and PublicDebt&Privatization

Hon.FCPA.Kuria Kimani, CBS,MP

Chairperson Departmental Committee on National Planning

ADOPTION OF THE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND NATIONALPLANNING AND THE SELECTCOMMITTEEON PUBLIC DEBT AND PRIVATIZATION ON THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SESSIONALPAPER NO.3 OF 2025 ON THE PARTIAL DIVESTITURE OF SAFARICOMPLCBYTHEGOK

We,the undersigned Members of the Departmental Committee on Finance and National Planning and the Select Committee on PublicDebt and Privatization do -CH+ hereby append oursignaturesto adopt thisReport today,Monday,2ndFebruary2026.

| | Name | Designation | Signature | |-----|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------| | 1. | Hon.Abdi Shurie,CBS M.P | Chairperson | | | 2. | Hon.FCPA.Kuria Kimani, CBS,MP | Chairperson | | | 3. | Hon.Mrembo Irene Njoki,MP | Vice-Chairperson | | | 4. | Hon.FCPA(Amb.)BenjaminKipkirui Langat, CBS,MP | Vice- Chairperson | | | 5. | Hon.Omboko Milemba,CBS,M.P | Member | | | 6. | Hon.PeterKaluma,CBS,MP | Member | | | 7. | Hon. (Dr). Irene Kasalu, M.P. | Member | | | 8. | Hon.CPA Dr.John Ariko Namoit,MP | Member | | | 9. | Hon.Kwenya,Thuku Zachary,M.P. | Member | | | 10. | Hon.Andrew Adipo Okuome,MP | Member | | | I1. | Hon.Muiruri Muthama Stanley MP | Member | | | 12. | Hon.FCPA.Joseph Maero Oyula,MP | Member | |

| | Hon.Abdi,AliAbdi,M.P | Member | 13. | |-----|-------------------------------------|----------|-------| | | Hon.David Mwalika Mboni,MP | Member | 14. | | 15. | Hon.Aden Daud,EBS.M.P | Member | | | 16. | Hon.Chiforomodo Munga Mangale,MP | Member | | | 17. | Hon.Barongo,Nolfason Obadiah,MP | Member | | | 18. | Hon.(Dr).Daniel Manduku,M.P. | Member | | | | Hon. Chege Njuguna, M.P | Member | 19. | | | Hon.CPA.Julius K.Rutto,MP | Member | 20. | | | Hon. Joseph Makilap, M.P. | Member | 21. | | | Hon.Umul Ker SheikhKassim,MP | Member | 22. | | 23. | Hon.(Dr.) Shadrack Mwiti Ithinji,MP | Member | | | 24. | Hon. Paul Kibichiy Biego, MP | Member | | | 25. | Hon.BettyN.Maina,MP | Member | | | 26. | Hon.Kirwa, Abraham Kipsang, M.P. | Member | | | 27. | Hon.Letipila,Dominic Eli,M.P. | Member | | | 28. | Hon. George Sunkuyia Risa, MP | Member | | | 29. | Hon.(CPA).Suleka H.Harun,M.P. | Member | | | 30. | Hon.Mohamed Soud Machele,MP | Member | |

REPUBLICOFKENYA

13THPARLIAMENT NATIONALASSEMBLY-FIFTHSESSION-2026

PUBLICDEBTANDPRIVATIZATIONCOMMITTEEMEMBERS.

ADOPTIONSCHEDULE

JOINT REPORT ONTHECONSIDERATIONOF THESESSIONAL PAPERNO.3ONTHEPARTIALDIVERSTITUREINSAFARICOM PLCBYTHEGOVERNMENTOFKENYA.

SITTING

VENUEM!MICHAmBRR,.CoU.rU! TA,MP

| No. | NAME | SIGNATURE | |-------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------| | 1. | The.Hon.Abdi Shurie CBS,M.P- Chairperson | | | 2. | The.Hon.Mrembo,Irene Njoki,M.P.- Vice-Chairperson | | | 3. | The.Hon.Omboko Milemba,CBS,M.P. | | | 4 | The. Hon. (Dr). Irene Kasalu, M.P. | | | 5. | The.Hon.Kwenya,Thuku Zachary,M.P. | | | 6. | The.Hon.Muiruri,MuthamaStanley,M.P | | | 7. | The.Hon.Abdi,Abdi Ali,M.P. | |

| No. | NAME | SIGNATURE | |-------|----------------------------------------|-------------| | 8 | The.Hon.AdenDaud,EBS.M.P | | | 9. | The.Hon.Barongo, Nolfason Obadiah,M.P. | | | 10. | The. Hon. Chege Njuguna, M.P. | | | 11. | The.Hon.(Dr)Daniel Manduku,M.P. | | | 12. | The.Hon.Kipkoros,Joseph Makilap,M.P. | | | 13. | The.Hon.Kirwa,Abraham Kipsang,M.P | | | 14 | The.Hon.Letipila,Dominic Eli,M.P. | | | 15 | The.Hon.(CPA) Suleka H.Harun,M.P. | |

CI+ACHAMACHAGR CommitteeClerk

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Report On Consideration Of Sessional Paper No. 3 Of 2025 On Partial Divestiture In Safaricom

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

JOINT REPORT ON:

Published by:

TABLEOFCONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

1.0 PREFACE

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Establishment and Mandate of the Departmental Committee on Finance and National Planning

CHAPTER ONE

1.2.1 Committee Membership

Chairperson

UDA Party

Vice-Chairperson

UDA Party

Members

ODM Party

UDA Party

ODM Party

ODM Party

WDM Party

UDM Party

ODM Party

UDA Party

1.2.2 CommitteeSecretariat

Principal Clerk Assistant II /Head of Secretariat

1.3 Establishment and Mandate of the Select Committee on PublicDebt and Privatization

1.3.1 Committee Membership

CHAIRPERSON

VICE-CHAIRPERSON

Jubilee Party

ANC Party

Wiper Party

Jubilee Party

Jubilee Party

ODM Party

1.3.2 CommitteeSecretariat

Senior Fiscal Analyst / Clerk Assistant

CHAPTER TWO

2.O OVERVIEW OF THE SESSIONAL PAPER NO.3 OF 2O25 ON THE PROPOSED DIVESTITURE IN SAFARICOM PLC BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA

2.0 Background

2.1Role ofParliament in ConsiderationofSessional Papers

2.2 Performance of Safaricom PLC:Company Profile and Shareholding Structure

2.3 Trend in Share Prices Since Inception

2.4 ReviewofSafaricom PLC'sHistorical FinancialPerformance

2.5 Trend in Government Revenues from Dividends

Table 4:Shareholders'Dividend Trends Over the Years

2.6Importance of Partial Divestiture in Relation to Safaricom PLC

SESSIONALPAPER

3.1THENATIONALTREASURY

CHAPTER THREE

3.1.1 Safaricom Shareholding

3.1.2 Basis of the Divestiture Route-Existing Strategic Investor

3.1.3Valuation

3.1.3.1 Valuation-Comparatives with similar Businesses

3.1.3.2Valuation-MarketValuation Approaches

I. EV/EBITDAMultiples

II. P/EMultiples

3.1.3.3 Valuation-Income Approaches

3.1.4NegotiationOutcome

3.1.5 Dividendspaid in Advance

3.1.6 Costs

3.1.7Divestiture Structure

3.1.7.1 Benefits of the proposed Divestiture

3.1.7.2 The specific benefits of the partial divestiture include:

3.1.8Economic Imperatives

3.1.9 Deepening our Capital Markets

3.1.10 ValueRealization

3.1.12 Continued growth and Investmentby Safaricom PLC

3.2CAPITALMARKETAUTHORITY(CMA)

10l.CMArecommended thefollowing:

3.3 NAIROBI SECURITIES EXCHANGE (NSE)

104.TheStakeholdermaderecommendationsasfollows:

3.4COMPETITIONAUTHORITY OF KENYA(CAK)

3.5COMMUNICATIONAUTHORITYOFKENYA(CA)

3.6 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENYA(AG)

3.7CENTRALBANKOFKENYA(CBK)

3.8OFFICEOFTHEDATAPROTECTIONCOMMISSIONER

3.9OFFICEOFTHEAUDITORGENERAL(OAG)

3.10PUBLICPROCUREMENTREGULATORYAUTHORITY(PPRA)